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Abstract 
In this thesis we are going to examine the problem of the Overhuman 
[Übermensch] in the work of German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. The 
Overhuman is a subject the notoriety of which far exceeds its careful 
treatment by Nietzsche’s commentators. Nietzsche’s mistreatment by the 
Nazis, the simplistic association of the term with Hollywood phantasies, as 
well as the large number of issues that the term covers, are some of the 
reasons for the relative obscurity of the term. On our part, we are going to 
investigate our subject by examining a broad array of issues and problems 
that Nietzsche wishes to address through the use of the term Overhuman. We 
are going to argue that, following the demise of various humanist ideologies in 
the West (all united under the all-powerful signifier of a transcendent God), 
man faces the challenge of having to justify his existence on earth solely by 
the utilization of immanent reasons, an event perhaps unprecedented in 
human history. Nietzsche tries partly to exemplify and partly imagine an earth 
that is going to be man-made and the various challenges and problems that 
this process is going to entail. We will argue that the term Overhuman refers 
to a process whereby man rediscovers an immanent culture and the new rules 
according to which life on earth is to take place; we are also going to examine 
the new political order which is going to replace the old one, which for the 
most part produced man as a docile animal, unable to stand up for his own 
rights and demands. Furthermore, we will examine the extent of the 
interconnection between the human and the Overhuman, an issue of the 
highest importance for Nietzsche. Finally, we are going to argue for a 
different, non-productive understanding of time that the Overhuman 
inaugurates and humanity is in desperate need for. Our thesis will argue for 
the centrality of the notion of the Overhuman in Nietzsche’s work; indeed we 
will argue that this is Nietzsche’s most persistent and most widely researched 
problem, and we are going to argue that without an, as much as possible, 
holistic examination of Nietzsche’s philosophy, the researcher will be either at 
a loss to understand Nietzsche’s Overhuman as problematic, or he will be 
destined to drive himself to wrong conclusions. Our thesis will show the 
extent of the challenge that Nietzsche’s thinking poses to Western culture and 
that any further cultural development of the human is unimaginable without 
modern humanity first facing the issues that Nietzsche has raised through his 
conception of the Overhuman. 
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                                   É que um mundo todo vivo tem a 
força de um Inferno. 
                            ‘Because a world fully alive, it 
would have the power of hell.’ 
              Clarice Lispector, A paixão segundo G.H. 
 
 
Someone, you or me, comes forward and says: I 
would like to learn to live finally. 
Finally but why? 
To learn to live: a strange watchword. Who would 
learn? From whom? To teach to live, but to whom? 
Will we ever know? Will we ever know how to live 
and first of all what “to learn to live” means? And 
why “finally” 
                            Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introducing Overhuman Thought. 
 
Among other activities a Sunday visit to the zoo is an ordinary event in the life of every 
family in the West (and beyond). Children and parents alike expect to get a glimpse of the 
natural life of beasts and plants, to learn about the diversity of nature and wonder at the many 
similarities between human and non-human animals
1
. Throughout the 19
th
 century and up to 
the beginnings of the 20
th
, European families flocked to the zoos in order to learn something 
about the life of the beasts in conditions resembling those of their natural environment. There 
is a twist in the story though. The kind of zoos very popular in those years were human zoos, 
zoos where human animals were exhibited much to the excitement, and sometimes the utter 
disgust, of the spectators, the average European family. In a series of exhibitions from the 
beginning of the 19
th
 century to the 1930’s when the decline of the human zoos began, 
thousands of people (Zulus, Indians, Nubians, and others) were forcibly removed from their 
natural environments and placed in zoos where they were exhibited, among non-human 
animals, for the satisfaction of the curiosity of the European families in the age of the 
Empires
2
. The two great centres of human zoos were naturally Paris and London, where 
people from their colonized territories (Africa for France and India for Britain) got imported 
and exhibited in zoos for the obvious reason of demonstrating the utter necessity of civilizing 
                                                             
1 With the exception, of course, of various religious groups.  
2 On the subject of the human zoos please see: Blanchard, Pascal (ed.). Human Zoos – Science and Spectacle in 
the age of Colonial Empires. Teresa Bridgeman (trans.) Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. 2008  
to live is to betray your God: every life-act, 
every act that affirms we are living beings; 
requires the violation of your God’s 
commandments;  
Carlos Fuentes, The death of Artemio Cruz 
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the exhibited ‘beasts’. The logic underlying the existence of the human zoos is the logic of 
colonialism itself. The savage, which lives in a pre-civilized state, has to be civilized i.e. 
humanized, to be brought from a state of animal condition to the life of the civilized humans. 
The civilized West has the moral obligation to humanize the world of wild human-animals 
since to be (fully) human is to belong to what is properly human, i.e. to culture and not to 
what belongs to the animal, i.e. to nature. This strict dichotomy between culture and nature 
was pursued with ‘religious’ fervour among the civilized West, sometimes leading to 
atrocities such as that of colonization and the extinction of local cultures, to racism and the 
extremes of 20
th
 century such as eugenic programs and mass exterminations of (the 
perceived) ‘defective stock’. However, the culture/nature dichotomy is also a normal part of 
the education of every civilized European. To be (fully) human in the West is to exist within 
the bounds of ‘civilized’ manners coming down to us today through a long process of training 
and education
3. Every boy and girl of a ‘good’ family learns from a young age that the use of 
cutlery is ‘civilized’ behaviour and to eat with your hands is to live the life of animals. 
Equally, every boy and girl of a ‘good’ family knows not to spit on the floor, not to speak 
with the mouth full, to control (all of) his/her bodily functions etc. To do otherwise is to 
depart from the life of the humans and to embrace the (perhaps) free and enjoyable yet 
animal, and thus despicable, unworthy of the humans, life of savages and (non-human) 
animals. 
Western humanity is accustomed through millennia of history to define the human through its 
relation to a transcendent deity who guarantees the special relation of the created (human) 
and the Uncreated (God). Through this relation humans have acquired a privileged status in 
creation. Their mission is to “multiply and fill the earth.”4 So long as this bond remains 
strong humans will remain participators in divine nature and human history, in the words of 
Athanasius of Alexandria, will be a grand project of theopoiesis.
5
 What happens, though, 
when this bond brakes? From the Age of Enlightenment onwards the West has, for the first 
time in its history, consciously and systematically undermined the conditions that made 
possible the human’s dependence on a transcendent deity. Humans have become increasingly 
independent and the source for the meaning of their short sojourn upon earth has been moved 
                                                             
3 Norbert Elias has explored this process in his classic: Elias, Norbert. The Civilizing Process. Edmund Jephcott 
(trans.) Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 2000.  
4 The Bible – English Standard Version. ESV Bible. The German/English Parallel Edition. Illinois: Crossway & 
Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, Genesis: 9:1 
5 On the issue of salvation and deification see: McGrath, Alistair. Christian Theology – An Introduction. Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 2011, pp. 315-347 
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from the deity back to the human. Nietzsche is clear: “There was never a greater deed – and 
whoever is born after us will on account of this deed belong to a higher history than all 
history up to now!”6 Far from being a time of celebration, the human’s increased 
independence marks for Nietzsche the time of the greatest responsibility. Indeed it is a time 
when one loses one’s orientation as all the old certainties collapse behind one. How is one to 
live after the death of God? And more importantly perhaps, who is the human when the 
ultimate guarantor of his humanness has been taken out of the picture? Who is the human 
when all transcendental presuppositions have been removed and when all that remains is the 
fluidity of human history? This is the question to which Nietzsche dedicates his life, and 
tracking this trajectory is the purpose of this work.  
Since the space of God has been emptied, the only source of meaning with regard to the 
human condition is to be derived through a long process of re-naturalization of the human 
animal. Humans have to learn to be modest: “We have stopped deriving humanity from 
‘spirit’, from ‘divinity’, we have stuck human beings back among the animals.”7 Nietzsche’s 
naturalistic programme aims to show that all formerly transcendental faculties of the human 
animals are in reality nothing but loci of the competing instincts and forces within 
organisms.
8
 Their purpose of development was not a gift from some deity with which humans 
will come closer to God but rather a by-product of evolution which helped weaker creatures 
to survive
9
. Equally, on a macro-level Nietzsche will investigate the many ways that humans 
constitute themselves through their cultures. Nietzsche’s GM is hence a story of how a 
culture constitutes what we have come to call ‘the human-animal’ as opposed to ‘non-human 
animals’. Nietzsche places particular importance on the theory and history of culture(s) 
because it is culture that has taken the space of transcendental explanations relating to the 
human. From now on it is culture that ‘makes’ humans; to the investigation of this topic 
Nietzsche has dedicated the most considerable part of his productive life, from his early 
affiliation to Wagner up to his late concerns about the harmful effects that German diet has 
on spiritual matters in EH. But although culture is the new privileged space of the humans, 
Nietzsche will come to question the specific course that a certain culture has taken and the 
type of humans that this culture has come to produce. Throughout his oeuvre Nietzsche has 
confronted the question of how a culture has to constitute itself in order to produce the type 
                                                             
6 GS: 122 
7 AC: 14, D: 49 
8 GS: 333, 354. WP: 387. KSA: 13:11 [310], AC: 14, BGE: 268 
9 See Cox, Christoph. Nietzsche – Naturalism and Interpretation. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
1999, pp. 71-86  
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of humans that it will inevitably produce. But as Europeans we are in the grip of the dominant 
culture of the West which is the by-product of the two enormous forces of Greece and 
Judaism. Christianity becomes Nietzsche’s principle enemy since it encapsulates a movement 
of decadence (from Socrates to the Judaic priest) that has hampered the development of 
humanity and has forced it to concentrate on the kind of development prescribed by it by the 
dominant forces reigning in the West whereas other forces, which are certainly present in 
humans, have been forced to remain latent. To borrow a well-known term from Marcuse, the 
problem of Western culture is that it produces a one-dimensional man instead of a multi-
dimensional humanity which for Nietzsche is possible (at least as experiment)
10
. But how did 
such a crooked way become possible and how did perversity itself come to be called 
normality?  
Nietzsche puts forward a rather provocative idea according to which the seed of destruction 
was imported to the Hellenic world by Plato, an exemplary anti-Greek in matters of culture
11
. 
Nietzsche takes seriously the legend according to which Plato was educated in Egypt, and he 
considers this an event which was to have enormous consequences in the history of culture. 
Plato achieves two things. First, he makes Christianity possible, since he imports from the 
East the notion of the ‘ideal’ which he immediately juxtaposes with the notion of the ‘real’. 
The ‘ideal’ is utilized to ‘save’ humanity from the perceived dangers of the ‘real’, dangers 
which threaten the very foundations of life. In his BT Nietzsche has expressed these dangers 
through the so-called ‘wisdom of Silenus’ which summarizes the perils threatening humanity 
from the prospect of a nonsensical existence
12
. Simultaneously to the genesis of the 
possibility of Christianity, Plato also inaugurates the cultural decadence of the Hellenic world 
which, once fixated on the ‘real’, becomes now hostile to it and perseveres in biological 
existence by investing into a future ‘imagined’ life and existence. In TI: IV, Nietzsche 
describes the process whereby the ‘real’ becomes superfluous through its gradual devaluation 
due to the influence of Christian culture. What was once the possession of a whole culture 
(the Hellenic culture) becomes, through the destructive influence of the East
13
, the privilege 
of the few. The ‘real’ world is accessible not to humanity as a whole but only to those who, 
through the utilization of ascetic practices, will be able to achieve the perfection required by 
the ‘ideal’. Life comes to expect a justification which lies outside life, from an externally 
                                                             
10 BGE: 44 
11 “I find he has strayed so far from all the fundamental instincts of the Hellenes, he is so spoilt by morality, so 
proto-Christian…” TI: What I owe the Ancients: 2 
12 BT: 3 
13 TI: What I owe the Ancients: 3 
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imposed ‘ideal world’, which gradually becomes the only source of justification and thus the 
only source of meaning for life. The result of this long cultural process is the relocation of the 
immanent foundations of life to a transcendent source of meaning which remains nevertheless 
unattained and ultimately unknown. ‘Faith’ replaces inquiry; the ‘ideal’ unknown world 
comes to replace the ‘real’ world which is rendered unnecessary since all meaning has been 
transferred to the ‘ideal’14, but with the abolition of the ‘real’ the ‘ideal’ is rendered 
superfluous as well. In EH Nietzsche explains: “Reality has been robbed of its value, its 
sense, its truthfulness insofar as an ideal world was faked up… The ‘real world’ and the 
‘apparent world’ – in plain words: the fake world and reality…The lie of the ideal has till 
now been the curse on reality; on its account humanity itself has become fake and false right 
down to its deepest instincts – to the point of worshipping values opposite to the only ones 
which would guarantee it a flourishing, a future, the exalted right to a future.”15 It is the 
moment of what Nietzsche calls the ‘shortest shadow’, the moment of the advent of nihilism, 
the withdrawal of all meaning from the world. But the hour of the greatest peril is also the 
time of the greatest opportunity. Either the world is going to be lost or it is going to revitalize 
itself, it is going to offer itself the right to a future. Incipit Zarathustra.  
Zarathustra’s advent describes the end of the West’s principal ideological foundation; that of 
humanism. For our purposes humanism “is the idea by which a constant identification with a 
quasi-mystical universal human ‘nature’ produces great cultural achievements, which serve to 
promote the cohesion of humanity in general.”16 Since the mystical element has been 
removed, human animals have been left without an identification process from which to 
extract their significance. The sort of (transcendental) qualities once identified with the extra-
natural element of man (through grace for Western theology or through inhabiting the same 
ousia with the divine (ὁμοούσιος) for the Eastern Church) have to either be forever lost or to 
pass back to a sort of animal which has been deprived of any transcendental elements.  
But if humanism describes the religious stage in the development of humanity, a stage that 
has largely come to its end
17
, does that mean that an era of post-humanity has to also leave 
behind the long process of the humanization of man which culture is? Nietzsche believed that 
                                                             
14 “with the real world we have also done away with the apparent one!” TI:  How the ‘Real World’ finally 
became a fable.  
15 EH: Foreword, 2 
16 Herbrechter, Stefan.  Posthumanism – A Critical Analysis. London: Bloomsbury. 2013, p. 12 
17 The ‘end of the religious’ or the so-called ‘death of God’ is of course a rather theoretical discussion in the 
West which is based in the erosion of the ideological conditions that made possible such a belief in God. In 
reality God returns to the West through the younger and most virile version of the old monotheisms i.e. Islam.  
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human animals are characterised by a plasticity [plastische Kraft] which allows them to 
develop, to transform, and to incorporate everything foreign and alien so that they can make 
use of it for their cultural evolution
18
. The example here would be the extraordinary power of 
incorporation that ancient Greek culture had which allowed it to welcome foreign elements 
and then transform them to something uniquely Hellenic. The human animal characterized by 
this astonishing plasticity is able perennially to develop into new and unexpected forms and 
types which allow it to embrace an ever-renewed space of experience. In this sense the 
human animal represents something eternally unfinished, a process rather than a definite, 
well-defined reality
19
. Contrary to the phantasies of modern liberalism, which treats every 
anthropomorphic being as fully human, Nietzsche believes that human animals have to 
achieve their humanness and in that respect one never stops becoming human. Humanization 
thus describes the process of becoming-human, which is to say a tautological statement, since 
for Nietzsche the human can be nothing other than a process of becoming-human. Post-
humanity, rather than an era which leaves the human behind it, becomes an era which aims to 
rehabilitate the human, where rehabilitation describes accordingly the process of leaving 
behind the extra-natural features of the human animal and re-inhabiting the natural.  
For this, though, a critique of the values of the West is required, since it is those values that 
are to be held responsible for the decline of ‘man’. Nihilism has been identified by Nietzsche 
as a particularly Western phenomenon
20
. It is the ultimate consequence of Christian morality, 
which has idolized a catastrophic mystical belief in the value of truth over and against un-
truth, which has been devalued and persecuted
21
. Whereas the Western mind works by 
abstractions and exclusions, Nietzsche attempts to revalue the formerly excluded and bring it 
back into light as something worthy and valuable, as something which has something 
important and interesting to say for the humans and to the humans. Revaluation is the long 
process of discovering the terra incognita of the human animal. It is, as Nietzsche notes, the 
prerequisite of every attempt to escape nihilism.
22
 The revaluation of values is thus closely 
linked to the overcoming of the cultural conditions which have made nihilism possible and 
thus Western culture as well. The cultural unity of the triad of Athens-Rome-Jerusalem has to 
be placed under scrutiny and ultimately to be overcome. To be sure, this is a task of titanic 
proportions which only a type of existence other than the human of today, a type of human 
                                                             
18 UM: On the uses and disadvantages of history of life: Section: 1 
19 BGE: 62 
20 WP: 1, KSA: 12:2[127] 
21 GM: III, 27 
22 WP: 28, KSA: 12:10[42] 
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which is the result of the process of the Christian-moral interpretation of the world, could 
possibly achieve. It requires a type of human both more than human, since the human has to 
be overcome, and truly human, since it is only as human that the human can return to itself, 
to the experiment which, in every case, it is. This process and this hope is what Nietzsche 
calls Übermench (Overhuman).  
 
Overhuman adventures. 
 
Unlike other Nietzschean notions (Will to Power, eternal return, perspectivism etc.) the idea 
of the Overhuman has a rather unfortunate and undeserving history. Squeezed between its 
Nazi appropriation and the Hollywood pipedreams for an all-powerful defender of humanity 
the Overhuman is usually treated awkwardly by interpreters as either a sign of something else 
(‘higher’ humans, the end of subjectivity, cultural rejuvenation, critique of morality) or a 
simply unfortunate term which fails to convey anything significant. The vast majority agree 
on seeing the Overhuman as a metaphor for a kind of ‘higher’ humanity which overcomes the 
cultural restrictions of the day, but also for a humanity that manages to concentrate all of its 
creative powers into a creative whole, in order that it can then accomplish a work which 
overcomes the fragmentation of the lives of everyday individuals. For William Salter, an 
early (and unfortunately unacknowledged) master of Nietzschean studies, the Overhuman “is 
a poetic designation for great individuals carried to their utmost human limit”23. Salter pays 
particular attention to the possibility of conceiving Overhuman along Darwinian lines but, 
being an astute reader of Nietzsche, he is quick to dismiss the idea. An early proponent of an 
agonistic Nietzsche, Salter clarifies the necessity for ‘unfavourable’ social conditions that the 
oppositional Overhuman spirit needs in order to flourish
24
. The Overhuman will have a 
fundamentally different valuation of life than the valuation of the “industrial masses (the 
business and working class)” with all of their piety in “industrious habits, fixed rules, 
moderation in all things, settled convictions”. On the contrary, Overhuman life is going to be 
characterised by a life dedicated to “leisure, adventure, unbelief … even excess”25. That 
                                                             
23 Salter, Mackintire William. Nietzsche the Thinker: A Study. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1917, p. 
400 
24 Ιbid. p. 409 
25 Ibid. p. 413 
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importance of the different type of life that the Overhuman needs in order to flourish is going 
to be elucidated in the first chapter of this work. 
In his university lectures in the 1930’s, Karl Jaspers recognizes that the thought of the 
Overhuman is not just a peripheral thought for Nietzsche but rather the very core of his 
thinking. “Nietzsche strives to promote the task of bringing forth the superman with his 
whole thinking.”26 Jaspers, alone among commentators, recognizes the centrality of the 
Overhuman teaching, yet he claims that Nietzsche had not elucidated the precise conditions 
under which the Overhuman can come about
27
. In this thesis we are going to show that 
Nietzsche did show the way toward a possible preparation for those conditions, even if 
explicit proposals are foreign to the Nietzschean oeuvre which ultimately aims at the self-
training and self-education of individuals.  
The case of Walter Kaufmann is a peculiar one. Recognised in Anglo-American circles as the 
pope of Nietzschean studies, his work is more valuable as a testament to the needs of a 
particular society (the ‘modern democratic West’) and a particular era (post-war) rather than 
for its enduring philosophical significance. The need for a Kaufmann interpretation of 
Nietzsche sprang out of the experience of the Nazi over-politicised version of Nietzsche. 
While Nazis made politics the very centre of their (certainly simplistic) reading of Nietzsche, 
the post-war era in its attempt to de-Nazify (and thus also erroneously to de-politicize) 
Nietzsche moved to the opposite extreme. With Kaufmann we witness, then, the genesis of a 
‘Buddha-Nietzsche’, a reading of Nietzsche cut off from its socio-cultural environment, 
aiming solely at the self-enlightenment of individuals through hard work and artistic creation. 
Kaufmann’s Overhuman, then, is someone who achieves self-mastery, a man “who 
overcomes himself, sublimating his impulses, consecrating his passions, and giving style to 
his character”28. The kind of overcoming envisaged by Kaufmann is an overcoming which 
takes place in the individual’s private sphere and does not or cannot be allowed to affect the 
society around it. In Kaufmann’s wake stands the highly influential work of another 
interpreter, that of Alexander Nehamas. Nehamas’ highly aestheticized reading of Nietzsche 
wants the Overhuman to be aware of the flux within which is eternally caught
29
. The 
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Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmitz (trans.) Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 1997, p. 168 
27 Ibid. 
28 Kaufmann, Walter.  Nietzsche – Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
1974, p. 312 
29 Nehamas, Alexander. Nietzsche – Life as Literature. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
1985, p. 158 
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Overhuman is ultimately the one who is devoted to a constant ‘self-overcoming’, since his 
existence is the product of a Heraclitean movement and thus it cannot rest on any certainty. 
However interesting Kaufmann’s and Nehamas’ readings may be, they represent an isolated, 
de-politicised, and thus ultimately, for us, indifferent Nietzsche. In this thesis we will try to 
show that projects such as revaluation, critique of Christianity, modernity, democracy and 
others have real and tangible consequences to life. These consequences signpost a different 
reality toward which Nietzsche’s thinking aims to and do not confine themselves to the 
privacy of ‘self-change’ and the isolation of private goals. A ‘different’ morality clearly 
changes the rules of the game; it does not simply change our private lives. A ‘different’ 
morality produces humans other than the humans that have been produced so far. The de-
politicized, aesthetic reading of Nietzsche aims to downplay the political consequences of his 
teaching. It produces a Nietzsche suitable to modern audiences but not necessarily true to 
himself.  
Richard Schacht sheds further light on the close connection between ‘higher types’ and the 
Overhuman without though associating the latter with the thought of the return as Kaufmann 
had done.
30
  The Overhuman for Schacht, as for the majority of the commentators, represents 
the coming into life of an ideal type envisaged already by Goethe, where the holistic 
development of spirituality and strength will eventually lead to the overcoming of a type of 
civilization perceived as an exclusively taming process
31
. The central question for Schacht 
regards the exact point of differentiation between higher and common types, and while 
Schacht attributes to Nietzsche traces of Lamarckianism, he also recognizes that Nietzsche 
ultimately abandons (biological) Lamarckianism in favour of a process of differentiation 
among humans which is centred on culture and education
32
. Wolfgang Müller-Lauter further 
investigates the matter of the relation between higher types and the Overhuman. For him, 
though, these two types represent two differing realities where the most significant point of 
their differentiation is the connection of the Overhuman to the thought of the return
33
, a 
connection for which the higher humans remain oblivious
34
. Müller-Lauter’s contribution 
consists in clarifying the differing uses of the Will-to-Power by the higher types and the 
Overhumans. While higher types remain victims to an understanding of the Will-to-Power as 
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an infinite empowerment of humans, the Overhuman’s conception of the Will-to-Power 
consists of a constant changing of this power’s goals. While the power of the higher types is a 
power toward something stable and unchangeable, the power of the Overhuman is never one 
but a multiplicity of powers (as well as the counter-powers which constitute them) and an 
infinity of goals. The Overhuman always wills for something other
35
. 
In one of the most influential misinterpretations of Nietzsche’s thought, Martin Heidegger 
understood the Overhuman as the culmination of the process of subjectivisation which 
Western metaphysics ultimately is. Heidegger sees Nietzsche as a thinker of a ‘single 
thought’, the thought of the Will-to-Power which Heidegger, in the most unashamedly 
conservative reading, understands exclusively within the Nazi framework of his time namely 
as power to domination. Heidegger’s power (but not Nietzsche’s) has as a single goal “the 
aimlessness of man’s absolute dominance over the earth. The man of such dominance is the 
Over-man.”36 Understood within a framework of domination Heidegger’s Overhuman 
completes the process of nihilism by conceiving man “as the absolute centre and sole 
measure of beings as a whole
37” and thus also completes a process which starts with Plato 
and culminates in the thought of Enlightenment, a thought which wants man to perennially 
create (and thus also un-create) his values, a process, which as Michael Watts observes, can 
only lead to the total undermining of the very notion of value-positing
38
. Against the 
‘dominant’ power of the Overhuman which seeks to bring the whole of the earth under his 
control Heidegger will suggest a kind of self-abandonment which will liberate humanity from 
its bond to a subjectivizing thought which thinks only under the spell of the will. Not will but 
a release from all willing, into a ‘fundamental attunement’ (Grundstimmung) with the world, 
is to be Heidegger’s mystical suggestion as to the solution to the problem of civilization. 
Heidegger makes two mistakes. Firstly, he conceives the history of philosophy as a process of 
subjectivization, which erroneously thinks it will inevitably culminate to the master of will 
i.e. the Overhuman. But, as we are going to show in this thesis, Nietzsche’s Overhuman is 
hardly a master of this singular thing called will; the Overhuman resembles more the 
dexterous navigator trying within a sea of wills to direct his ship in the direction he prefers. 
Far from being a dominator of the earth, the sovereignty of the Overhuman consists on letting 
things (and him as well) be free, on disconnecting himself from the tyranny of production(s) 
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and results and living a life of pure (self-)consumption
39. Heidegger’s second mistake 
concerns his attribution to Nietzsche of a notion of power which Nietzsche simply never held. 
Because of that, Heidegger had formed a very ‘timely’ portrait of Nietzsche, which has, 
however, little to do with the Nietzsche presented in this thesis. 
In one of the most interesting and fruitful contemplations on Nietzsche’s thought, Italian 
philosopher Gianni Vattimo has claimed that any treatment of Nietzsche’s mediations  
concerning overhuman thought can only pass through the investigation of the problem of 
nihilism, which for him constitutes the most urgent and the most pressing of the problems of 
humanity. Vattimo makes the provocative claim that nihilism is not just the outcome of the 
logic governing ‘Socratism, Platonism, and Christianity’, but rather constitutes the very 
essence of Western civilization. For Nietzsche, the West is nihilistic, since “the emphasis of 
life is put on the ‘beyond’ rather than on life itself – when it is put on nothingness – , then the 
emphasis has been completely removed from life.”40 Vattimo agrees with Nietzsche that 
“nihilism is already there” each time the world is justified by a ‘meaning or a goal’ lying 
outside the world itself.
41
 But what makes the West nihilistic ‘through and through’? Why 
does nihilism constitute the being of the West?  
Vattimo believes that the history of nihilism is inextricably linked to humanity’s inability to 
“break free of the crushing weight of the past”42. From the time of On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History of Life, Nietzsche has attempted to find a way to liberate the 
present from the crushing weight of the past, which devoids both individuals and cultures 
from their creative capacities. Both there and in GM
43
, the cultivation of forgetfulness 
becomes the necessary presupposition of action. Nihilism is linked to the experience of a 
‘historical malady’ which describes the will’s inability to will retroactively, i.e. to influence 
and perhaps change the ‘given’. This fundamental experience, the inability to change the 
given, creates in humans feelings of revenge which then permeate every cultural achievement 
of humanity. Zarathustra describes revenge as “the will’s ill-will toward time and its ‘It was 
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[es war]’”44. The solution to the problem of revenge, and thus also the solution to the problem 
of nihilism, Vattimo believes, will come from the solution to the problem of temporality.  
Vattimo is one of Nietzsche’s interpreters who absolutely link the thought of the return to the 
thought of the Overhuman
45
. Through his reading of On the Vision and the Riddle, he claims 
that the Moment [Augenblick] eternalizes the present by forcing both past and future to 
acquire their meaning from the present moment of decision. Instead of a present crushed by 
the past or dominated by a final future end, the circularity of the Augenblick guarantees the 
infinite value of a ‘pregnant’ present. “Every moment of history becomes decisive for all 
eternity”46. The value of the thought of the return lies in the thought that the present 
moment(s) of a circular time become all equally valuable from the perspective of life. 
Nietzsche’s ‘present’ liberates itself both from the historical malady, the crushing weight of 
the past, and from a linear teleological understanding of time which would imprison the 
human animal within logic of production.  
In the wake of Vattimo’s important contributions, this thesis will also argue for the necessity 
of the connection between the thought of the Overhuman and that of a non-linear 
understanding of time; the prioritization of an eternalized present will be examined in detail 
in the chapter ‘Eternal Return. A Sovereign Thought’. In his essay ‘The Wisdom of the 
Superman’, Vattimo has also stressed the factor of irony and especially that irony which turns 
inwards. Vattimo understands the Overhuman as the principal actor of this irony, since it 
allows the Overhuman to differentiate itself from other actors of a ‘crude’ overhumanity, 
what Vattimo calls ‘mass overman’47. The problem of Overhuman power, the power which 
differentiates the Overhuman from a subject simply exercising power, will be examined in 
detail in our chapter ‘On power’. Vattimo closes this essay by wondering whether his 
understanding of a power-relieved Overhuman might not open the way to a future human 
perceived as ‘a locus of welcoming’ and even a case of the manifestation of Christian caritas. 
On the subject of both irony and caritas, Vattimo is heavily reliant (although he does not 
acknowledge it) on the meditations of Georges Bataille regarding sovereignty. Bataille has 
placed particular importance on both irony and laughter
48
, as well as on something which 
(only superficially) looks like Christian caritas, namely self-sacrifice. The extent of the 
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Overhuman’s willingness to self-sacrifice in relation to the Christian views on the subject 
will be also examined further in our fourth chapter.   
In recent years the traditional awkwardness with which commentators have treated the 
thought of the Overhuman has reached a new peak in the work of what we would call (word) 
fetishists. Daniel Conway
49
, Bernard Reginster
50
, and (to a lesser extent) Laurence Lampert
51
 
have taken a rather strange position which relates the number of appearances of the word 
Übermensch in Nietzsche’s oeuvre with the importance that Overhuman thought had on his 
work. They all conclude that since the (word) Übermensch does not appear frequently on 
Nietzsche’s work, that must indicate the relative unimportance that Overhuman thought plays 
for Nietzsche. To begin with, the fetishists’ observation concerning the limited appearances 
of the word is correct, yet their overall view concerning the unimportance of a notion like that 
of the Overhuman (thought) is certainly not right. This work will show that, on the contrary, 
Overhuman thought was Nietzsche’s lifelong preoccupation and it appears throughout his 
oeuvre behind the investigation of ideas such as a higher humanity, aristocracy, order of rank, 
and even in the thought of the return itself. On his early PTAG, Nietzsche notes: “The task is 
to bring to light what we must ever love and honour and what no subsequent enlightenment 
can take away: great individual human beings.”52 Despite the many twists and turns that 
Nietzsche’s meditations will take through the years, his dedication to the necessity of the 
overcoming of the West’s nihilistic route through the implementation of the reverse cultural 
conditions
53
 that will make the higher possible again remains unaltered. On a note from 1884 
he confesses that: “…the destiny of humanity depends upon the attainment of its highest type” 
and he continues: “From my childhood I have pondered the conditions for the existence of 
the sage, and I will not conceal my joyous conviction that he is again becoming possible in 
Europe – perhaps only for a short time.”54  
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Philology of the Overhuman. 
 
Rather than an isolated term in Nietzsche’s large oeuvre, the Overhuman makes its 
appearance throughout his writings, though disguised behind a large array of terms that 
Nietzsche employs in order to describe an ascending type of life. This is a life that, as it 
becomes richer and more complex, comes to embrace the polyphony of life
55
 against the 
monophony
56
 of morality, a morality which, as Nietzsche describes in GM, is employed to 
endorse the increasing banalization of human history. In what follows we will describe 
Nietzsche’s uses of the term Overhuman and then turn to a brief examination of the various 
terms that Nietzsche uses, at times as synonyms and at times as variations of the main term 
Overhuman. We will argue that Nietzsche’s employment of this large array of terms, which 
all seek to describe a stronger and more inclusive type of human, rather than diminishing the 
importance of his meditations on the Overhuman
57
, increases it to the degree of elevating it to 
his most persistent and omnipresent thought.  
It has been suggested
58
 that Nietzsche derives his term Overhuman [Übermensch] from one 
of Lucian’s satirical texts: Kataplous. While Kaufmann ignores the context of Lucian’s text, 
Babette Babich has recently argued for the influence that Lucian’s text exercised on 
Nietzsche and that a reading of the Overhuman cannot ignore Lucian’s parodic 
ὑπεράνθρωπός. In that text, also translated as Journey into the Underworld, Lucian tells the 
story of the journey to Hades of the tyrant Megapenthes, who, however powerful he was in 
life, now on the way to Hades comes to realize that he is to be stripped from all his power(s) 
and all of his earthly possessions. Babich characterizes the text as “a meditation on vanitas 
and its inevitable reversal”59. Megapenthes is a man of power who makes the humble 
shoemaker Micyllus report that he “thought him a very god” and that, while in life 
Megapenthes seemed “a superman [ὑπεράνθρωπός] thrice-blessed, better looking and a full 
royal cubit taller than almost anyone else”, nevertheless “when he was dead, not only did he 
cut an utterly ridiculous figure in my eyes on being stripped of his pomp, but I laughed at 
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myself even more than at him because I had marvelled at such a worthless creature…”60 
Lucian’s hyperanthropos, then, is a parodic meditation on power and its inevitable loss. 
Babich suggests that “Nietzsche’s Zarathustra also teaches the Übermensch in a parodic 
fashion”, particularly in the later added parodic fourth part of TSZ. For Babich “it is 
characteristic of both Lucian and Nietzsche to mix things up”61, in the sense that everything 
solemn (the tyrant Megapenthes) is to be mixed with the gaiety produced by the reversal of 
his fate. The power of the hyperanthropos comes to be ridiculed in front of the inevitability of 
death and loss.  
As evidenced by the parodic fourth part of TSZ and especially the chapter ‘On the superior 
humans’, where Nietzsche ridicules the superior humans on the basis of taking themselves 
too seriously and thus being unable to understand the significance of personal failure as the 
most valuable part of Zarathustra’s message62, Nietzsche is aware of the simplifications that 
every theory of power is prone to. In this thesis we are going to illuminate this neglected 
aspect of a hyperanthropos who has to learn to laugh, as one always laughs: at himself. While 
Nietzsche never questions power as a constituent part of nature, he believes that brute force 
[Kraft] has to be overcome by something that integrates the other of force and sublimates it 
into something new. This is power proper [Macht].
63
 In the second chapter of this thesis we 
are going to argue that Nietzsche regulates ‘brute force’ by integrating it to agon — which for 
its part is regulated by principles and rules that do not allow power to be expressed in an 
annihilating fashion, something that the Nazi interpretation of power was unable to 
comprehend. In the last chapter of this thesis we are going to discuss Nietzsche’s resistance to 
the productive logic of the West and his ridicule of productive power in favour of 
unproductive sovereignty. In our view, then, the Overhuman mixes solemnity with laughter 
and resists the logic of success in favour of loss, a loss which nevertheless remains sovereign, 
in that it gets elevated into the most valuable experience of life.  
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The Overhuman first makes a shy appearance, as a noun
64
 in plural form, in 1882’s GS: 143. 
In the context of a discussion on the advantages of Greek polytheism, Nietzsche juxtaposes 
the history of morality, which produced and reproduced the ideal of one norm, to Greek 
polytheism, which produced the ideal of a plurality of norms. Nietzsche argues that “the 
invention of gods, heroes, and overmen (Übermenschen) of all kinds, as well as deviant or 
inferior forms of humanoid life (Neben- und Untermenschen), dwarfs, fairies, centaurs, 
satyrs, demons, and devils, was the invaluable preliminary exercise for … the sovereignty of 
the individual.”65 Although in this passage the Overhuman is not granted an individual 
existence, it is the product of sovereign individuals. However, its placement within a reverse 
history of humanity, a history that overturns the one-dimensional development of humanity 
hitherto, sheds light on the use of that concept later by Nietzsche. Indeed, the Overhuman is 
going to express the plurality and synthesis of antithetical forces, rather than exclusions as it 
has done until now in the history of morality.  
The Overhuman makes its first proper appearance in the opening pages of TSZ. As 
Zarathustra introduces himself as the teacher of the Overhuman, Nietzsche makes clear what 
the book is to be about. TSZ describes what the Overhuman is and how humanity could, 
through a process of overcomings, achieve its overhuman potential. Immediately after the 
pronouncement of the subject matter of the book, Nietzsche provides the two preliminary 
fundamental characteristics of the Overhuman: The Overhuman describes a process of 
overcoming (“The human is something that shall be overcome [überwunden].”) and it is 
regarded as the “sense of the earth” [der Sinn der Erde].66 Overcoming is one of the key 
Nietzschean terms. It describes a process where something or someone goes beyond a 
previous state of affairs. Culturally speaking, humanity is called to overcome “those values, 
drives and habits and conditions of our current existence that Nietzsche identifies as having a 
pernicious effect.”67 Katrina Mitcheson rightly points to the connection between Nietzschean 
overcoming and Hegelian sublation [Aufhebung]. To overcome, rather than jumping over 
something and leaving this something behind
68
, actually means to go beyond by transforming 
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the thing left behind. Equally, when Nietzsche calls for the transvaluation [Umwertung] of 
values, he does not urge the abandonment of values but rather their transformation into 
something new
69
. The Overhuman, then, is called to exercise a long series of overcomings 
where new valuations are going to replace the old ones and multiple experiments are going to 
replace the hitherto one-dimensional development of humanity. In this thesis we are going to 
describe the Overhuman in terms of four steps or four overcomings
70
 (cultural, political, 
moral, and temporal) necessary for the disengagement of humanity from its human past and 
embracing of the future. As for the second of the main characteristics of the Overhuman, that 
of its faithfulness to the earth, Nietzsche makes clear
71
 the antithesis between the immanent 
project of the transvaluation of values and through it the preparation for the Overhuman, as 
opposed to the project of the history of morality which aims at the domestication of man 
through his dependence on transcendent presuppositions. Later in TSZ, this post-
metaphysical outlook is expressed by Zarathustra’s pronouncement: “Dead are all Gods: now 
we want the Overhuman to live”72. 
But while in the beginning of the book Zarathustra had introduced himself as the teacher of 
the Overhuman, later in part three, his animals assign to him the new role of the teacher of 
‘eternal recurrence’ which now becomes Zarathustra’s ‘fate’.73 Zarathustra’s preoccupation 
with time makes clear that the two concepts, that of the Overhuman and that of the thought of 
the return, are inextricable. For the Overhuman to be possible, another relation to time and 
‘time’s it was’ has to be established. Productive time, the kind that has produced man so far, 
is not adequate for the birth of the Overhuman. As we will argue in Chapter Four of this 
thesis, man accumulates time so that he can produce things, while the Overhuman wastes 
time so that he can give birth to his sovereignty. The time of the Overhuman is not the time of 
things but the time of the squandering sun, the monstrous energy of the universe. This thesis 
is going to respect Nietzsche’s demand for faith in the real and our view of the Overhuman 
will take place against the momentous event of the assassination of the transcendental 
signifier God and all of its manifestations
74
. Subsequently, this thesis is going to argue for the 
                                                             
69 Mitcheson, Katrina. Ibid p.2-4 
70 The number of course is the result of space restrictions and personal abilities. Ideally, an examination of the 
Overhuman should include the investigation of a very great number of overcomings. But this is a work 
requiring the involvement of a great number of scholars working in collaboration. It is a project then belonging 
to the future.   
71 The rest of the sentence reads: “…and do not believe those who talk of over-earthly hopes” TSZ: 
Zarathustra’s prologue: 3 
72 TSZ: On the Bestowing Virtue 
73 TSZ: The Convalescent 
74 What Nietzsche in GS: 108, calls the ‘shadow’ of Buddha.  
30 
 
rebirth of man in the time of the Overhuman, in the time of the final dispensation of 
accumulative time in favour of the wasteful movement of the future.  
After TSZ, Nietzsche seldom refers to the (term) Overhuman. His most noteworthy mentions 
are to be found in AC and EH. The AC remark is of particular interest. In TSZ Nietzsche has 
made the following claim: “Never yet has there been an Overhuman”75 but in AC he claims 
that “there is a continuous series of individual successes in the most varied places on earth 
and from the most varied cultures; here a higher type does in fact present itself, a type of 
Overhuman [eine Art Übermensch] in relation to humanity in general.”76 Certainly, as 
Nietzsche himself clarifies, TSZ’s Overhuman and AC’s higher type who is ‘sort of 
Overhuman’ are not the same. Yet the fact that Nietzsche characterizes higher types as a ‘type 
of Overhuman’ indicates that both serve the same logic, i.e. that of the enhancement of the 
human animal.
77
 And although in TSZ the Overhuman is specifically linked to the thought of 
the return, the logic within the Overhuman operates far exceeds the limits of TSZ and 
embraces the whole of Nietzsche’s oeuvre. Before developing this idea in the following 
paragraphs, let us mention the other interesting late remark concerning the Overhuman to be 
found in late Nietzsche. 
In EH Nietzsche remarks that his use of the term ‘Overhuman’ is utilized to express his 
opposition to various nihilistic human types like Christians, modern, or simply those 
designated as ‘good’ men. He complains that the readers have misunderstood the Overhuman 
for some kind of idealistic type. In Nietzschean language the ideal (and the type idealistic) 
express mainly a “negation of some aspect of life or of existence more generally” as well as 
“the positing of and probably subordination to some transcendent reality”78. An idealistic 
type is a human type who wishes to ‘escape reality’ by subordinating himself to some 
imagined state (the ‘beyond’79) in which his life will be justified. Nietzsche goes on to 
suggest that the greatest confusion is the association of his anti-idealistic Overhuman with 
Darwinism. Without going into Nietzsche’s tumultuous relation to Darwinism80, let us just 
note that Nietzsche opposes the idea of progress (through the mechanism of natural selection 
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which privileges only the weak
81
) which is supposed to lead to an ultimate telos in favour of 
the natural prodigality of earth and the return to the primordiality of the forces constituting 
the human animal.
82
 While evolution has produced the human animal, an enduring type of 
animal which is solely concerned for the preservation of his species
83
, Overhumanity is to be 
characterised by its profound disregard
84
 for itself and its self-placement in the logic of 
unproduction. 
This thesis argues that Übermensch is one of the versions, one of the multiple faces, of the 
Overhuman. Nietzsche has experimented throughout his life with trying to find a way to 
express the different route that human history is in urgent need of taking. Nowhere does 
Nietzsche express more clearly this deep interrelation between the Übermensch and his 
multiple designations for the Overhuman than in a Nachlass note from 1887. There, he sees 
modern human history as the history of the gradual diminution and dwarfing of man. The 
economic management of the earth is going to lead inevitably to the production of a type of 
human resembling “a tremendous clockwork, composed of ever smaller, ever more subtly 
‘adapted’ gears”. Against this movement, another is needed. Nietzsche uses the words 
Gegenbewegung (counter-movement) and umgekehrten Bewegung (reversed movement). The 
last phrase is of particular interest, since it has been used before, in the remarkable BGE: 44, 
where the task of the philosophers of the future (another of the manifestations of the 
Overhuman) is to reverse the conditions that hitherto have created humanity.
85
 Nietzsche 
makes clear that this counter-movement, by opposing the slave-like masses, aims to produce 
a new type of human. “It aims to bring to light a stronger species, a higher type that arises 
and preserves itself under different conditions from those of the average man. My concept, 
my metaphor for this type is, as one knows, the word ‘overman’ [Übermensch]”86 
Nietzsche’s preoccupation with a higher humanity87 begins already from his student years in 
the prestigious Schulpforta. In his 1862 student essay ‘Napoleon III as President’, he asserts 
that the role of the genius far exceeds that of the rest of humanity and that the genius should 
not be judged according to the laws applying to the rest of humanity. At the time highly 
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idealistic, and in the spirit of Hegel, young Nietzsche believes that the genius is “the final link 
to a chain” a chain which sets apart the genius from the rest of the failing humanity.88 A few 
years later, as a young professor in Basel, Nietzsche writes an important, but never quite 
published, text, PTAG. Here, he attempts to understand early Greek philosophy not in the 
usual dispassionate way of academia, but through insisting that one is to approach philosophy 
as an example of a higher bios, a bios exemplified in “great individual human beings [der 
Große Mensch]”.89 Likewise, the publication, between 1873 and 1876, of the four UM marks 
the culmination of Nietzsche’s early preoccupation with culture as the incubator of 
exceptional human beings. As we will examine in the first chapter of this thesis, Nietzsche 
continuous to view history in a teleological manner where the telos is to be the replacement 
of the species human (the product of the moral history of the West) with individual human 
beings which have turned out best due to favourable conditions. The organized and persistent 
cultivation of these conditions remains the task of culture whereas the aim, the ultimate telos 
of culture, must be the production of grosse Menschen
90
. 
During his middle period, a period characterized by the depth of his psychological 
observations, his (short-lived) faith to the scientific spirit of the Enlightenment, and his 
political moderation, Nietzsche continues to investigate the theme of the meaning of the 
higher and the multiple dichotomies between higher and lower. His focus is now the 
psychological investigation of what constitutes a noble soul (D: 278, 380, GS: 3, HATH: 
206) as well as the investigation of lower forms of human culture as prerequisites of the 
envisaged higher forms (HATH: 224, 246). Characteristically, in HATH (including WS) 
alone there are 51 references in the themes of nobility, higher humanity, and higher cultures. 
Although numbers fall in D (9 references) and GS (8 references), the quality of his 
observations does not. Thus, in the exceptional GS: 3 the noble nature is characterized by 
unreasonableness (the noble succumbs to his drives, he does not follow reason
91
), 
magnanimity, self-sacrifice, incomprehensibility, and impracticality, whereas the common 
nature pursues the safeguarding of the conditions of its self-preservation, an attitude surely 
practical yet certainly not noble.  
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During the last period of his productive life Nietzsche becomes practically obsessed with the 
pursuit of an ascending type of life which will finally produce the synthesizing human of the 
future
92
. Throughout his last writings Nietzsche uses a large array of terms in order to refer to 
this type of human (‘higher men’, ‘new aristocracy’, ‘masters of the earth’, ‘nobles’, 
‘stronger race’ etc.93). These types are not identical. They all express the same willingness to 
reverse
94
 the project of the (self)-subjugation of humanity, but the ways of this reversal are 
multiple. Thus in the last part of BGE, What is noble?, we find the infamous proposal 
concerning the bond between the overhuman future and the establishment of the order of rank 
in society: “Every enhancement so far in the type ‘man’ has been the work of an aristocratic 
society – and that is how it will be, again and again, since this sort of society believes in a 
long ladder of rank order and value distinctions between men, and in some sense needs 
slavery.”95 Certainly assertions like the above contradict Zarathustra’s squandering and self-
sacrificing Overhuman which we are going to describe in the fourth part of our thesis. Yet, 
for Nietzsche, such contradictions are neither accidental nor simply stylistic choices but 
rather the very heart of his project. 
In GM Nietzsche describes in painstaking detail the production of human animals as sick, 
weak, and domesticated animals. The history of humanity becomes the narrative of a long 
history of subjugation and intellectual slavery. Humans have been turned into the type of 
animals that are unable to envisage another future for themselves, a future involving the 
rehabilitation of earth and their terrible naturalness
96. “The ascetic treats life…as an error that 
one refutes through deeds.”97 But there has never been such an error. Humans are in no need 
of repair or improvements of any kind. Nietzsche suggests, and this is the core of our thesis 
as well, that one has to dare
98
 to envisage a future which will embrace the human beyond the 
artificial binaries of the history of morality. “The higher man is inhuman and superhuman: 
these belong together”99. Against the human of the history of morality who is unable to 
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engage the wholeness of his drives and he thus is either the one or the other, the true ‘nobles’, 
the ‘higher men’, the ‘masters of the earth’—in short, the Overhuman—is a synthesis of the 
most contradictory forces. The Overhuman is to incorporate the unruliness and wastefulness 
of nature. He is to be the great synthesising event in the history of the Earth and thus the 
inception of a new civilization upon the Earth.  
 
Identifying the Overhuman. 
 
What we call humanity is the conglomeration of domesticated animals. Because of this, 
humanity matters only to the extent that the investigation of the history of its domestication 
can serve as a valuable lesson toward its overcoming and attainment of a type of human 
which, by developing under the reverse conditions
100
 from those of the present, will 
eventually unfetter a range of possibilities as yet only latent. Humanity’s mystical 
dependence on the divine is over and with that humanity is exposed for what it is: a religious 
prejudice whose time is up, as well as a short episode in a human history filled with man’s 
arrogance. “We do not regard the animals as moral beings. But do you suppose the animals 
regard us as moral beings? – An animal which could speak said: Humanity is a prejudice of 
which we animals at least are free.”101 However, only to the extent that humanity is a story 
about masses and multitudes is it destined to be lost. Nietzsche believes that there is a way in 
which humanity could justify its existence upon earth. This is the production of individual 
exceptional human types
102
. Humanity is justified only through its function as an incubator of 
the exceptional. But Nietzsche sets the problem which will occupy our work: “This more 
valuable type has appeared often enough already: but only as a stroke of luck, as an 
exception, never as willed.”103 Humanity is justified only because types such as Napoleon, 
Alexander, Caesar
104
 or Goethe
105
 were made possible. The question remains whether those 
types could be the conscious and deliberate outcome of a cultural process. Could a culture 
produce on a massive scale, so to speak, exceptional human types? Nietzsche believes that 
this is not possible. The reason, as will be further discussed in Chapter Four of this work, is 
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that the highest represents a complexity which is always on the brink of collapse. “The richest 
and most complex forms…perish more easily: only the lowest preserve an apparent 
indestructability…The higher type represents an incomparably greater complexity – a greater 
sum of co-ordinated elements: so its disintegration is also incomparably more likely. The 
‘genius’ is the sublimest machine there is – consequently the most fragile.”106 In front of the 
brutal strength of the “organized herd instincts”107 of the ‘weak’, those rare plants that are the 
exceptions get defeated. That happens because the ‘weak’ represent brute force [Kraft] while 
the highest are bearers of power [Macht] that has become sublimated
108
. The true sign of 
great human being, Nietzsche contests, is “his victory over strength [Der Sieg über Kraft]”109 
But if the only hope for the justification of humanity is lost, what remains? 
Although Nietzsche does not believe that the massive production of the exceptional is 
possible (or even desirable), it is possible, however, “to will this type of ‘chance’ 
consciously”110; this is the work of culture.111 As Keith Ansell-Pearson notes: “…a culture 
can only lay down the conditions that are favourable to the unpredictable and non-calculable 
lighting-like appearance of unique, singular human beings. Types are hereditary, but then a 
type is not a ‘lucky stroke’, ‘nothing extreme’. The task is to make ‘the scales more delicate 
and hope for the assistance of favourable accidents’”112 A philosophy aiming at the 
educational and cultural preparation of the future ‘masters of the earth’ will then be a 
philosophy which is going to attempt a radical change at the cultural paradigm of the present 
and a philosophy which will reverse
113
 the conditions that have created the current one-
dimensional moral fanatics
114
 of the West. A culture matters to the degree that it opens up the 
future to multiple possibilities and to the degree that it sets individuals free from the bonds of 
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tradition. Nietzsche’s lifelong preoccupation with the thought of the Overhuman was his 
attempt to consider such a future and to contemplate the cultural presuppositions for the 
attainment of such a future. This work is going to follow this Nietzschean path. In what 
follows we will describe the particular socio-cultural conditions that are required for the 
cultivation of this type of human, which comes after current Western/Christian paradigm and 
which Nietzsche calls the ‘Overhuman’. 
Chapter One paves the way for the investigation of the Overhuman condition by looking 
closely at Nietzsche’s understanding of culture and the way with which culture creates the 
conditions for the development of particular types of human animals. The chapter is going to 
clarify the degree to which culture and the thought of the Overhuman are intermingled. While 
one of the aims of every philosophy after Kant is the emancipation of the individual from the 
fetters of its tradition, Nietzsche nevertheless strongly believes that a cultural ideal, like that 
of the Overhuman, will be prepared not only in people’s private spheres but also 
institutionally
115
. A morality is not only our private sense of right and wrong but also the way 
with which a state or a society internalizes this sense and transforms it into laws and rules of 
conduct. These rules then produce individuals accordingly. For this reason a culture becomes 
the battlefield of all agons that have to be fought in the name of the future and Nietzsche, at 
least on his early years and still under Wagner’s influence, treats culture as the privileged 
space of his Overhuman investigations. A typical example of the kind of cultural reversal that 
Nietzsche has in mind is his treatment of the much abused term ‘philosopher’. The chapter 
will clarify the degree of the difference between modernity’s scholar and what Nietzsche 
understands as the commander-philosopher of the future. In a truly Greek fashion, Nietzsche 
places all of his attention on the βίος (bios) of the individual rather than on its έργον (work), 
and makes the former rather than the latter the source of human value. Finally the chapter is 
going to shed light on some popular misunderstandings regarding the conflation of 
posthumanity with recent developments in science and technology. Rather than being 
ahistorical and value-neutral, science is filled with human history’s attempt to improve the 
species by working on its perceived weaknesses
116
. But improvement is an ideological term 
which harbours various attempts from all sorts of groups to direct human development 
toward a prearranged goal. As the latest manifestation of the ascetic ideal
117, science’s 
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dependence on the mystical origins of something called ‘Truth’ reveals the extent of its 
dependence on the current cultural paradigm and thus to the one-dimensional development of 
the human animals which will ultimately lead them to the stalemate of suicidal nihilism. The 
chapter will conclude by arguing that the Transhumanists’ vision of Posthumanity is, rather, 
the opposite of the cultural criticism that Nietzsche seeks as the source of his valuation of the 
Overhuman. The Overhuman will challenge the whole of the history of humanity and thus 
also humanity’s dependence on mystical terms of religious origins.  
Chapter Two will further explore the role of institutions in Nietzsche’s thought and in 
particular will expose Nietzsche’s profound relation to politics. In that respect we are going 
to investigate Nietzsche’s critique of the petty politics of 19th century Europe and his 
subsequent prioritization of a form of politics that he calls Grosse Politik. Nietzsche believes 
that the former form of politics expresses a movement of decadence which through the 
implementation of egalitarian politics aims at the equalization of the value of the human 
while the latter, through the application of the order of rank, aims at the revaluation of 
exceptional forms of life, granting to them special rights which will allow them to flourish. 
For Nietzsche the West has been for too long a victim of a politics of decadence which has 
created only the instinct-less animals of today who are structurally unable to harbour great 
passions and thus also unable to produce great works. However, Nietzsche is not up for easy 
simplifications. In the second part of the chapter we will propose a novel reading of 
Nietzsche’s contribution to politics. Hegelian in origin, perhaps much to Nietzsche’s dismay, 
our reading will suggest that rather than aiming at the implementation of a Kraft
118
-Politik, in 
order to eradicate the conditions that brought about the production of the late-bourgeois, 
Nietzschean politics aim, through our reading of Nietzsche’s unusual understanding of 
Macht, to bring about a state of perpetual conflict whose intention is to upset established 
orders and to introduce an agonistic spirit in modern politics which will realign humanity 
with its antithetical founding forces.  
Chapter Three will be occupied with the examination of On the Genealogy of Morality. 
Genealogy is an exceptional work that charts the psychological history of decadence. It is a 
history of the many ways in which the human animal has been turned into the submissive 
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animal of late modernity. How did this future-oriented animal, which the human is, come to 
refuse its own right to a future of its own creation? Why does the human animal produce and 
reproduce itself constantly in relation to the problem of nihilism and the threat of a 
meaningless existence? Through the investigation of humanity’s psychological constitution, 
Nietzsche finds it exceptionally peculiar that humans have been turned into the docile beings 
they are. There is, Nietzsche detects, an undercurrent of Overhuman forces in this 
psychological history, which have however never been utilized. Paradoxically, Nietzsche 
observes, the conditions of decadence are also the conditions of the overcoming of 
decadence. “The same conditions that hasten the evolution of the herd animal also hasten the 
evolution of the leader animal.”119 Genealogy declares its faith in no clear-cut solutions 
which in any case would be a remainder of the faith of metaphysics in dichotomies. Instead 
the Overhuman’s genealogy reveals a very complex animal that is able, in principle, to 
harbour the most extreme contradictions and yet to “give birth to a dancing star.”120 
In the final chapter we will offer our own distinct contribution to the (embryonic) literature 
on the Overhuman. With the help of the exceptional Nietzschean Georges Bataille, we are 
going to further clarify Nietzsche’s unique conception of the Overhuman as that animal 
which necessarily perishes due to the great level of its complexity and fragility. We are going 
to argue that the perceived superiority of the super/over/Über human, rather than consisting 
in some quality of a brutally perceived strength, consists in the willingness of the Overhuman 
to squander itself not so much due to some moral principle but rather out of a will to realign 
the human with the wasteful movement of the cosmos. Our reading of the thought of the 
return will allow us to relate the thought of the Overhuman to a meta(but also pre)-Christian 
conception of time for which the future is not considered an accumulation of moments in 
need of a final redemption but rather an eternity of moments of infinite value in no need of 
redemption. Finally our perception of a squandering Overhuman will allow us to place 
Nietzsche’s meditations in the context of a suggestion concerning a different way of life. The 
Overhuman is not another abstract thought. It is not to be judged by the usual methods of 
metaphysics. The thought of the Overhuman inaugurates the right to a different life. It is a 
choice about the kind of life you live and also the acceptance of the consequences of choosing 
that life.  
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Nietzsche on the challenges of culture and the illusions of Transhumanity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first part of this chapter will argue for the importance of culture as the womb of the 
Overhuman in Nietzsche’s thought. In SE Nietzsche notes that “mankind ought to seek out 
and create the favourable conditions under which those great redemptive men can come into 
existence.”121 The mention of ‘favourable conditions’ clearly indicates that Nietzsche thinks 
that exceptionality ought to be cultivated by the institutions of society. Nietzsche believes 
that the value of a culture depends on the degree of its dedication to the production of 
individual great human beings. In his early period, more than in the middle or late, Nietzsche, 
under the influence of Wagner, thinks of the Overhuman primarily as a social task. We will 
argue that while Nietzsche idolizes the type of culture which dedicates itself to the production 
of the exceptional, he also criticizes the type of culture which confines itself to the role of the 
(cultural) excuse for bourgeois civility. We will also argue that Nietzsche attempts a 
paradigm shift from the detached study of philosophy to the bios of the philosopher. We will 
show that by shifting the weight from philosophy to philosophers, Nietzsche returns to 
philosophy its subversive role which is largely lost in modernity, while also portraying 
philosophers as precursors of the Overhuman. In the second part of this chapter we will 
examine the movement of transhumanism, one of the most interesting branches of 
posthumanism. We will argue that popular forms of posthumanism are based on 
presuppositions that Nietzsche would never have accepted. Particularly, we will argue that 
Nietzsche would have opposed transhumanism’s unquestioned reliance on the productive 
logic of Christian times, in favour of a circular logic of return to the primordial forces 
constituting the human animal or transhumanism’s understanding of the human problem as a 
problem of technics instead of a problem regarding values. We will show the extent to which 
                                                             
121 UM: Schopenhauer as Educator: 6 
You ‘re on earth, there’s no cure 
for that! 
Endgame, Samuel Beckett 
40 
 
the thought of the Overhuman is to be differentiated from posthumanist illusions seeking to 
bypass the problem of the human by resurrecting religious asceticism in the form of technic.  
 
Culture in Nietzsche’s work. 
 
What is culture? Why do we need it? To begin with, we would like to position Nietzsche’s 
meditations on the modern zoo-political problematic developed by Peter Sloterdijk, for whom 
a culture is to be treated as a zoo or a theme-park (a ‘homeostatic anthroposphere’) in which 
humans voluntarily place themselves, dwell in a truly Heideggerian fashion, whereas this 
voluntary placement calls also for the establishment of rules according to which humans will 
control their environment and subsequently produce themselves
122
. For the most part we 
intend to treat Nietzsche’s meditations on culture within the horizon of Sloterdijk’s 
conception of anthropotechnology, which concerns itself with the various technologies or 
disciplines which produce anthropous (ανθρώπους). Sloterdijk himself defines 
anthropotechnics as follows: “By this I mean the methods of mental and physical practicing 
by which humans from the most diverse cultures have attempted to optimize their cosmic and 
immunological status in the face of vague risks of living and acute certainties of death.”123 
Two terminological clarifications are needed here. Sloterdijk’s mention of ‘practicing’ refers 
to the Foucauldian ‘technologies of the self’, the techniques or practices with which humans 
seek to clarify, interpret and give meaning to the problem of their existence. In the words of 
Foucault, ‘arts of existence’ are: “those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not 
only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change 
themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain 
aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria.”124 In that sense Sloterdijk’s meditations 
on anthropotechnics largely follow, at least in a methodological level, those of Foucault; 
however Sloterdijk distances himself from the (late) Foucauldian project of an 
aesthetisization of existence in favour of the rehabilitation of (the Platonic in origin) thymos, 
a concept used by Sloterdijk both as a methodological tool in service of understanding 
various social phenomena (notably revolutions) and as his own suggestion for the 
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rehabilitation of thymotic practices (Nietzsche’s infinite overcomings) as a way of attacking 
the levelling aspects of modernity. The second terminological clarification refers to the use of 
the word immunology by Sloterdijk. Immunology is indeed the science of the immune 
system. Sloterdijk equates cultures and living organisms and describes them as large 
immunological systems, systems in need of protection and repair.
125
 Thus man’s biography 
becomes the biography of Hommo immunologicus
126
. In what follows we intend to treat 
Nietzsche’s meditations on culture as a long history of anthropotechnology, where humans 
fashion themselves firstly in the way they want, secondly in the way they must do so as 
products of this large immunological sphere that culture is, and finally in the way they have 
to, due to the external threats in their environment. In short, humans are to be treated here as 
animals which produce themselves, are further produced by the disciplines which had 
produced them, and then have to repair themselves from attacks against them. Nietzsche 
indeed understands this immunological aspect of culture. Truly, it is only because of Wagner 
and Wagner’s insistence on the preparation of the future within communities (bubbles, 
spheres) of co-minded revolutionaries that he is able to understand it. But the more he 
distances himself from Wagner, the more Nietzsche comes to question his youthful 
preoccupation with immunology, i.e. with the protection that a culture needs. Later, 
Nietzsche still thinks of humans as products of their products, but the bubble now has burst 
and humans have to expose themselves to various diseases. Two paths lie in front of them. 
They will either live and grow stronger or they will perish.  
In the summer of the remarkable year of 1888, Nietzsche writes: “The high points of culture 
and civilization do not coincide: one should not be deceived about the abysmal antagonism of 
culture and civilization. The great moments of culture were always, morally speaking, times 
of corruption; and conversely, the periods when the taming of the human animal 
(“civilization”) was desired and enforced were times of intolerance against the boldest and 
most spiritual natures. Civilization has aims different from those of culture –perhaps are even 
opposite-”127. This is a remarkable passage for many reasons. To start with, nowhere else in 
his work does Nietzsche make such a clear distinction between culture and civilization. While 
he exhaustively investigates both various culture(s) and various civilizations, he will never 
suggest that there is an ‘abysmal antagonism’ between the two. Moreover, he uses the terms 
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‘culture’ and ‘civilization’ interchangeably or in a completely opposite sense, as in the 
passage from GM: 1.11, where the word culture is used instead of the word civilization as in 
the Nachlass note. In the Nachlass note (1888), civilization describes the gewollten und 
erwugenden Thierzähmung (willed and forced animal training), while in the GM passage, 
culture’s meaning is “to breed a tame and civilized animal, a household pet, out of the beast 
of prey ‘man’”128 There is little doubt that Nietzsche’s texts are experiments in both style and 
thought and that consistency (the will to a system) is not one of his aims. Does that then mean 
that we should not take the above passage seriously? We believe not. This is because the 
description of ‘Civilization’ that Nietzsche offers in the Nachlass passage coincides with the 
description of the process described in GM: II, whereby the human animal internalizes 
punishment and through this internalization a Gedächtnis des Willens (a memory of the will) 
is created. The animal that civilization wills and constantly produces belongs to memory, 
where memory acts as the foundation of a responsible, promise-making humanity; that is to 
say, in Nietzsche’s words a ‘reliable, regular, necessary’129 humankind, or in short, a 
‘uniform’130 species. Memory and responsibility produce and reproduce the need for a 
species of animals dedicated to their moral and rational improvement forgetful-all-too-
forgetful of their animal origins, their originary strength, their independence and their 
solitude. 
The ‘memory of the will’, the production of a reliable animal which can be held responsible, 
punished, and then internalize this punishment and through this internalization create his 
‘conscience’, is the product of the long history of civilization/culture. It has to be noted that 
the narrative of GM (1887) follows the early thoughts of Nietzsche on Socratic and 
Alexandrian culture in BT (1872). The production of the ‘reliable’ man is the outcome of the 
efforts of the scientific optimism of Socrates and the subsequent development of a culture 
which was depicted in the establishment of the remarkable city of Alexandria. Alexandria, 
more than a city, was a symbol of Alexander’s willingness to create a space in which and 
from which knowledge would be the absolute criterion of life, a city where its breathtaking 
library would be the kernel of the new scientific revolution inspired by the dialectical 
optimism of Socrates. Alexandria boasts that ‘truth’ will be discovered no matter what. But, 
as expected, Nietzsche thinks otherwise. Socratic optimism will never discover ‘truth’ 
because as a process it is from the very start bound to duplicate that which originally 
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generated it: the will to truth will come to be destroyed when it recognizes that the history of 
truth is a history based on exclusions, untold stories, horrible secrets; in short, the history of 
truth narrates not truth but the ideology which generates the need for a history of truth. The 
following passage is characteristic of this very Nietzschean approach. In his re-examination 
of ‘The Problem of Socrates’ in TI (1888), Nietzsche explains the rise of Socratism as the 
product of a blackmailed culture. Either Greeks had to accept that the world is ultimately 
knowable (therefore deducible to the categories of understanding) or they would have to 
succumb to the pessimism of this type of Schein that deceives itself by not acknowledging 
itself as what it truly is: an illusion.       
How is then the Greek who throws himself blindly to Socratism? “...you have to imitate 
Socrates and establish a permanent state of daylight against all dark desires – the daylight of 
reason. You have to be clever, clear and bright at any cost: any concession to the instincts, to 
the unconscious, leads downwards...”131 The process of a human animal becoming ‘reliable, 
regular, necessary...’ described in GM:1.2 which concerned the establishment of memory 
through the implementation of the laws of causality is reflected here in the organization of 
Socratic-Alexandrian culture, with its blind devotion to an idolatry of reason/clarity which 
can only produce (and thus it can only understand) that from which it comes: its necessary 
presupposition. Clarity understands only that which is clear and eternally produces it 
generating a closed systematic process of reasoning which may be useful yet ultimately is 
irrelevant.    
Before examining Nietzsche’s definition and description of the role of culture, let us briefly 
refer to another case of what a culture cannot be. A case that reveals the kind of culture that is 
unable to generate the multiplicity required for the production of ‘a higher species than man’ 
[eine höhere Gattung als den Mennshen]
132
 as Nietzsche writes in 1880, a species which will 
be based on the perennial production and the perennial reproduction of individual differences, 
which serve to open up the human species to a time of experimentation, to a time which will 
be finally true to the experimental character of human animals. To that end Nietzsche 
publishes in 1873 one of the most devastating pieces of cultural critique ever to be produced, 
the ‘First Untimely Meditation’, titled David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer. In this he 
combines the use of sharp irony with shattering attacks on the complacent German 
bourgeoisie. David Friedrich Strauss, better known for his momentous Life of Jesus, is the 
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undeserving
133
 subject of the attack. Acting out of the influence of the Wagnerian circle, 
Nietzsche concentrates his attack on Strauss’ The Old Faith and the New: A confession. The 
materialism which is to replace the faith in a Christian God is an anathema for the Wagnerian 
circle struggling to build a culture around the need of perennially dying Gods which, 
although they have been withdrawn from the stage of the human drama, yet exist eternally as 
dying, as the need for a founding mythos which will generate community and hold it together. 
Yet Nietzsche’s points and personal attack on David Strauss are rather trivial, mostly 
philological in nature, and largely irrelevant to the modern reader. What is relevant for us is 
the true subject of the First Meditation, which is none other than the hypocrisy of the 
‘cultured’ middle classes. The historical background of the essay has to do with the wave of 
national euphoria sweeping away the German states at the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian 
war. The question is clear enough: What happens when someone (military) wins the most 
culturally advanced nation of the Western world? Much to Nietzsche’s dismay, his 
compatriots misinterpreted military victory for a victory also in the field of culture, the logic 
supposedly being that the strength of the (would be) nation depicts its vitality in every field of 
human affairs. To Nietzsche, the cultural critic and the astute observer of human frailties, all 
this seems to be a colossal simplification of the workings of history and human psychology: 
“...a great victory is a great danger. Human nature finds it harder to endure a victory than a 
defeat,”134 Nietzsche warns.  
This is an amazing passage and certainly revelatory of Nietzsche’s views not only in politics, 
history, or psychology but in the way in which he envisages the human to come, the 
Übermench. The question that Nietzsche asks is the following: What happens to a victorious 
culture, a culture that thinks of itself as victorious? In the same way we can ask along with 
Nietzsche: What happens to a victorious human animal, an animal that thinks of itself as 
being somehow successful in various fields of human affairs? Nietzsche’s answer is 
devastating and stands as a warning to all those visionaries of superhuman victories and 
exterminating angels of the future who will sweep out error in favour of their own private 
truth. Nietzsche’s response in the First Meditation is that a culture which thinks itself as 
‘victorious’, or as ‘true’, is a culture destined to perish. If German culture is destined to fail it 
will be because it failed to realize the extent to which a culture is always already inseminated 
by the seed of the error that constitutes it. In reality there is no culture because humanity has 
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run out of the need for any collective enterprises, as Nietzsche will come to realize later. And 
if culture is where we find ourselves to be and a vision for where we want ourselves to go, it 
is also an impossible enterprise, since in 1873, in the midst of all the Wagnerian noise 
spreading out of Bayreuth, Nietzsche may preach the need for a culture as ‘the unity of 
artistic style in all the expressions of the life of the people’135 but he is also, even 
subconsciously, aware that times have changed and that modernity with its radical bifurcation 
(that between ideality and reality) of the human animal has no time for the rebirth of German, 
Greek, or any other culture. Does Nietzsche know all that in 1873? No, he doesn’t. He is still 
a child of his times, he hasn’t yet become untimely. But what he offers in the First 
Meditation, i.e. the psychology of the cultural philistine (Bildungsphilister) is an indication of 
his acute sensitivity to the changing times and also an indication that, despite his idealistic 
preaching for the reunification of culture, he is also aware of the dramatic swift that has taken 
place at the very heart of modern culture. As moderns we are no longer bound to a life of 
natural unity between theoria and praxis, but to a life of sheer contemplation. In short Plato 
has beaten the Greeks
136
 and Marx (only if considered from within the cultural paradigm of 
modernity) with his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach was ultimately right. The cultural philistine 
describes a type of human as a passive consumer of art works which fail to change in any 
fundamental way his monotonous existence.  Like a neurotic New Yorker from a Woody 
Allen film, the closest you get to thinking or feeling differently is by eternally delaying it 
through discussing it with your therapist. Here is how Nietzsche describes the life of the 
philistine: “The philistine...he sternly segregates the ‘serious things in life’ – that is to say 
profession, business, wife and child – from its pleasures: and to the latter belongs more or 
less everything that has to do with culture. Therefore woe to an art that starts to take itself 
seriously and makes demands that touch upon his livelihood, his business and his habits, his 
philistine ‘serious things in life’...”137 Nietzsche’s reflection on the human type of the cultural 
philistine in the First Meditation open up a theme which is of utmost importance to any 
examination of the event of culture. How do we place ourselves in culture, what attitude do 
we take and indeed what is the role of philosophy to the extent that it communicates with 
culture. In what follows we intend to show the kind of philosophical life that Nietzsche 
advocates and why Nietzsche revisits (but without wanting to imitate) the Greeks in his 
attempt to explore the phenomenon of modern culture. 
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A note on “philosophy as a ‘way’ of life”.  
 
Visions of destructions are common among the youth, and sometimes acts of destruction as 
well. For the new to come something old must die. Some twenty years before the beginning 
of the construction of Bayreuth Festspielhaus, Richard Wagner reportedly expresses the 
desire to “built a theatre on the banks of the Rhine, perform The Ring in it on four 
consecutive nights, and then burn the theatre down in flames.”138 Fortunately the initial plan 
is never executed. What changes between the 1850’s and the 1870’s? Why is Bayreuth not 
burned down? Is it only the conservatism of old age which comes to restrain the 
uncontrollable desires of the youth, or is it something more than that? The answer lies partly 
in Wagner’s close friendship during the 1850’s with the infamous anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, 
who believes in the necessity of a complete (and at times spectacular) destruction of the old 
order, a destruction which would accelerate the possibility of a new formation of social 
relations no longer based upon the distribution of power but on the free association of the 
members of society and the common management of the means of production. Bakunin and 
Wagner take part in the insurrection in Dresden (or the May Uprising) in 1849. Many 
buildings get destroyed, people get killed, Bakunin is arrested and Wagner flees to 
Switzerland. Downtown Dresden is in ruins, the rebellion ends in a spectacular failure. Our 
claim is that despite the usual outbursts and visions of destruction that Wagner had 
throughout his life, the very construction of Bayreuth denotes the passing from a world of 
ruins to something constructive, something which can be used as the symbolic centre of a 
new beginning and to facilitate the rejuvenation of a culture that has exhausted itself. This is 
what Bayreuth symbolizes: the necessity of destruction married with a plausible vision for the 
future
139
. It also symbolizes something else which is crucial both to Wagner and to (early) 
Nietzsche: that whatever vision for the future one has, this has to be moulded within a 
community which shares the same fundamental values concerning the necessity of distancing 
itself from a past that has been proved infertile and the cultivation of the conditions necessary 
for the production of new and exciting forms of human existence.  
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Undoubtedly Nietzsche is one of the thinkers who most celebrated and taught the value of 
solitude. In various aphorisms the solitary one is praised for his independence of mind, the 
clarity that comes from thinking alone instead of the confusion of the market place (TSZ: 45). 
In BGE
140
 solitude is the greatest virtue to be identified with ‘cleanness’ as opposed to every 
social formation which makes things inevitably ‘unclean’ [unreinlich]. But the time has not 
yet come when Nietzsche will start to value solitude more over companionship. In the 1870’s 
Nietzsche still shares (or better, reverberates) the vision of a transformed culture, a vision 
born and nourished in the rooms of the Wagner estate, the Villa Tribschen in Lucerne to 
which Nietzsche was a frequent visitor.  
In a footnote to his lectures on the Pre-Platonic philosophers given at the University of Basel 
in 1872, Nietzsche reflects on the connection between ‘a genius’ and the culture within which 
this genius is born. How was it possible that Hellas gave birth to such a variety of 
philosophical types, Nietzsche wonders, when normally a people “produces only one 
enduring philosophical type”141? He goes on to characterize the Hellenic world as the 
“Republic of Geniuses”142. In those lectures Nietzsche seeks to give an answer not to the 
question concerning the birth of philosophy in the Greek world but instead to the question 
concerning the birth of the philosopher. He writes: “We want to observe how ‘the 
philosopher’ appeared among the Greeks, not just how philosophy appeared among them.”143 
The question he asks is: How did the philosopher become possible as a type among the 
Greeks? Already in this early stage of his thought we can observe the anthropocentric core of 
Nietzsche’s thought, his work as a psychologist, a vivisector of the human soul. How does 
such an original type as that of the philosopher originate from within a culture, and thus what 
is his relation to the non-original? The Volk? Indeed why is it important for Nietzsche to raise 
the question of the philosopher instead that of philosophy? The answer lies in Nietzsche’s 
classical training, which directs him toward a different understanding of philosophical 
activity from that of those trained in philosophy. In what follows we will examine the 
classical understanding of philosophy and how that understanding paved the way for 
Nietzsche’s fascination with the philosophical genius and thus exemplary individuals.  
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On how one ‘does’ philosophy. 
 
When is the first time that the word ‘philosophy’ makes its appearance? Pythagoras and 
Heraclitus are the prime candidates for using some or other form of φιλοσοφία. However, the 
evidence, as Pierre Hadot informs us, is contestable. His position is that it is only with 
Herodotus that we can certainly speak for the first appearance of some form or another of 
φιλοσοφία or philosophic activity. The story from Herodotus’s Histories, as again Hadot 
informs us, places Croesus, king of Lydia, to address his guest, the legendary legislator, 
Solon in the following words: ‘My Athenian guest, the rumour of your wisdom [sophies] and 
your travels has reached us. We hear that since you have a taste for wisdom [philosopheon], 
you have visited many lands because of your desire to see.’144This is thus the suggestion: 
shoever has a taste for wisdom [philosopheon] packs his bags and begins to travel the world 
because of his ‘desire to see’, as Herodotus puts it. According to this schema, philosophic 
activity is fused into the experiences of a life that must necessarily go beyond everydayness 
(the one with no taste in wisdom stays home, for in doing this he would do what is 
convenient to him and the others, his everydayness would lack the element of the 
unexpected
145
).  
Pierre Hadot, in his monumental Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique?, and Michel Foucault, 
in his ‘Lectures at the College de France 1981-1982’ titled ‘The Hermeneutics of the subject’, 
are among those who have done a great service on illuminating the method of philosophizing 
among the Greeks and the way that this method developed in Hellenistic philosophy. 
Foucault distinguishes between the mode of philosophizing in Greek, Roman, and Hellenistic 
times on the one hand and on the post-Cartesian development of philosophy on the other. The 
difference between these two modes consists of this: while for the ancient cultures 
philosophy’s role is primarily therapeutic, to cure humans from their errors which inevitably 
lead to a life of anguish, modern philosophy restricts its role to that of the detached observer 
of a truth that happens without the participation of the subject but solely as the result of a 
process of logical reasoning. Nothing can be more alien to the moderns than the 
transformative mechanism that philosophy exercises upon the subject in terms of the ‘true’. 
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According to that model, the validity of what is ‘true’ must be checked by the extent to which 
the subject confronts his proclamation of what is ‘true’. Foucault notes: “What authenticates 
the fact that I tell you the truth is that as subject of my conduct I really am, absolutely, 
integrally, and totally identical to the subject of enunciation I am when I tell you what I tell 
you.”146 Or to put it more simply: “There can be no teaching of the truth without the person 
who speaks the truth being the example of this truth.”147 The way the ancients exercised 
philosophy was not by approaching something foreign to the subject (the ‘Truth’), but as 
something that it is constantly produced out of the activity of the subject in his search for 
what is ‘true’. To philosophize is to make a radical choice concerning the way you live and 
indeed to make that choice that is going to correct the errors of your previous misjudgements 
and in that way to prepare the way in which the subject becomes the recipient of the 
unfolding of what previously was hidden, a-letheia. Access to the truth is not a right, 
Foucault notes
148
. Greeks and Romans prepare themselves in many ways in order to get ready 
for a truth that perennially unfolds in the way one prepares for it. In contrast to the mode of 
philosophizing of the ancients, the moderns distance themselves from the spiritual 
(transformative) character of philosophy. It is not just that philosophy succumbs to the 
Lockean understanding of it as an under-labourer to science. Knowledge in modernity is 
identified with science. Foucault again notes: “I think the modern age of the history of truth 
begins when knowledge itself and knowledge alone gives access to the truth. That is to say, it 
is when the philosopher (or the scientist, or simply someone who seeks the truth) can 
recognize the truth and have access to it in himself and solely through his activity of 
knowing, without anything else being demanded of him and without him having to change or 
alter his being as subject” (Foucault, 2005: 17). The picture is familiar: the scientist 
discovering ‘truth’ in his laboratory. No demands are made of him. The scientific process of 
truth-finding and the scientist’s mode of living are not to be connected or to communicate at 
any moment. They are totally and fundamentally separate. ‘Non ridere, non lugere, neque 
detestari, sed intelligere!’ [Not to laugh, not to lament, not to detest, but to understand.] 
Spinoza’s famous proclamation may infuriate Nietzsche149, who regards the struggle of 
antithetical forces as the birthplace of every intelligere; nevertheless, it is a sign of the new 
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mode of knowledge with witch the Enlightenment comes to take the place of ancient 
spiritualism.  
There is probably not a more powerful visual representation of the role of philosopher in 
modernity than the picture ‘Philosopher in Meditation’ (dated 1632) by the Dutch painter 
Rembrandt. Rembrandt presents an old man sitting on a chair contemplating, while in front of 
him and upon his desk lies an open book. What immediately strikes the viewer of this 
painting, apart from the rather eerie feeling of the philosopher’s total isolation from the rest 
of the world, is the powerful play with shadow and light taking place at the picture. Whereas 
the room is hardly lit, from the window in front of the philosopher’s desk we can see a light 
which almost stops or gets greatly reduced as it enters the room. The light is outside, and 
what gets inside is disproportionally little compared to what it should be. From Plato’s 
allegory of the cave to Descartes’ lumine naturali, light has been associated with 
understanding and a clarity which reveals what was previously hidden. Indeed it can be said 
that the whole of creation actually begins with God’s command: γενηθήτω φῶς (Let there be 
light). But the philosopher, strangely a man devoted to understanding i.e. to light, sits in a 
dark place (inside a room, a library) and dares not to look at the source of the light or to place 
himself in a lighted space. Is that a comment by Rembrandt on the position of the intellectual 
in modernity? A comment on the intellectual’s weakness to be, as the pre-Socratics were, a 
stimulant for their culture, or as Nietzsche would have it, ‘commanders and legislators’? We 
will argue that this is indeed the case and that Nietzsche would have certainly thought of that 
painting as a comment on the decadent scholarly spirit of modernity.  
 
From philosophy to the philosopher. A change of paradigm. 
 
In the much-quoted first aphorism from ‘Reason in Philosophy’, Nietzsche accuses 
philosophers of their ‘Egypticism’; that is, the inherited150 tendency of philosophers to 
examine something by de-historicizing it, by not taking into account that, as he puts it in 
HATH, ‘everything has become’151. From Plato onwards, philosophy examines beings sub 
specie aeterni, sacrificing thus the particular to the universal. In a rather cryptic passage from 
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‘On First and Last Things’152 he identifies the principal error of what he calls ‘Metaphysical 
philosophy’ as its inability to give an account of how something originates in its opposite 
(truth in error, logic in unlogic etc). Because metaphysical philosophy has no answer to give, 
it finds refuge in the thought that all higher valued concepts originate in some mystical Ur-
source which the being-in-itself is supposed to be. Against this methodology of metaphysics 
he suggests that we, on the contrary, have to exercise a historical philosophising [historische 
Philosophieren], through which it will be revealed that all concepts, ideas and sensations are 
interlinked. This historical philosophising is the product of the positivist turn (yet short-lived) 
that HATH had inaugurated. Nietzsche explicitly suggests that historical philosophising is to 
be an integral part of natural sciences. He goes on to characterise this new methodology as a 
“chemistry of the moral, religious and aesthetic conceptions and sensations.”153 Unlike the 
mystical reverence that the old metaphysics had demanded (one is not supposed to question 
Truth
154), the new science of chemistry reveals the archetypical unity of all things. “What if 
this chemistry were to end up revealing that in this domain too the most glorious colours are 
derived from base, indeed from despised materials?”155 Whereas to the old metaphysician the 
origin of the ‘most glorious’ in the most ‘despised’ would have been an anathema, if not 
something downright incomprehensible, for the ‘new’ philosopher it inaugurates the 
possibility of philosophical ‘praxis’ separate from the dogmas of metaphysics. The ‘new’ 
philosophy will not have anything to do with ‘conceptual mummies’, it will not exhaust itself 
in the contemplation of the beyond but on the contrary it will be, as Nietzsche never tires of 
repeating, a nomothetic activity, i.e. an activity dedicated to the production of new forms of 
human existence, and the philosopher is no longer the ‘contemplator’ (an activity certainly 
reminiscent of his religious past) but the nomothetes of the future. “But true philosophers are 
commanders and legislators: they say ‘That is how it should be!’”156   
This shift to the understanding of philosophy, which was certainly under way since the time 
of Nietzsche’s work on Diogenes Laertius in Leipzig in 1867157, allows Nietzsche to dedicate 
his time mainly to the examination of the particular aspects constituting the personality of the 
philosopher and only secondarily to the philosophical ideas comprising the philosopher’s 
work. We have to understand precisely the why and how of this move if we are to follow the 
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Nietzschean problematic. The question that Nietzsche wishes to ask does not concern the 
intricacies of dogmas but the conditions of possibility for the production of new life-forms. 
Thus, in an illuminating passage from his university course on the Pre-Platonic philosophers 
delivered in Basel from 1872 to 1876, Nietzsche states that one of the aims of his 
investigation is “to observe how ‘the philosopher’ appeared among the Greeks, not just how 
philosophy appeared among them.”158  In another similar passage he also asks: “What is the 
relationship between the people and the genius...?”159 The examination of the subject matter 
of the birth of the philosopher (how the type philosopher originated) is linked to the riddle of 
Greek culture, the problem of culture, and the origins of ‘genius’, questions which 
preoccupied Nietzsche throughout the 1870’s. What interests Nietzsche is clarifying the 
conditions which can produce the ‘exemplary’ type and deciphering the mystery of the 
personality of the exemplar. Not only the notebooks from 1870, but also the rest of 
Nietzsche’s meditations on the problem of the philosopher160, do nothing more than reinforce 
Foucault’s insight on the blending of truth with the philosophical life.  
As with all of Nietzsche’s meditations161, the idea of the philosopher-legislator162 has a long 
development throughout his oeuvre. In the notebooks from the 1870’s, the philosopher is 
called “a self-revelation of nature’s workshop”; he appears “during those times of great 
danger, when the wheel of time is turning faster and faster”163. The philosopher is a 
Versucher (the one who attempts); he comes when a culture has exhausted (or it thinks that it 
has) its possibilities and has no way to produce new forms of human existence. Unlike the 
man of science who is driven by an “unmeasured and indiscriminate knowledge drive” (“a 
sign that life has grown old”164), the philosopher of ‘tragic knowledge’ redirects the drive to 
knowledge against knowledge itself so as to “return to art its rights”165. ‘Pure’ knowing is not 
the task now, but rather ‘creating’166, i.e. the process where one abandons the suicidal will to 
truth in favour of a “good will to appearance” which is naturally the role of art167. This 
‘creating’ knowledge will later become the drive to ‘law giving’. As Douglas Burnham 
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beautifully puts it “knowledge then does not represent the world…but rather fashions it.”168 
How is the philosopher supposed to do that other than by transforming himself into a work of 
art? Nietzsche is adamant and in total agreement with the (indeed rather extreme) position of 
Michel Foucault
169. “The philosopher’s product is his life...His life is his work of art...”170 
and again: his life [the philosopher’s] “occupies the most important position, before his 
works”171. Nietzsche, like Foucault, does not say that what characterizes a philosopher is the 
number of books that he writes, whether he has disciples, or if he is the initiator of new 
philosophical schools. Nothing of that matters for Nietzsche. One is a philosopher to the 
extent that philosophical theory can be incorporated into one’s everyday life. Again 
Nietzsche says that the philosopher of tragic knowledge does not come in order to create a 
new ‘faith’ but in order to cultivate ‘a new life’172. The philosopher then as a spiritual leader, 
the leader of a cult, the leader of a people, is already an early insight that Nietzsche will 
continue to cultivate throughout his life. It is also one of the multiple links between what is 
and what is destined to be overcome i.e. one of the points where one meets the Overhuman.  
In BGE one of the masks of the Overhuman is that of the “philosopher of the future or ‘true 
philosopher”. Nietzsche there resists the traditional understanding of the philosopher solely as 
an academic, a scholar, or an intellectual. Scholarship and academic contemplation are not 
attributes to be denied; on the contrary, they are components of the philosopher’s weaponry, 
but the ‘new’ philosopher steps beyond the contemplative activity of critical thinking onto the 
world of action [Praxis] in order to change it. Famously, in his Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach, 
Marx declared the mission of the revolutionary as that of coming to fulfil the work of the 
philosopher by applying the philosophical findings to the world of everyday experience and 
political action. If post-Hegelians had found a new way to understand man and society, then 
that way had to be translated into a new ethics and a new way to arrange conduct among men. 
Like Marx, Nietzsche also believes that the work of philosophy has to be fulfilled by its 
application to political action, for that reason the philosopher is now to be transformed into a 
‘commander and legislator’; unlike Marx, though, Nietzsche does not believe that the work of 
the philosopher had finished by ‘interpreting the world’. It is still the mission of philosophy 
and philosophers to go on by taking upon themselves the work of revolutionary change. For 
                                                             
168 Burnham, Douglas. Reading Nietzsche – An analysis of Beyond Good and Evil. Stocksfield: Accumen. 2007, 
p. 146 
169 Or one should say Foucault is in agreement with Nietzsche?  
170 PT: Philosophy in hard times: 48 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. The philosopher: 37 
54 
 
that reason Nietzsche retains the worn-out word ‘Philosoph’ but gives it an entirely new 
meaning.  
Indeed, one cannot be clearer than that: “I am going to insist that people finally stop 
mistaking philosophical labourers and scientific men in general for philosophers”173. As we 
already know from Foucault, the scientific man’s relation to truth is only ‘external’ to the 
subject. Truth does not affect the “serious things in [one’s] life”, Nietzsche would add. But 
the idea that Nietzsche has for the philosopher is the very opposite of that of the ‘scientific’ 
man
174
. In one of his (many and remarkable) lists he presents the multiple masks of the 
philosopher. This untimely man has then to be: 1. a critic, 2. a sceptic, 3. a dogmatist, 4. a 
historian, 5. a poet, 6. a collector, 7. a traveller 8. a guesser of riddles, 9. a moralist,  10. a 
seer, 11. a ‘free spirit’, and as if all the above were not enough he then adds 12. and 
practically everything. [!]
175
. It is clear then that the philosopher has to assume a superhuman 
role “in order to run through the range of human values and value feelings and be able to 
gaze with many eyes and consciences from the heights into every distance, from the depths 
up to every height, from the corner onto every expanse.”176 The poet-philosopher, the 
traveller-philosopher etc. place themselves in the service of a task higher than themselves. 
One does not overturn values for the sake of overturning them, one overturns values because 
one is obliged
177
 to listen to the will of the task which with great pressure commands him to 
create values, to be as a creator, which means as a legislator.  
Are Nietzsche’s meditations on the role of philosophers idiosyncratic in nature, or do they 
exemplify something more? Are they meditations of a man unlearned in academic philosophy 
and thus unable to appreciate the depth and the value of philosophical reasoning? Is 
Nietzsche in short a ‘simplifier’ and a ‘poet-philosopher’, as Heidegger complained that he 
had been by the academic establishment in Germany at the beginning of the century?
178
 
These questions are crucial, since they ultimately target something even higher than the 
person of Nietzsche, namely the role and the scope of philosophy itself. In a remarkable 
passage Kant admits the following: “The ancient Greek philosophers…remained more 
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faithful to the Idea of the philosopher than their modern counterparts have done. ‘When will 
you finally begin to live virtuously?’ said Plato to an old man who told him he was attending 
classes on virtue. The point is not always to speculate, but also ultimately to think about 
applying our knowledge. Today, however, he who lives in conformity with what he teaches is 
taken for a dreamer.”179 Nietzsche’s uncanniness consists in not following the paradigm of 
the ‘modern ones’, who Kant accuses of having abandoned the fundamental connection 
between speculation and ‘living’ (which for the Greeks meant a life dedicated to the good of 
the polis); instead Nietzsche attempts to follow what is most foreign to modernity, the 
paradigm of the ancients. Because of that, his thoughts sound ‘strange’ and certainly 
unfashionable to an age that has been trained to idolize the part instead of the whole and to 
glorify isolated individuals instead of the life of cultures and the fate of civilizations. The 
philosopher for Nietzsche is an exceptional human type because he dedicates himself to what 
is unsure and to what escapes the utilitarian calculations of which modern living consists. The 
philosopher is a forerunner of the Overhuman because he escapes utility altogether and 
dedicates himself to aims higher from those of the human of today. “To the rabble, wisdom 
seems like a kind of escape, device or trick for pulling yourself out of the game when things 
get rough. But the real philosopher…lives ‘unphilosophically,’ ‘unwisely,’ in a manner which 
is above all not clever, and feels the weight and duty of a hundred experiments and 
temptations of life: he constantly puts himself at risk, he plays the rough game…”180 
Nietzsche’s meditations on philosophy and the philosophers, then, are of great importance to 
us, since they inaugurate Nietzsche’s faith in the necessity of a vital change which has to take 
place at the very heart of modern culture, a change which will restore ‘faith in man’ as the 
locus of the fundamental forces constituting the phenomenon of life on earth, a type of human 
which will be able to reunite what is fragmentary to a unified whole.  
 
More on Culture as a factory of greatness. 
 
In the notebooks from 1870, meditations on the new emerging forms of philosophers take 
place concurrently with meditations on culture. The philosopher (or the ‘genius’) finds 
himself always in a dialectical relation with his (or with any) culture. The mysteries of the 
one cannot be deciphered without deciphering the mysteries of the other. If, as we have seen, 
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the new philosopher is to assume almost superhuman powers in order to overturn the existing 
values and create new ones, what is the role of culture as a whole? Indeed we have to return 
now to our initial question. Why do we have culture? 
In an aphorism from 1872, we read “The problem of culture is seldom grasped correctly. The 
goal of a culture is not the greatest possible happiness of a people, nor is it the unhindered 
development of all their talents; instead, culture shows itself in the correct proportion of these 
developments...In all the drives of the Greeks there is manifested a mastering unity – let us 
call it the Hellenic will...The culture of a people is manifest in the unifying mastery of their 
drives...”181 What is important to note in this aphorism is that the process of ‘mastering unity’ 
takes place against a conception of the polity as a conglomeration of individuals seeking 
happiness and contentment. Nietzsche is saying that culture is there neither to serve an 
abstraction (i.e. the people) nor to offer to this abstraction what was described in ‘The Birth 
of Tragedy’ as the illusion of Socratic/Alexandrian culture, its optimistic willingness (and its 
hubris) to render the world intelligible. We owe to “the enormous courage and wisdom of 
Kant and Schopenhauer ...”182 the deconstruction of the ‘hidden foundation of our culture’, 
the graspability of the world of appearances and the elevation of appearance into the status 
“of the sole and supreme reality”. This is the point where a new ‘tragic culture’ ought to 
begin with the replacement of Socratic rationalism (science) by wisdom, where wisdom 
indicates (at least at the time of the BT) an immersion in the primordial unity of the 
Apollonian and Dionysian forces. But even more than that, the challenge here is the 
revitalization of an Aeschylean culture and not the continuation of a Euripidean one. But 
what does this mean and what is the significance of the prioritization of the Aeschylean over 
the Euripidean culture? 
In BT Nietzsche describes the influence of Euripides in Greek art and society as catastrophic. 
But what is the major difference between tragedy represented by Aeschylus and the New 
Attic Drama that Euripides comes to represent? The difference is that tragedy (the field of 
Dionysus) describes structures whereas Euripidean drama describes the psychology of its 
heroes, i.e. the spectators who have taken the place of the symbolic figures of Apollo and 
Dionysus on stage. Tragedy does not describe the sufferings of humans because it does not 
concern itself with imitation, but it describes the sufferings of the symbolic figures of Gods as 
appearances of elemental structures of the world itself. Prometheus, Nietzsche notes, is 
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interesting because in him one can discern “his simultaneously Apolline and Dionysian 
nature”183; in Prometheus we see the forces constituting the human drama, not the adventures 
of an individual. Euripides is guilty for Nietzsche because he initiates the process of the 
psychologization of all art and culture. From Euripides onwards the adventures of individuals 
(a notion that for the Greeks never existed) become the primary focus of art and culture, and 
psychology is called on to explain their behaviour, whereas Aeschylean culture uses myth not 
as a principle of explanation but rather as the motivational force of a culture and its people. 
According to this schema, Wagner (and the young Nietzsche) would be the progeny of 
Aeschylus, whereas much of today’s theatre184 would be the offspring of Euripides.  
With dark colours Nietzsche paints the canvas of Euripidean influence on Greek Tragedy. 
What is the outrageous move of Euripides? That the spectator comes on stage! “Thanks to 
him people from everyday life pushed their way out of the audience and on to the stage; the 
mirror which once revealed only great and bold features now became painfully true to life, 
reproducing conscientiously even the lines which nature had drawn badly.”185 This does not 
raise a problem only within aesthetics, as certain commentators have assumed that it does.
186
 
For Euripides, naturalism, as Burnham and Jesinghausen have rightly suggested, functions as 
a “normative image”187 in service of the education of the public. But the destructive influence 
of Euripides is not limited only to aesthetics. The Euripidean move takes place primarily in 
the field of politics. The placing of the public on stage is a political move designed to offer to 
the public the rights of what was once exceptional. With Euripides everyone now has the 
right to make his life the object of art, whereas previously it was only structures revealed 
through the acts of exceptional figures (e.g. Prometheus) that were the object of Tragedy. 
Nietzsche could not be clearer on this when he says that Odysseus, “the typical Hellene of 
older art” has “now [sunk] to the level of Graeculus”.188 Graeculus is an interesting word that 
gives us the clue to the political reverberations that Nietzsche associates with Euripides. The 
word Graeculus (literally the little Greek) is widely used during the years or Roman conquest 
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of Greece, mainly in a derogative sense. Especially when used by Cicero, it describes a liar, 
dishonest, lazy, pretentious, ‘know-it-all’ kind of person189. Despite the obvious political 
reasons that the (military superior but culturally inferior) conquerors Romans have to insult 
the conquered (military inferior but culturally superior) Greeks, the word also indicates what 
Nietzsche describes as ‘a good-natured and cunning domestic slave’ who from now on will 
be the center of art. In short: the rabble as the very core of artistic creation. It is not difficult 
to imagine the level of Nietzsche’s horror!  
Let us now return to the challenge that Aeschylean culture poses. Aeschylus is important for 
Nietzsche because he functions as the lighthouse for another possible beginning. As humanity 
we are called to choose the narrative of our origins, and therefore of our future also. The 
choice that as humanity we are called to make is the following: either we are going to pick 
the Semitic myth of the Fall, with all its ramifications of deception, cunning etc. and thus 
place guilt at the very beginning of our existence, or we are going to pick Prometheus. As 
Quentin Taylor notes: “In the Greek myth...sacrilege represents the decisive act of man’s 
enhancement; for through sacrilege man ‘gains culture’, the ‘best and highest possession man 
can acquire... BT: 9’”. Let us pay attention to how Nietzsche describes this stubborn rebel: 
Prometheus, who is naturally the personification of Hellenic culture: “Raising himself to 
Titanic heights, man fights for and achieves his own culture, and he compels the gods to ally 
themselves with him because of his very own wisdom, he holds existence and its limits in his 
hands.”190 The Hellenic and the Judaic are two responses to the problem of the orientation of 
culture. Nietzsche believes that while the Hellenic represents an ascent in matters of human 
development, the Judaic, in contrast, represents a descent. The Hellenic is stubborn, 
rebellious, disobedient, and disorderly. Cultural production begins only as the result of an act 
of holy defiance, to spit on the face of God(s) and in that way to lose ‘paradise’ (reward) 
while gaining culture. Judea represents for Nietzsche the counter-movement in the field of 
culture; there the soul is trained to look “obliquely at things”191, hiding becomes the soul’s 
home and resentment of the soul’s principal affect. Nietzsche’s apotheosis of the Aeschylean 
is based on his fundamental attitude of resistance toward a culture which has turned guilt into 
its foundation stone. What type of people can such a culture create? Only modern humans, 
believing in the happiness of all and in the universal value of mediocrities. But a culture’s 
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role lies elsewhere and Nietzsche is adamant. A culture’s role lies only in the production of 
the exceptional
192
, of that which overcomes our everyday self and realizes forcefully-made-
latent potentials. Nothing else matters because everything else would be to live the life of the 
animals
193
. 
In the third timeless meditation, Schopenhauer as Educator, we find two of the most explicit 
and interesting definitions of culture. The first is: “Culture is...perfecting of nature.”194 Here, 
culture is the propaedeutic of nature. You do not ‘find’ nature, you ‘achieve’ nature. 
Nietzsche’s naturalism has nothing to do with the naiveties of the Stoics. Philosophy is either 
a nomothetic activity or harmless chat. Equally, for Nietzsche man is called to perfect the 
work of nature through its legislating activity. “Living – is that not precisely wanting to be 
other than this Nature? Is not living – estimating, preferring, being unjust, being limited, 
wanting to be different?”195 Nietzsche’s vision of the philosopher-legislator and a society 
based on aristocratic values entails constant work on the natural gifts that all (and not some) 
humans possess.
196
 What distinguishes the Nietzschean ‘genius’ from the lazy is that the first 
have consciously and systematically cultivated their innate talents under conditions of the 
most extreme discipline. It is because a will to a great discipline is at work in the life of every 
‘genius’ that these people stand at the top of the social structure. It is only because they are 
able to command (themselves) that eventually are called to command (others). Perfecting 
nature is called “an ascent” from which one is called to play with ‘great tasks’. “Physis calls 
for nomoi”, as Leo Strauss notes, and the quest for nomoi is the work of culture. This leads us 
to the second definition of culture given in SE: “...the goal of culture is to promote the 
production of true human beings and nothing else.”197  
Two things could be said here, the first regarding Nietzsche’s definition of the human and the 
second regarding ‘nothing else’. As to the former, let us just note that the ‘true’ human being 
is the one who will understand himself as a field of contradictory forces seeking domination. 
Greatness then consists in an act of great synthesising. The human hitherto produced lacks 
great unity. This unifying act is to be the task of the future. “The great synthetic man is 
lacking, in whom the various forces are unhesitatingly harnessed for the attainment of one 
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goal.”198 As to the latter, Nietzsche is not telling us that we need culture in order to think, to 
feel, to participate in the development or the bonding of human communities. He tells us that 
culture, i.e. the production of true human beings, is a goal in itself and that nothing else 
matters. James Conant has argued that culture for Nietzsche is not a term of exclusion but 
rather one of participation
199
. We are all able to achieve great works of culture and the value 
of exemplary individuals consists in showing us that we able to follow our own footsteps. 
After all, Zarathustra demands that his disciples defy him. Conant’s reading is certainly 
valuable but ultimately misguided. Nietzsche was not a class-aristocrat, but he certainly was 
an aristocrat in the sense that the quest for greatness belongs to those who have trained 
themselves to ignore the value of mere survival and to dedicate themselves to something 
which overcomes them. A decisive factor of the ‘selection-process’ of those deemed to 
command over those who will be commanded is the willingness of the first to let go of what 
is most valuable to them, their own existence
200
. To hang on to existence is a sign of 
animality and, though the human being is one more animal among other animals, it is also 
this animal that has been tortured, and tortured itself, so much that it finally developed an 
inner world, as Genealogy teaches us, a ‘chamber of torture’, which he calls his soul, his 
consciousness.
201
 
As Nietzsche passes from his early to the middle period of his work (1878-1882), we see a 
change in his understanding of the phenomenon of culture. While in the early period culture 
relied on the force of myth (any myth) and the narratives that these myths can create, with his 
gradual emancipation from both the Wagnerian world-view and Schopenhauer’s metaphysics 
Nietzsche comes to adopt a more ‘scientific spirit’, where science indicates an emphasis on 
method and mistrust according to the finest tradition of the Enlightenment. Wagner’s picture 
on the wall comes down and is replaced with that of the French Enlightenment’s hero: 
Voltaire! To be sure, this is only a dalliance and a long-term affair, at least with the 
egalitarian presuppositions of the French Enlightenment, is never established. What is 
established, though, through the help of science, is a willingness to engage in a 
methodological dissection of the suppositions not only of tradition but also which had 
informed his earliest thought up to a certain point. Even if the new hero becomes the 
scientist, Nietzsche still recognizes the necessity of what we would like to call the unthought 
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remainder. The unthought remainder refers both to that which is left unthought and to that 
which contaminates the possibility of a wissenschaftliche (not only scientific) approach to 
truth. It refers to what haunts the dreams of the bourgeoisie and to the monstrous Urspring of 
reason; to the monsters from Goya’s etching ‘The sleep of reason creates monsters’. For that 
reason, because the only way that a culture has to renew itself is through a shamanic call of 
the spirits, Nietzsche introduces the idea of the ‘double brain’: “But if science provides us 
with less and less pleasure, and deprives us of more and more pleasure through casting 
suspicion on the consolations of metaphysics, religion and art, then that mightiest source of 
joy to which mankind owns almost all its humanity will become impoverished. For this 
reason a higher culture must give man a double-brain, as it were two brain-ventricles, one for 
the perceptions of science, the other for those of non-science: lying beside one another, not 
confused together, separable, capable of shut off; this is a demand of health.”202 As Paul 
Franco rightly observes, this is the “new version of the Apollonian-Dionysian dialectic”203 
where illusions are controlled by science and science becomes aware of its limits through 
illusions.  
However more receptive Nietzsche becomes to democratic sentiments in his middle period, 
the remarkable consistency on the necessity of the higher/lower distinction remains unaltered. 
A typical example is to be found in HATH: 439 “A higher culture can come into existence 
only when there are two different castes in society: that of the workers and that of the idle, of 
those capable of true leisure.” The idle here are synonymous with the slaves of the early and 
the late period. Nietzsche, following the Hellenes, has provided a very clear definition of 
slavery: “...he who does not have two-thirds of his day to himself is a slave, let him be what 
he may otherwise: statesmen, businessman, official, scholar.”204 The only possibility of 
culture is a life devoted to contemplation, free from the demands of everyday existence. Can 
you imagine Socrates having to go to the office? 
Nietzsche never stops discussing culture and making observations on various cultural themes 
throughout his life. However, in his later period (1883-1888), the theme of culture as a 
possibility of production of renewed forms of human existence gradually gives way to 
discussions on politics, as paradigmatically happens in BGE. It seems that as Wagner’s 
influence fades away, Nietzsche leaves behind him his youthful preoccupation with culture 
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and paves the way to what he would later call ‘great politics’, which is not devoid of the aims 
of culture, but instead of being presenting in an aesthetic field (as opera, music, etc.), they 
come now to be applied in the field of politics and political institutions. In a Nachlass note 
from May-July 1885, we are informed that what Nietzsche is looking for now is 
“Institutionen zur Züchtung höherer Menschen” (institutions required for the breeding of 
higher humans)
205
. As we are going to argue later
206
, through his study of politics Nietzsche 
takes a more radical step toward what he always thought as philosophy’s nomothetic activity. 
His agonistic policy, which for us is not a politics of competition but rather a policy of giving 
and letting-go, is going to become the principle arena for the application of all those 
principles that are foreign to the current paradigm of the Judeo/Christian civilization. 
Nietzsche’s ‘experiment with politics’ is an experiment on how far politics can incorporate 
the need for a different direction in culture from the direction in which we are heading now.  
 
On Overhumans and Transhumans. 
 
In Kolyma Tales, an account of the life in Soviet labour camps, author and former inmate 
Varlam Shalamov describes with a dry, downplayed tone and with emotional detachment life 
reduced to its bare minimum. Inmates’ lives are portrayed in all of their horrific simplicity. 
Unlike other, more sentimental, portrayals of camp life, such as Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag 
Archipelago, Shalamov’s narrative lacks anything that can remotely resemble the human. In 
the Kolyma Gulag camps everything once known to constitute a human life is absent: “All 
human emotions – love, friendship, envy, concern for one’s fellow man, compassion, longing 
for fame, honesty – had left us with the flesh that had melted from our bodies during their 
long fasts.”207 In a confession of the things that he learned from the life in the camps, 
Shalamov notes: “The extraordinary fragility of human nature, of civilization. A human being 
would turn into a beast after three weeks of hard work, cold, starvation and beatings.”208 
Shalamov’s account is a strong reminder of the misunderstood relation between the 
technological and the perceived ‘moral’ progress of humanity. Certainly human life is a goal-
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oriented activity
209
; one gets up in the morning, drinks his coffee, goes to work, etc. Yet 
micro-goal oriented activity is to be differentiated from macro-progress ideologies. What we 
have come to call Western/Christian civilization is a culture based on the eschatological 
vision of a final redemption of time and the humans. Following a tradition of hierarchical 
posting of being
210
, Christian culture is based on the assumption that through the utilization 
of ascetic practices (which are designed to control the thymoeid part of the soul), individuals 
will come closer to what overcomes nature (and the unwanted passions of the soul, or the 
material of the senses) and become Form (for Plato), pure being, or God. Unlike though of 
the micro-goal oriented activity of the humans, which arranges their everydayness around 
meaningful activities, the macro-progress ideologies, like Christian civilization, do not aim 
only at the arrangement of everydayness but at the total alignment of the history of humanity 
and the character of existence to the goals that ideology has set for the humans. Individuals in 
the grip of macro-progress ideologies find themselves in a heteronomous relation to the 
culture of the ideology which they are called to serve, whereas micro-goal oriented activity 
remains largely autonomous.   
Since Christian civilization is moved by eschatological visions, it has produced individuals 
who are inextricably linked to this movement of production which takes place continually 
until the final redemption of humanity. According to this model, humans ought to better 
themselves
211
. The overcoming of obstacles, the successful achievements of tasks, however 
small or insignificant they may be, constitutes the very foundation of Western/Christian 
culture and civilization. Humans ‘improve’ themselves in infinite ways. Western/Christian 
civilization is entangled in what we could call ‘ideologies of improvement’. The ‘ideologies 
of improvement’ refer to all those institutions through which human animals seek to achieve 
their ‘end’ within the context of a linear and progressive understanding of time. Education, 
religion, science, and politics (left or right) are all forms of these ideologies. Thus an 
educated person would be someone believing in the continuous transformating effects on his 
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personality through the accumulation of knowledge made possible through the system of 
education. Such a person will seek to ‘improve’ himself by going to school, then to 
university, and by visiting museums and galleries. It is generally believed that despite the 
constantly moving target of ‘sufficient knowledge’, individuals tend to aim toward some goal 
from which some kind of understanding can shed light on the subjects under investigation. 
Similarly for a religious person, the end of his askesis will be theosis, the state of 
identification of the human with the divine; for a person concerned with politics the ‘end’ 
will be the final triumph of the proletariat or the maximum accumulation of profits and so on.   
In the rest of this chapter we will be interested in one particular way of ‘improvement’ that 
has endured throughout history despite its many failings and shortcomings. We are going to 
examine the movement known as ‘transhumanism’ and its multiple connections with 
eugenics. Our aim is to place the aims and the ‘philosophy’ of the transhumanist movement 
under the scrutiny of a 19
th
 century philosopher whose ideas, as it has been suggested, has 
influenced eugenic thought. We intend to show that Nietzsche would never have advocated 
eugenic thought (with all of its paraphernalia) as this would have been alien to his entire 
teaching concerning the much-misunderstood notion of the ‘overcoming’ of the human 
animal. We will argue that the Overhumans suggested by Nietzsche not only differ 
dramatically from the posthumans of the transhumanists but represent a fuller and richer 
possibility for the understanding and the flourishing of the human animal. Ultimately our 
purpose is to suggest a different way (a βιος not a θεωρια) of seeing and understanding the 
possibility of human flourishing independent of the science-dependent thought of the 
transhumanists. 
 
From Eugenics to Transhumanism. 
 
We will begin with a very short history of the Eugenic movement, since that will enable us to 
situate it within the long history of what we have called ‘ideologies of improvement’. The 
history of eugenics is as old as mankind itself. According to the founder of modern eugenics, 
Sir Francis Galton, “Eugenics is the science which deals with all influences that improve the 
inborn qualities of a race, and especially with those that develop them to the utmost 
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advantage.”212 Famously, babies born with defects were thrown by the ancient Spartans into a 
chasm on Mount Taygetus. Various eugenic techniques have been used throughout the world 
and from many seemingly very different civilizations. Modern eugenics was for many years 
the most promising field of study for the newest and most ‘virile’ of the nations of the West. 
The United States of America was to harbour the dreams of this new science and it was to 
lead what the author Edwin Black has called the ‘campaign to create a master race’213. The 
first breeding communities are created already in 1865, and from then on, America’s intense 
desire to safeguard the strong from the weak leads in 1907 to the first eugenic legislation 
passed by the state of Indiana concerning the involuntary sterilization of particular 
individuals. Not much time passes until the ‘good news’ of the new science reaches across 
the Atlantic. The British upper classes are anxious about the rise in numbers of ‘defective 
stock’214 and, as a result, the First International Congress on Eugenics is organised in 
London in 1911. King George V is represented by the First Lord of the Admiralty Winston 
Churchill. Soon the Germans take over. Largely as a response to the degrading living 
conditions of the working classes in Manchester, where drunkenness, disorder, and illness 
reign, the German establishment further promotes the Sozialhygiene movement. The results 
are well known. Adolf Hitler’s deputy Rudolf Hess famously stated that “Nazism is applied 
biology”215. After the war the convenient placement of the guilt with those ‘evil Germans’ 
leaves the USA and their allies to further pursue their eugenic policies. It has been estimated 
that from the beginning of the century until the end of 1960’s in the USA, some 70,000 
individuals were forcibly sterilised.
216
 In Scandinavian countries the situation is similar. In 
Sweden alone between 1935 and 1975, 62,888 sterilizations were performed
217
. Despite the 
regional differences (e.g. in Scandinavia eugenics is considered an ally of the social—and 
socialistic—policies of the welfare state whereas in the USA as an expression of the need for 
the protection of the Nordic race—the North Europeans who populated the American 
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Continent—from alien infection), the core ideology remains the same. The infectious 
degeneration of the masses calls for the protection of highly gifted populations or individuals. 
Man wishes to better himself and the State is there to assist him in his quest. 
Transhumanism is an international movement which aims to promote the use of technology 
to enhance human abilities, physical or intellectual, or to eliminate ageing and to support the 
right of individuals to choose their preferred way of reproduction with the assistance of 
technology. A core belief of the movement is that technology is able to help humans to 
liberate all of their creative abilities which are now incapable of flourishing due to the 
restrictions of the body. As they characteristically put it: “Cancer, malaria, dementia, aging, 
starvation, unnecessary suffering, cognitive shortcomings are all among the presents that we 
wisely refuse.”218 Nick Bostrom, one of the leading figures of the movement, places 
Transhumanism in the tradition of the Western Enlightenment and describes it as ‘rational 
humanism’219. Although the term ‘rational’ is not explained, we will take it to be used in 
contradiction to ‘irrational’ or better metaphysical humanism; the religious humanism which 
emphasizes the inherent value of the human due its καθ’εικονα (in his own image) relation to 
God. Rational humanism, then, would be the humanism which emanates from the secular 
tradition of the Enlightenment and locates the value of the human in its relation not to a 
transcendent being but to Nature from which we inherited our ‘natural rights’ — ‘Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness’, in the words of Thomas Jefferson. Indeed, David 
Pearce in his The Hedonistic Imperative proposes the elimination of all suffering from all 
sentient beings through the use of drugs or neurosurgery.
220
 Transhumanists react 
passionately to the association of their movement with ‘traditional’ eugenics. The difference 
is located at the contribution of the state. Whereas the old eugenics was about the State’s 
right to impose its ideology (through eugenic methods) on the new ‘liberal’, as it has been 
called, in eugenics what it is of paramount importance is, in the words of Nicholas Agar, 
‘state neutrality’221. Articles 7 and 8 of The Transhumanist Declaration222 state clearly the 
                                                             
218 Bostrom, Nick. In Defence of Posthuman Dignity. 2005. [online] Available at: 
http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/dignity.html [Accessed 18 June 2011]  
219 Bostrom, Nick. What is Transhumanism. 2001 [online] Available at: 
http://www.nickbostrom.com/old/transhumanism.html [Accessed 18 June 2011] 
220 Pearce, David. The Abolitionist Project. 2007. [online] Available at: http://www.hedweb.com/abolitionist-
project/index.html [Accessed 18 June 2011]  
221 Agar Nicholas quoted in Sandel, J. Michael. “The case against perfection: What’s wrong with designer 
children, bionic athletes, and genetic engineering”, in: Savulescu, Julian & Bostrom, Nick. Human 
Enhancement. Oxford –New York: Oxford University Press. 2009, p. 85 
222 Transhumanist Declaration in: More, Max & Vita-More, Natasha (ed.). The Transhumanist Reader. 
Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 2013, p. 54-55 
67 
 
movement’s commitment to the free distribution of techniques of human enhancement. 
Bostrom elaborates: “Because people are likely to differ profoundly in their attitudes towards 
human enhancement technologies, it is crucial that no one solution be imposed on everyone 
from above but that individuals get to consult their own consciences as to what is right for 
themselves and their families. Information, public debate, and education are the appropriate 
means by which to encourage others to make wise choices, not a global ban on a broad range 
of potentially beneficial medical and other enhancement options.”223 It would seem then that 
there is a crucial difference between non-liberal and liberal eugenics. Transhumanists manage 
to avoid the problem of power and its imposition, which had remained unsolved by the old 
non-liberal eugenics,. Also, they manage to avoid the unsettling ideologies of racial 
supremacy. According to the new ‘liberal’ model, science produces the techniques and a 
well-informed democratic society distributes the ‘means’ of enhancement to the public. There 
are, however, three presuppositions that Transhumanist thought conveniently chooses to 
ignore. First, transhumanists presuppose the ideological neutrality of what they call ‘science’. 
But science is nothing objective or neutral except if one confuses the merits of the 
applicability of technics with science itself. It is to the divine Kant, Nietzsche supports, that 
we owe the dissolution of the Socratic scientific optimism and its stubbornness to believe “in 
our ability to grasp and solve…all the puzzles of the universe”224. For Nietzsche, Kant has 
proved the elevation of appearance to sole reality and the ultimate unknowability of the ‘true 
essence of things’. Science thus becomes a “naïve humanitarian correction”225, a regression to 
Socratism, a misunderstanding of a ‘text’ for a certain ‘interpretation’ among other possible, 
perhaps more fruitful, interpretations. Second, the transhumanists’ naive belief in the modern 
democratic liberal state fails to do justice to problems of inequality caused by differences in 
wealth, cultural origin, geographical location, and class differences. Can what is true and 
possible in Denmark also be true and possible in Malawi? Transhumanists betray their 
dependence (and thus also their limitations) on the cultural models of a handful of Western 
post-industrialized democracies from which they come. Third, the Transhumanists finally 
presuppose the neutrality of the flow of information. But this is certainly a naivety with no 
bearing on any society where various interest groups compete for the domination of their 
positions over and against the position of the rest of the groups.  
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More than all of the above, though, there is additionally an unexamined presupposition of the 
Transhumanist movement, their naive belief at the (purported) ‘progress’ of the human 
animal, and subsequently their dubious use of the notion of ‘breeding’. It will be argued that 
it is necessary to think of Eugenics and Transhumanism within the logic of the ‘ideologies of 
improvement’ and thus to expose the limited horizon of possibilities for the human animal 
that result from the application of such ideologies. Our link and guide to our path will be the 
thought of Friedrich Nietzsche.  
In the essay “On Becoming Posthuman” one of the leading figures of Transhumanism and 
founder of the Extropy Institute, Dr. Max More, starts by quoting Nietzsche: “I teach you the 
overman. Man is something that is to be overcome. What have you done to overcome 
him?”226 Quoting out of context is naturally a familiar practice. But what if we juxtapose 
against the quote that More gives another Nietzschean quote, let’s say the following: 
“Mankind does not represent a development of the better or the stronger or the higher in the 
way that is believed today. ‘Progress’ is merely a modern idea, that is to say a false idea”227? 
We then have two completely different pictures of the problem of the human coming from 
the same thinker. Two questions then need to be examined. First: What does ‘improvement’ 
mean to Nietzsche? Second: What does the notion of the overcoming of the human signify? 
 
Improvement and Overcoming in Nietzsche’s thought. 
 
In 1888 Nietzsche begins his peculiar autobiography Ecce Homo (half a self-interpretation of 
his work, half a reinvention of himself) by making a peculiar statement: “The last thing I 
would promise would be to improve humanity”, and he continues: “ I do not set up new idols; 
let the old ones learn what it means to have legs of clay.”228 A peculiar statement indeed 
coming from the man who tried to overturn Christian morality in the name of a radically new 
human to come which will be able to justify human existence on earth and as such the whole 
of existence. Nietzsche uses the term ‘Improvement’ (Verbesserung) in order to designate 
two essential tendencies of civilizing process. The first is the process of the taming 
(Zähmung) of the human animal and the second is the process of breeding (Züchtung) human 
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animals. What he, in TI, calls the ‘Improvers of humanity’ are those who make use of these 
antithetical tendencies in order to produce human animals. GM is the long exposition of the 
story of the taming of the human animal. In that book, the civilizing process is nothing more 
than a synonym for the subjugation of the instincts of healthy animals to the needs and 
demands of organized societies. GM tells us the sad story of the transformation of health into 
sickness and also the transformation of a human animal living alongside nature into a 
Hausthier, a household pet. “The meaning of all culture is simply to breed a tame and 
civilized animal, a domestic animal, out of the beast of prey ‘man’”229 This is the process of 
all culture (aller Cultur); however, in the context of GM the process of ‘taming’ takes place 
within the context of Christian civilization. It is because of the uncanny cleverness of the 
priest (note that Nietzsche is quite adamant about the power of priestly intelligence: “—
nobody else’s intelligence [Geist] stands a chance against the intelligence [Geist] of priestly 
revenge.”230) that the human produces himself as both tame and interesting. It is because the 
priest sets in motion the process of the internalization of human animals (thus creating ‘souls’ 
for themselves) that out of this process of internalization what it is born is both sick (since it 
is internalized) and interesting (since it has acquired depth). The Rache (revenge) of the priest 
takes the form of ideals, specifically ascetic ones. GM’s Third Essay tells the story of the 
positing of ascetic ideals as the way to ‘block’ the prospect of nihilism. Christian askesis 
refers to a methodology of abstinence aiming at the liberation of the soul from the fetters of 
the body as the necessary precondition for the vision of God
231
. Christianity and the culture 
produced by its dogmas (what is called ‘The West’) is a culture based on the necessity of the 
restriction of the forces latent in human animals. “Christianity is a metaphysics of the 
hangman.”232 What is to be the response to the Christian dystopia? What could be the 
response to the levelling effects of the Christian world-order and to the degenerate cultures 
that that has been produced, namely the modern, liberal, democratic West?  
In the afore-mentioned chapter from TI, the response seems to lie in the idealization of 
breeding methods, such as those found in the Laws of Manu, the ancient Hindu 
Dharmashartras (legal texts). In the Laws of Manu Nietzsche finds a social organisation 
which suits his taste. The caste system allows different social classes to flourish and the 
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highest specimens of mankind to develop their abilities without being contaminated by the 
Christian (modern, democratic, liberal) morality of the masses and their banal taste in all 
matters. That there are and should be exceptional and non-exceptional individuals 
undoubtedly constitutes the presupposition of all Nietzscheanism. “The order of castes, order 
of rank, only formulates the supreme form of life itself... [The order of rank] is necessary for 
the preservation of society.”233 Compared to the guilt-laden morality of Christianity, one 
indeed breathes better here. “One breathes a sigh of relief on emerging from the sickly 
dungeon-air of Christianity into this healthier, higher, wider world.”234 The evidently cheerful 
mood in which Nietzsche finds himself when asserting the rights of selected minorities has 
led even some of his most careful readers to misread him. Thus, in his treatment on the 
relation between Nietzsche and Manu, Daniel Conway
235
 has been led to a one-sided 
understanding of breeding in relation to Hindu Laws and Nietzsche. Nietzsche refers to the 
Laws of Manu on two occasions: in the chapter on The Improvers of Humanity in TI and 
again in AC. Conway’s analysis follows the clear-cut logic of AC: the caste system is the 
political translation of the natural order, society produces all different types of human 
animals, plurality of production is guaranteed in the same way as the protection of the highest 
specimens. Conway is right, but he is right only in the context of AC, not in that of TI, in 
which breeding as such is treated as a by-product of what he calls morality, which denotes 
the cultivation on behalf of a certain culture (the Christian world-order) of a certain type of 
the human animal. Let us examine the textual evidence. TI VII:2 begins by associating 
improvement with morality. The improvers of humanity cultivate (or breed) their animals by 
the use of moral training. Morality (or moral training) then includes two tendencies: the one 
is taming and the other is breeding. Our argument is that in the context of TI VII: 2, breeding 
also (and not just taming) is a part of morality. Additionally, Nietzsche puts to work his 
strong sense of irony when he asserts that both terms (taming and breeding) are zoological 
terms, terms which refers to the irrational zoon (ζωον), an undoubtedly degrading way of 
referring to human animals. In TI VII: 3 Nietzsche is even clearer: “Let us take the other case 
of so-called morality, the case of breeding a particular race and kind.”236 If, then, in TI VII 
breeding is a zoological and not an anthropic term, a term used by the breeder par excellence 
of human animals, the Christian priest (in all of his manifestations throughout history), then 
how could we speak about a human which overcomes the human without that overcoming 
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being an improvement of the human species? “The human is an endpoint”[der Mensch ist ein 
Ende]
237
. 
“One should speak only when one may not stay silent; and then only of that which one has 
overcome…my writings speak only for my overcomings…To this extent [they] are to be 
dated back — they always speak of something ‘behind me’”238 Although the above passage is 
taken from HATH, the paradigmatic text on self-overcoming is Nietzsche’s autobiography, 
EH. There, more than in any other text, the reader can observe the slow process of recovery 
from a long illness, never explicitly identified by Nietzsche, yet clearly, as the figure of 
Doppelgänger in Why I am so wise: II shows, associated with his previous attachments on 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy and certainly to Schopenhauer’s great admirer Wagner. In that 
passage illness becomes the presupposition of health not in the sense of a necessary 
coexistence—one ultimately has to choose health over illness—but as the necessary shock 
that an organism has to undergo in order to emerge stronger than before: “…the years when 
my vitality was at its lowest were when I stopped being a pessimist: the instinct for self-
recovery forbade me a philosophy of poverty and discouragement…”239 Overcoming in EH is 
associated with the process whereby one gets released from illness (“illness slowly released 
me”240) by coming to overturn the conditions that rendered him decadent in the first place. 
Overcoming requires a ‘rigorous self-discipline’ which will allow the free-spirit to be 
liberated from the fetters of tradition and his socio-cultural environment. Paul Franco has 
identified the principle qualities of a free-spirit (a preparatory human being) as: “curiosity 
about the average human being, a presto tempo in thinking and writing, independence, 
esotericism and a love of masks, suspicion, hardness and lack of illusions” and finally ‘the 
ultimate virtue’, “honesty”241 Similarly TSZ can be read as a long preparation for the final 
achievement of an ever-changing stage of creative playfulness and innocence symbolized by 
the figure of the child in ‘On the Three Transformations’. Zarathustra’s disciples have to 
undergo a series of transformative practices to the point where they will finally be able to 
achieve ‘independence and command’. Overcoming in TSZ presupposes above all else a will 
to the most severe (inhuman that is to say overhuman) self-discipline on behalf of the disciple 
so as to master his multifarious drives in a synthesis which will lead him to independence. 
Whereas improvement is then associated with the process of the taming of the human animal 
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and the process where one is called to align himself to an externally imposed ideal, 
overcoming is associated with self-discipline and self-command, a willingness to leave 
behind ‘Zarathustra’ for he may have deceived you.  
 
Elements of Nietzschean psychology. 
 
In the rest of this chapter we will highlight the main aspects of a possible new understanding 
of human animals
242
. This new way aspires to move beyond the traditional way of 
understanding, what has hitherto been called ‘man’: a mistake in need of correction. 
Throughout history ‘armies’ of correctors have sought to correct the human by improving it. 
According to the new model of understanding humans that we will propose here, they are in 
no need of correction since they have neither done anything wrong nor sinned in any possible 
way. In that respect this new understanding of the human is fundamentally anti-Christian, 
since its first and only presupposition is that human animals are intrinsically innocent and 
hence stand in no need of ‘correction’. In that sense the overcoming of the human refers to an 
attempt (which perhaps could also be the mission of a meta-Christian culture) to bring to light 
the various antithetical forces constituting the human animal, and through an act of plastic 
power [Plastische Kraft]
243
 to reformulate them into a creative whole: “To become master of 
the chaos one is; to compel one’s chaos to become form: to become logical, simple, 
unambiguous, mathematics, law – that is the grand ambition here.”244 And it is a grand 
ambition indeed! Not only because the mastery of the chaos is unquestionably a Sisyphean 
task but also because the recognition that the human animal is chaos is one of the most 
ambitious and far-reaching of Nietzsche’s contributions.  
Aside from the work of Schopenhauer, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that 
Nietzsche ‘learns philosophy’ from one book. That book is none other than the monumental 
Geschichte des Materialismus (History of Materialism) by Friedrich Lange. Through Lange, 
but also through his further investigations, Nietzsche becomes acquainted with the work of a 
series of natural scientists such as the pathologist Rudolf Virchow, the biologist Ernst 
Haeckel, the English physiologist Michael Foster, the embryologist Wilhelm Roux, and 
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others
245
. The time in which Nietzsche lives is marked by the rise of the new science of 
Darwinism and also by a new interest in the revolutionary implications that the study of 
nature can have for the study of social phenomena. One particular aspect of the fascination 
with the Naturwissenschaften in the second half of 19
th
 century in Germany is of particular 
relevance for us here. The latest developments in cell biology stress the importance of 
regarding living organisms as a unity of well-coordinated individual parts; it is the 
Zellenstaat (cell state) which becomes the ideological foundation, created by the elite of 
academic professors, of the ideal of Kulturstaat
246
. The state is regarded as nothing more than 
the extension of the healthy coordination between the cells taking place in(side) every living 
organism. Both Rudolf Virchow and Ernst Haeckel compare cells to citizens; Virshow has a 
more egalitarian view since the cells cooperate for the good of the organism, whereas 
Haeckel believes in a more hierarchical structure. A student of Haeckel is the embryologist 
Wilhelm Roux, who later exercises an enormous influence on Nietzsche. His Der Kampf der 
Theile im Organismus continues and expands the work of his teacher. According to Roux, the 
organism is a battlefield where the different cells struggle for mastery. The origins of 
Nietzsche’s notion of the Rangordung is to be found here, since Nietzsche believes that the 
internal struggle leads to the constitution of an hierarchy of forces which compete in order to 
prevail
247
.  
Nietzsche’s biological readings help him to situate himself in a tradition other than the 
prevalent Christian one. How many souls do we have? Nietzsche, the Greek scholar, the 
reader of Homer and Plato shapes himself in a tradition which understands the human as the 
locus of multiple powers striving to prevail. The monumental work of Bruno Snell
248
 has 
shown that for Homer the human refers to nothing unitary but to a virtual place with multiple 
centres of psychic energies and mental functioning. Every limb is a force and every organ a 
mental activity. The Homeric man is a grand landscape of powers, not a unitary subject. 
Plato comes to organise the anarchic environment of Homeric man by reorganising the parts 
of the soul in order to suit his authoritarian political vision. In the most audacious move in the 
history of mankind, Plato relocates the noos (understanding) from the breast (where it was for 
Homer) to the head; this follows the relocation of the thymoeid (spirited) part of the soul 
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above the diaphragm and the epithumetic (appetitive) part below the diaphragm.
249
 So we live 
in the shadow of Plato. We believe that the ‘rational’ is the ‘highest’ and the ‘appetitive’ (the 
‘animal’ needs of the human) the lowest. Plato manufactures humans (a human soul governed 
by the all-powerful noos), and those Platonic humans will become the norm for the 
Christian/Western civilization. Here is not the place to expand upon this theme. Let us just 
note what Nietzsche keeps from Homer and Plato and what he rejects. What he keeps is the 
notion of the polycentricism of the psyche and what he rejects is the Platonic subordination of 
the parts of the soul from one single centre. Nietzsche’s understanding of the soul as a 
multiplicity seeks to replace Plato’s authoritarian vision with an eternal struggle for 
domination. Alluding to Goethe’s celebrated passage from Faust, “Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! 
in meiner Brust”250, Nietzsche believes that the subject is a multiplicity of forces seeking 
domination. “The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just 
as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis 
of our thought and our consciousness in general? A kind of aristocracy of “cells” in which 
dominion resides?... My hypotheses: The subject as multiplicity.”251 The Christian (because 
Platonic in origin) vision of a single everlasting soul (explicated by St. Gregory of Nyssa at 
the 4
th
 century AC) is replaced by a vision of a soul “as a society constructed out of drives 
and affects”252.   
In what remains we will suggest that throughout his career Nietzsche radically opposes any 
linear (or progressive) understanding of the human animal which seeks to cure/fix/repair his 
(purported) shortcomings/weaknesses/failings and that his opposing circular understanding of 
the human animal is proposed as an antidote to a culture which gave human animals guilt for 
what they are, so as to control them better and manipulate them. According to Nietzsche’s 
circular understanding of the human, it is necessity itself which returns again and again and 
again so that nothing can interfere with the very process of the return. The eternal return of 
what is necessary liberates human animals from the burden of responsibility which the 
improvers of humanity imposed upon them. In that way the human becomes what he truly is: 
an animal aware of his fatality.  
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Already in 1872 (the year in which he writes the now much-celebrated essay Homer’s 
Contest), Nietzsche develops his central thesis on the value of the oppositional understanding 
of production. In a way it is a familiar Hegelian argument, insofar as Hegel follows 
Heraclitus. For Hegel, productions are results of striving between two antithetical 
movements. Inconsistencies give rise to new movements which represent both the older 
movements and the new ones. Young Nietzsche, in his treatment of the Greek concept of the 
agon, repeats this familiar movement. But whereas in Hegel dialectics culminates at the 
omnipotence of the one, Nietzsche’s project aims for the production of an eternal strife of 
oppositional forces. The goal is to safeguard the very possibility of strife as the prerequisite 
of production. The political aim is the protection of diverse forces of intensity which will 
work as the birthplaces of future productions. “That is the kernel of the Hellenic idea of 
competition [agon]: it loathes a monopoly of predominance and fears the dangers of this, it 
desires, as protective measure against genius – a second genius.”253 Young Nietzsche 
understands all too well what Hegel cannot: that to stop the process of production (that is to 
say, of strife) is to endanger life itself with its continuous need for growth and expansion. The 
‘end of history’ for Nietzsche in that essay will have nothing to do with the complacent 
hypnotic life of the last humans of the Fukuyamean dystopia. “If we take away the contest 
from the Greek life, we gaze immediately into the pre-Homeric abyss of a gruesome savagery 
of hatred and pleasure in destruction.”254 
This problematic on the importance of the sustainability of oppositional forces continues with 
the BT. An exemplary anti-Classicist text
255
, BT attacks the very core of a civilization based 
on the (false) equation of beauty with harmony developed in length by Winckelmann in his 
History of the Art in Antiquity. There is nothing harmonious about beauty, Nietzsche tells us; 
truth is terrible
256
 and what we call art is the battlefield of the oppositional forces of the 
Dionysian and the Apollonian which, for all their force, must be bound together if tragic 
culture is to emerge. Indeed the very possibility of culture rests upon the sustainability of the 
destructive forces of the Dionysian and the form-giving forces of the Apollonian. To think of 
one without the other is not only to misunderstand the rise of art in Greece, but, more than 
that, to promote a culture which is based on the subjugation of diversity and the one-
dimensional development of certain forces over others. Such a culture is not only undesirable 
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but altogether impossible, since Nietzsche’s Heraclitean understanding of eternal production 
through strife does not allow for a non-oppositional understanding of history and culture. 
Nietzsche’s insights into the necessity of opposition find their culmination in the most 
unlikely text. TSZ’s main concern is to preach the necessity of the overcoming of humans 
since they are products of a decadent civilization which is based on the equalization of the 
value of the human. Justice speaks otherwise and affirms difference and order of rank where 
the old humans believed that equality (Gleichkeit) is the answer to the riddle of production. 
Let us look at the following passage: “But once I asked, and almost choked on my question: 
what? Is the rabble too needed for life? Are poisoned wells needed and stinking fires and dirt-
soiled dreams and maggots in the bread of life? Not my hatred but my disgust gnawed 
hungrily at my life! Ah, I often grew weary of the spirit when I found that even the rabble 
was spirited.”257 What is this passage telling us? To begin with, it affirms the order of rank in 
society. It tells us that society includes higher (which in the Nietzschean jargon means more 
complex) forms of life and lower forms of life. Then it tells us that lower forms of life still 
have a value because they are needed for life. Life denotes the will to oppose and eventually 
incorporate antithetical forces. All life is will to power. Later on
258
 we are going to explicate 
Nietzsche’s notion of power within an agonistic model which does not allow annihilation 
(“There is no annihilation in the sphere of spirit.”259) but only the eternal production of forces 
which resist power. Indeed Nietzsche, as we interpret him, utilizes power only to the extent 
that power itself is able and willing to generate that which overcomes it. Outside of the model 
of ‘agonistic power’, power stands only as a force of destruction that has little to contribute.  
When the human animal is understood as what is produced within this field of antithetical 
forces, then it becomes apparent that any understanding of the human as an animal 
progressing from earlier stages of development to later and more complex ones is rendered 
superfluous. In this chapter we have tried to show that to the simplistic logic of development 
in which eugenics and neo-eugenics thought falls victim, Nietzsche would oppose his richer 
vision of the human animal which it doesn’t obey the logic of progress. According to the 
Nietzschean model, then, the overcoming of the human animals refers to their receptivity to 
the power of the forces which constitute them. This model avoids the necessity of correction 
which is engraved in every ideology of improvement. One does not have to get rid of the 
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inhuman as moral Christian thought does, it needs only to recognize and accept its creative 
power: “the higher man is inhuman and superhuman: these belong together... one ought not to 
desire the one without the other.”260 Through the agon forces become more and more intense, 
since they have to struggle against each other, but they don’t need either to be annihilated or 
to be corrected. Forces are what they are. The Nietzschean model escapes the logic of the 
priest and the corrector. One does not have to fix the humans because they are already 
ontologically what it is necessary
261
 for them to be.  
 
Concluding remarks. 
 
When in his BT Friedrich Nietzsche, out of a growing despair with a ‘dissatisfied modern 
culture’, called for a “rebirth of the German myth”262, he was echoing the long tradition of 
what George Williamson has called the longing for myth in German culture and history. 
According to Thomas Mann, the distinct characteristic of German culture is its rootedness in 
a primordial, mythologised and poetic spirit as opposed to the spirit of the French or the 
English, which finds expression through its interaction with the social and political reality of 
its time
263
. Despite the inconsistencies and tribulations of the tradition, myth will function for 
many German writers, artists and intellectuals as the counterforce both to the ills of 
modernity and to a Christianity considered by many as an alien occupying force expressive of 
the culture of the Semitic people upon the German peoples
264
. Despite the differences, there 
remains an eerie similarity between persons otherwise so radically different as the romantic 
philosopher Friedrich Schelling and the Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg. For both of them 
the demythologization of German culture is the source of all evils and thus they urgently call 
for the rehabilitation of culture with a ‘new mythology’265. For Schelling this new mythology, 
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which will unify the up to that point differing aspects of culture (the aesthetic, the religious 
and that of the public life (Oeffentlichkeit)), “shall be the creation, not of some individual 
author, but of a new race (my italics), personifying, as it were, one single poet.”266  
For (early) Nietzsche, the child of the Wagnerian continuation of the tradition of the German 
early Romantics, this ‘new race’, under the different names of ‘free spirits’, ‘Overhumans’, 
‘masters of the earth’, and ‘new nobility’, will come to overturn the traditions of the 
Christian-Western Civilization by a working-through of all existing moral values which will 
ultimately lead to their revaluation. For Nietzsche the result is uncertain, since the human 
must remain faithful to its experimental nature. However, the ‘battle’ for the revaluation of 
values will take place in the gap created by modern culture’s propensity to nihilism. Nihilism 
is the greatest threat that humanity has to face if it is to re-emerge stronger than before and 
different to its cultural past. But Nietzsche insists: “Attempts to escape nihilism without 
revaluating our values so far: they produce the opposite, make the problem more acute.”267 
Eugenic thought and its latest manifestation in the form of transhumanism is precisely an 
attempt to bypass the problem of nihilism without dealing with the problem of the revaluation 
of values. It is the quick way out of the problem. Transhumanism’s dependence on science is 
also revelatory of its dependence on Socratic optimism and the tradition of the idolization of 
truth which culminates in Christian morality. In a remarkable passage from TI, Nietzsche 
accuses Socrates as the founder of a tradition which elevates some aspects of the human 
experience over others. Reason becomes not only philosophy’s but also humanity’s tribunal. 
Depending on how well experience can fit into the guidelines of reason, it is either accepted 
or expelled. “We must be clever, clear, bright at all costs [um jeden Preis]: any yielding to the 
instincts, to the unconscious, leads downwards…”268 Nietzsche insists, even rhetorically, that 
the Socratic idolization of reason over the (uncontrollable) instincts is passed unaltered to the 
Christian culture and from there to modernity’s infatuation with science. The following 
passage from GM is revelatory: “Christian morality itself, the ever more strictly understood 
concept of truthfulness, the father-confessor subtlety of the Christian conscience, translated 
and sublimated into the scientific conscience, into intellectual cleanliness at any price [um 
jeden Preis].”269 The double appearance of um jeden Preis both in the TI passage and in the 
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GM passage shows that Nietzsche considers the business of the separation and promotion of 
some aspects of human conscience over others of paramount importance. Science continues 
the work of Christianity in that it considers ‘truth’ to have an absolute and universal value. 
Science itself, as the womb of truth, is elevated to a sacred level. In that sense, what science 
commands has to be.  
Yet science is not neutral. It serves the paradigm that made it possible, therefore also those 
forces which are utilized to create a certain type of human over other possible types. And if 
the principle of non-contradiction (an anathema for Heraclitus) has managed to create the 
human of today—the industrious bourgeois, the ‘good’ Christian, the all-too-human— 
Nietzsche resorts to other possibilities which could possibly produce other, contradictory, 
reversed types. “…the falsest judgments…are the most indispensable to us…To acknowledge 
untruth as a condition of life”270. Transhumanism is too dependent on the current paradigm of 
Western/Christian civilization to be able to create something new in the field of 
anthropoiesis. All that eugenics can produce is imitations of the bankrupted model of 
Western man. On the contrary, the transvaluation of values aims at the radical critique of the 
current anthropological paradigm and it moves beyond that, to the exploration of forces 
which until now were forcibly made latent. The Overhuman is to be hardly recognizable to 
the human not because of its dependence to the scientific idolatry of Truth but because it will 
become possible through the necessary reversal
271
 of the current paradigm of Western/ 
Christian civilization. And if the Transhumanists melodramatically wish “the well-being of 
all sentience”272, Nietzsche, in an eerie anticipation of the Transhumanist’s thought, advises 
the following: “You want, if possible…to abolish suffering. And us? – it looks as though we 
would prefer it to be heightened and made even worse that it has ever been! Well-being as 
you understand it – that is not a goal; it looks to us like an end…The discipline of suffering, 
of great suffering – don’t you know that this discipline has been the sole cause of every 
enhancement in humanity so far?”273 
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Nietzsche on Overhuman Politics 
or 
Cultivating the impossible. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let us glance ahead a century, and let us 
suppose that my attack on two millennia 
of perversity and defilement of the 
human has been successful. That new 
party of life which takes in hand the 
greatest of all tasks, the breeding of a 
higher humanity, including the ruthless 
destruction of everything degenerating 
and parasitic, will make possible again 
that excess of life on earth from which 
the Dionysian state, too, must arise once 
again.   
Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: BT. 4 
demokratie ist lustig 
Joseph Beuys  
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Introduction. 
 
In one of his famous sketches concerning the problem of European nihilism, Nietzsche 
describes the history of the future as the history of the arrival of nihilism. What lies in the 
future is not an event of liberation, redemption, or justification. The future is about nothing, 
the same nothing constituting the very essence of the West. “For some time now, our whole 
European culture has been moving as toward a catastrophe [eine Katastrophe], with a torture 
tension that is growing from decade to decade…”274 Nietzsche describes this catastrophe in a 
very practical manner. The ‘end of history’ (what Nietzsche calls ‘Katastrophe’) is going to 
see the triumph of a type of human characterized by plebeian spirit
275
, fatty diets
276
, training 
instead of education
277
, bad taste
278
, in short: a gutted human animal, an animal from which 
all vital instincts have been removed. Admittedly, the picture of the future that Nietzsche 
draws is rather unhelpful. How are we supposed to orient ourselves in the coming vacuum of 
history? What is the purpose of human communities in light of the imminent Katastrophe? 
Nietzsche’s meditations on politics are going to take place against the background of this 
looming threat. For that reason, it is in his concern with politics that one finds the most 
provocative Nietzsche, a Nietzsche unafraid to experiment with the most dangerous thoughts, 
remaining nevertheless aware of the dangers
279
.   
This chapter is going to explore Nietzsche’s relation to politics on two major steps. In the 
first part of the chapter we are going to examine Nietzsche’s critique of the political project 
of modernity and the reasons for his deep dissatisfaction with the way political communities 
have developed in the West. Nietzsche’s concern with politics develops naturally from his 
early meditations on culture
280
, which however heavily relied on the imposing figure of 
Wagner. While early Nietzsche concentrated on cultural rejuvenation (specifically that of 
Germany), later Nietzsche concentrates on questions regarding the critique of the current 
political status quo (that of modern liberal democracies) or governing (through the 
development of the ‘order of rank’), issues which are going to be examined in the first part of 
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this chapter. In the second part of the chapter we are going to examine Nietzsche’s early 
understanding of the agon and his late development of ‘Will to Power’. Our argument is 
going to be that Nietzsche’s antidote to the levelling effects of modern liberalism is the 
suggestion of a politics of perpetual conflict, a politics which reconciles the human with the 
strife which in any case already is. In our exposition we will suggest and clarify the following 
definition of the agon: Agon is an institutionalized experiment which allows man to flourish 
by freely developing his unsteady character within the bounds of the institutions within which 
the agon takes place. We believe that this specific understanding of the agon is close to the 
Nietzschean prerequisites regarding, first, the necessity for experimentation, and second, 
Nietzsche’s much declared faith in the necessity of both preservation and strengthening of 
what is ‘lower’ or ‘sick’, in the name of the intensification of the opposing drives of life.  
 
First Part: Diagnostics of the present. 
 
We concluded the previous chapter with Nietzsche’s warning regarding the exigency of the 
project that concerns the revaluation of values as humanity comes to face the threat of 
centuries of nihilism, due to the lack of an aim high enough, which would be able to reorient 
the currently fragmented human animals toward the task of producing a ‘higher species’281. 
This is a species strong enough to ‘keep up the faith in man’282, meaning the faith in the 
immanent values that man alone gives birth to, as opposed to the transcendent ideals 
produced by various interest groups for the sake of the manipulation of human production 
toward a single type of human animal. On the contrary, revaluation inaugurates the process 
that will eventually reveal the possibility for a multiplicity of production(s). But why is the 
task of revaluation so urgent? What is the current state of humanity? Where have two 
millennia of Western/Christian values led humanity? What, in short, are the diagnostics of the 
present? 
Shortly after the pronouncement of the Overhuman as his core teaching, Zarathustra goes on 
to proclaim the inevitable arrival of a counter force: that of the last human. Who is the last 
human? The last human represents the culmination of two millennia of Christian/Western 
civilization. He is the human who has discovered happiness in the form of capitalist 
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consumption and shallow entertainment. He has left behind him all the wars of the past (for 
what good is antagonism?) and ‘rubs up’ against his neighbour, ‘for one needs the 
warmth’283. Our thesis is that the last human in TSZ reappears (under the new light of 
asceticism this time) in GM III: 28 as the man who “still prefers to will nothingness, than not 
to will…” In the legendary final passage of GM, the meaninglessness of suffering comes to 
be covered once and for all by the ascetic ideal, which places suffering ‘within the 
perspective of guilt’. The logic of GM III: 28 develops as follows: Man suffers; he finds no 
meaning to his suffering; the gate opens to suicidal nihilism; the priest comes to save the 
(biological) existence of man by offering him the (priest made version) ascetic ideal 
(degradation of earthly pleasures and promise of extra-worldly rewards)
284
; man now knows 
why he suffers (he suffers because he deserves it); man is saved
285
. 
The life of the man who is saved once and for all in the concluding chapter of GM is the life 
of the last human in TSZ. Albert Camus’ novel “The Fall” describes the overtaking of a life 
of superficial regularity by the forces of darkness and irrationality. “A bourgeois hell, 
inhabited of course by bad dreams”286. Camus thus characterizes the life of his protagonist, 
whereas for Nietzsche his last human has to numb his existence with the poison of mass 
produced ‘happiness’: “A little poison now and then: that makes for agreeable dreams,” 
adding, perhaps with a smirk: “And a lot of poison at the end, for an agreeable dying.”287  
The last human is not only the constant flirting with the nihilism that makes him Christian, as 
GM: III. 27 describes, but is also the product of a modernity that has gone off track. For 
Nietzsche’s teacher Jacob Burckhardt, modernity describes the long process of the 
trivialization of the human
288
. For Burckhardt, and the people that Alan S. Kahan has called 
aristocratic liberals
289
, modernity is inextricably linked with the threat of despotism, 
despotism embodied in the growing commercial spirit which overtakes every aspect of social 
and cultural life, from universities to the production of art, to the hegemony of one social 
class over all others (the rise of the middle classes and their -fashioned in the needs of 
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commercialism- ethics), and lastly to a highly centralized state that will eradicate every need 
of individual expression or initiative on behalf of the individual and subordinate it to the 
demands of a highly unified and (thus) unanimous/anonymous and heteronomous mass. For 
example, this has taken place in Blair’s ‘Cool’ Britannia with the rise of the ‘nanny state’.290 
In particular, it was Burckhardt who had elevated the notion of ‘diversity’ not only to a 
desirable feature of the kind of humanity of which modernity hinders its expression, but, 
more importantly, to that feature which defines the very idea of what Europe is all about 
contra the Orient. In that fashion he writes: “This is European: the expression of all powers, 
in sculpture, art and word, institutions and parties, up to the individual – the development of 
the intellect on all sides and in all directions – the striving of the mind to express everything 
within it, not, like the Orient, to silently surrender to world monarchies and theocracies.”291 In 
his magnum opus, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, Burckhardt continues to 
present the highest exemplar of mankind, the Renaissance’s Italian, as a figure of demonic 
energy and diversity, the complete opposite of that other (utterly fictional, of course) figure of 
calm and always-composed classical Greek which Winckelmann had devised. “The Italians 
of the fourteenth century knew little of false modesty or of hypocrisy in any shape; not one of 
them was afraid of singularity, of being and seeming unlike his neighbours.”292 Aristocratic 
Liberals push to the extreme this notion of an uncontrollable movement of diversity. It is not 
a matter of dilettantism for them; rather, it is the only possibility against a society that 
becomes increasingly homogenised. As the figure of the ‘demonic’ Renaissance man gets 
transfigured in Nietzsche’s promotion of a Dionysian ethics, so the tradition of Aristocratic 
Radicalism reverberates throughout TSZ in an attempt of the teacher-Zarathustra to turn his 
disciples from muttering apes (“Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: 
whoever feels differently goes voluntary to the madhouse.”)293 to autonomous individuals.  
What, then, is the last human? Is it just a warning as certain commentators seem to 
believe
294
? Does Nietzsche tells us, ‘Be careful, otherwise you are heading to the last 
human’? Isn’t it true that the humans have still chaos within them and they can thus still give 
birth to a dancing star?
295
 No, it is not! “The time will come [Es kommt die Zeit] when the 
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human will give birth to no more stars. Alas! There will come the time of the most despicable 
human, who is no longer able to despise himself.”296 The last human is not a warning in case 
things go wrong. The last human is the conclusion of man’s short walk upon the earth. It is 
how man ends and we do know that man is a conclusion (‘der Mensch ist ein Ende’)297. 
“Right here is where the destiny of Europe lies – in losing our fear of man we have also lost 
our love for him, our respect for him, our hope in him and even our will to be man. The sight 
of man now makes us tired – what is nihilism today if it is not that? ... We are tired of 
man…”298 and because we are tired of man… “‘We have invented happiness’ – say the last 
humans and they blink.”299 The time of the great despisers is over. Man does not despise 
himself. He is content. Man does not fear himself. For what is to be feared in this ‘tamed and 
civilized animal, this household pet’ that we have turned man into, from the beast of prey that 
he formerly was? And where there is nothing to be feared, what is to be respected? The 
Nietzschean man has respect only for the pioneers of the impossible and the untouchable, and 
we have turned man into something the sight of whom makes us tired. These are not the times 
when man falls in battle. These are the times of the last humans. These are the times when 
man dies with ten tubes coming out of his mouth, with computers following his ‘vital’ signs 
and a diet of pills to preserve his biological existence. These are the times of the end of all 
dignity, of all fear, of all hope. These are the times of the last humans. 
 
On democrats and other hooligans.  
 
The episode is quite known. In May 1871 during the last days of the Paris Commune—of 
what has come to be known as the ‘Week of Blood’—and while Thier’s soldiers are trying to 
retake the city, the Communards counter-attack and set on fire various buildings, the 
Tuileries Palace among them. The flames just threaten the Louvre but the European 
newspapers of the day report that the Louvre is on fire, along with the building the valuable 
artworks it houses. When the news reached Professor Friedrich Nietzsche of the University of 
Basel, he collapses. He cancels his class and proclaims: “This is the worst day of my life.” He 
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later writes: “When I heard of the fires in Paris, I felt for several days annihilated and was 
overwhelmed by fears and doubts.”300  
Nietzsche attacks the French Revolution ferociously and systematically throughout his 
oeuvre. In GM: 1, 16, Nietzsche describes the history of the West as a battleground of two 
opposite forces. This fight takes place chronologically in three periods. The first battle is that 
which can be summarized by the following script: ‘Rome against Judea, Judea against 
Rome’; Nietzsche goes on to suggest that “up to now there has been no greater event than this 
battle, this question, this contradiction of mortal enemies.”301 While Rome expresses the 
virile spirit of the extroverted masters, Judea symbolizes the degenerate spirit of ressentiment. 
It is the first ‘revolt in morals’ which the slaves instigate against their masters. The 
psychology of the slave (a man trained to live in the shadows in order to survive) is such that 
it enables him to become more prudent than the master and thus to prevail (“A race of such 
human beings of ressentiment in the end necessarily becomes more prudent [klüger] than any 
nobler race”302). In the second period, the classical spirit reawakens at the time of the (Italian) 
Renaissance, the most brilliant period of humanity, after the Greeks, and certainly the period 
to which modernity owns most of its positive characteristics. Nietzsche enumerates what we 
owe to the Renaissance: liberation of thought; disrespect of authorities; victory of education 
over the arrogance of ancestry; enthusiasm for science and the scientific past of mankind; 
unfettering of the individual; a passion of truthfulness and an aversion for appearance and 
mere effect
303
. Unfortunately the (Italian) Renaissance is to be defeated by the Germans, who 
should “have on their consciences all the great cultural crimes of four centuries!”, and 
specifically by this ‘disaster of a monk’ Luther, who “restored the church, and what is a 
thousand times worse, Christianity, at the very point when it was succumbing…”304 (German) 
Reformation stands for the ‘peasant rebellion of the Spirit’. Luther, by democratizing the 
Church, by turning every man into a priest, plebeianizes the Spirit; he declares his “abysmal 
hatred of ‘the higher human beings’”, who the priests, as the most spiritual (i.e. the most 
internalized) human beings, are. The third period marks what Nietzsche calls “the last great 
slave revolt”305. It is the period of the French Revolution; which is ‘great’ because no one can 
stand in the way of the infuriated slaves who have systematically trained over long periods to 
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consider their slave status as an injustice against existence itself. The revolt had been 
anticipated already from the time of the BT. There Nietzsche explains the paradox of 
Alexandrian culture, which both needs (as every healthy culture needs) a slave class as its 
foundation and also understands (since Alexandrian culture is the product of Socratic 
optimism) that such a division of society between masters and slaves cannot hold. This naïve 
optimism gives rise to notions such as ‘human dignity’ and ‘the dignity of labour’, which are 
designed to undermine the authority of the master race. The destruction of the master race 
nevertheless comes at the expense of the whole of society, since the slaves are on the way to 
destruction as such (it is possible then that the slaves will burn the Louvre since the Louvre is 
the symbol of the old order and the house of the artistic expression of a class that has to be 
destroyed). “There is nothing more terrible than a class of barbaric slaves which has learned 
to regard its existence as an injustice and which sets out to take revenge, not just for itself but 
for all future generations”306. This is the paradoxical situation where the slaves find 
themselves. They will take revenge against existence itself, which they have been trained to 
consider unfair.  
From within the fires and tribulations of the French Revolution “like a last signpost to the 
other path”307 Napoleon appears and, with his appearance an up-to-that-moment intellectual 
problem, becomes flesh: the problem of nobility. The much-quoted phrase “Napoleon, this 
synthesis of Unmench and Übermench…”308 is not a comment so much on Napoleon, as it is 
usually read, but on a problem that for Nietzsche was of fundamental importance. The 
problem is not whether a historical figure was simultaneously a ‘brute’ and a 
superman/genius, but rather: How is it possible for nobility itself to be simultaneously a 
combination of the lowest and the highest, and can it be possible for such an ‘unholy’  
combination to be maintained or even produced? This is the problem and Nietzsche will go 
on again and again to discuss it through positive assessments of nobility, as in ‘What is 
Noble?’ in BGE, or through negative assessments, as in ‘On the superior Human’ in TSZ, a 
fact that shows his lifelong struggle with this question. 
What happens after the French Revolution? Nietzsche stands undecided. In BGE (1886) the 
revolution is described as the last ‘great slave revolt’, whereas in  (1887) Nietzsche wonders: 
“Was it over after that? Was that greatest among all conflicts of ideals placed ad acta for 
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ever? Or just postponed indefinitely?...”309 Despite Nietzsche’s aversion to all kinds of 
teleologies, it is clear that in both cases (in BGE and in GM) the French Revolution describes 
an end of some sort; but that this end belongs not to the Nietzschean logic but to the logic of 
the ‘human history’, which Nietzsche recognizes as not his own. It is possible, then (which 
means that it belongs to the logic of the unfolding of human history so far), that the world 
does end with the triumph of slave morality (symbolized by the French Revolution)
310
. We 
thus revisit here the problem examined before, of whether the last human is an eternally 
postponed warning or an—immanent—reality. The response is to be, once more, that for 
Nietzsche, human history follows a path that leads it straight to its own demise through the 
destruction of all possible alternatives (moralities) and the triumph of the one mode 
(expressed by the herd morality) of human existence over all others: that of the content man.  
This (moral) decline of man from a wild (externalized) animal to a domesticated pet has been 
consistently produced and reproduced in the hospitable womb of democracy and by (and this 
is even perhaps of the greatest importance) the ideology created from and around the notion 
of democracy, what Nietzsche calls demokratishe Bewegung
311
 or demokratishe 
Gesamtbewegung
312
 (the whole democratic movement). Herman Siemens has shown
313
 that 
while Nietzsche had a rather underdeveloped understanding of democracy as a political term, 
he nevertheless uses the term democracy more as a cultural trait and not as a specific political 
activity. When he then speaks of “der demokratische Geschmack” (the democratic taste), this 
has to do with an attitude, a way of behaving or evaluating, rather than with the intricacies of 
political negotiations. As Siemens again notes, “Democracy, then refers primarily to a set of 
values or ideas—increasingly identified as one of a network of mere ‘modern ideas’ in 
                                                             
309 Ibid. 
310 For all of his disparaging comments for Hegel, we can see here the peculiar similarities between Nietzsche’s 
understanding of the final defeat of master morality and the subsequent triumph of the slaves and Hegel’s 
understanding of the ‘end of history’ (at least in Kojeve’s very interesting anthropological reading of Hegel), 
which coincides with the French Revolution: the final triumph of the State where all contradictions are resolved. 
For Hegel (through Kojeve and Fukuyama), the final resolution of all contradictions brings about the birth of a 
new type of human which Fukuyama calls “men without chests”: the content bourgeois of the modern Western 
liberal democracies, a man which personifies the utter opposition to Kojeve’s famous definition of man as 
‘action negating the given’. For more on that see: McCarney, Joseph. Hegel on History. London: Routledge. 
2000, p. 169-191. Kojeve, Alexander. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. H.J. Nichols (trans.) Ithaca & 
London: Cornell University Press. 1969, p. 208-210. Fukuyama, Francis. The end of history and the Last Man. 
New York: Free Press. 1992. Particularly part V, The Last Man. 
311 BGE: 242 
312 KSA 11: 26 [352]  
313 Siemens, W.H. “Nietzsche’s critique of democracy (1870-1886)”, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 38, 
2009 
89 
 
Nietzsche’s later writings—but also to a disposition, attitude, or type that flourishes and 
dominates under those values.”314  
To find out what a man of ‘democratic taste’ could look like, we have to begin with the 
primary (strictly political in character) understanding of democracy. The problem with that 
lies in the fact that Nietzsche never (at least to any considerable extent) speaks directly for it 
(thus his underdeveloped understanding of political terminology), but only indirectly. That 
from BGE onwards democracy is largely considered the offspring of Christianity, and 
Christianity the movement of the gradual degeneration of the West, does not offer great help 
toward the examination of the term democracy. Let us try, then, to examine the basic 
principles of democracy and Nietzsche’s relation to those principles. Giving a definition of 
democracy is notoriously difficult. Both the notion and the practice of it had such a 
tumultuous, and many times contradictory, development throughout history
315
 that it has 
come to mean the most contradictory things to the most contradictory people (and peoples). 
Let us, however, take as a starting point two of democracy’s most fundamental 
characteristics, as those have been galvanized through democracy’s long development in 
history. A political regime can be characterized as democratic if the following two 
(minimum) functions are at work: first, rule of the majority of the people and second, (some 
sort of) equality (at least that of status at birth).  
In the first chapter we examined in detail what Nietzsche’s objection to the first function 
would be. In the post-French Revolution West, democracy does not simply imply the 
kratos
316
 of the demos but the kratos of the majority. And while for the Greeks the demos was 
already both a limited and a selective proportion of the overall population of the city state
317
, 
with the profound influence that the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau had on the French 
revolutionaries, power now is to be held by all since everyone is tacitly a member of the 
general will. Under the rule of the majorities the current social situation is described by 
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Nietzsche as the ‘kingdom of the mob’ [das Reich des Pöbels]318. The present belongs to the 
mob which places their ‘small’ virtues, i.e. those virtues aiming at the biological preservation 
of the species (as opposed to the virtues aiming at the strengthening and the cultural elevation 
of mankind), in the service of the prevalent ideology of the day, which is none other than the 
Utilitarian principle—the “happiness of the greatest number”319—a principle, though, which 
represents the ‘greatest danger’ for the superior humans. The protest against the democratic 
mob follows in the wake of Plato’s criticism of democratic mentality. For Plato, democracy is 
responsible for bringing about a “class of idle and extravagant men”320, a class of people so 
softened by “the insatiable desire for freedom”321 that they are unable to exercise any control 
over their passions. The problem with democracy is that it is solely concerned with freedom 
instead of virtue. This freedom leads to an extreme relativism where all respect to authority is 
lost, and in that way all possibility of learning is lost also, since everyone is concerned only 
with being at the same place as the other, to have the same value as everyone else, neither 
higher (as a teacher does) nor lower. “A teacher in such a community is afraid of his students 
and flatters them, while the students despise their teachers or tutors. And, in general, the 
young imitate their elders and compete with them in word and deed, while the old stoop to 
the level of the young and are full of play and pleasantry, imitating the young for fear of 
appearing disagreeable and authoritarian.”322 For Socrates democracy seems to be just a step 
before anarchy and the demolition of all social distinctions. Nietzsche, except in his ‘middle 
period’, largely shares this opinion. Democracy represents the succumbing to the basest 
instincts of the mob when the role of culture should be the constant exercise to the 
untouchable and the impossible, i.e. a mission that only the rarest of individuals can 
undertake. For Nietzsche the role of society is to perfect the shortcomings of  nature
323
, what 
nature failed to do right, and this will be made possible if humanity is to align itself with what 
is exemplary instead of what is common and plebeian: “For the question is this: how can your 
life…receive the highest value…? Certainly only by your living for the good of the rarest and 
most valuable exemplars, and not for the good of the majority, that is to say those who, taken 
individually, are the least valuable exemplars.”324  
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The second function that a regime has to fulfil in order to be characterized as democratic is 
that of (some sort of) equality (before the Law). The idea is of course as old as the Greeks 
themselves. In his famous funeral oration, the Athenian leader Pericles asserts that the 
dynamic character of Athenian democracy depends on the security that every citizen feels by 
living in a state whose institutions judge all citizens equally without taking into consideration 
possession of wealth, social status etc. This Athenian dynamism is transmitted into the 
founding text of American politics and one of the most interesting products of the European 
enlightenment: the Declaration of Independence. To show the extent of Nietzsche’s distance 
from traditional notions of equality, it would be useful to compare a passage from the 
Declaration of Independence to a passage from TI. The first is well known:  “We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness.”325 How does Nietzsche respond to this? “The doctrine of equality!...But there is 
no more venomous poison in existence: for it appears to be preached by justice itself, it is 
actually the end of justice… ‘Equality to the equal; inequality to the unequal’ – that would be 
true justice speaking: and its corollary, ‘never make the unequal equal’.”326 Let us examine 
the two texts.  
The passage from the Declaration of Independence asserts the equal value of all people at 
birth. It is an honest text that does not hide its presuppositions. To the question of the 
philosopher who seeks to discover the source of men’s equality, the text gives its response: 
rights are endowed by the Creator (the Christian God in this case) and are guaranteed by 
Him. Insofar as the community of the faithful accepts this role for the Creator then their 
belief can indeed function as the connecting and most importantly the meaning-giving, 
ideology of the community. An offspring of the American declaration is ‘The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’ adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the 10th 
of December 1948. The experience of WWII had shown the rather questionable place of God 
in human affairs, as well as the need for a negotiation of differences among states that is 
based on ‘reason’ rather than on brute force. In that spirit the former guarantor of rights (the 
Christian God) is exiled and his place taken by this good-old Aristotelian faith in (in many 
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respects even vaguer notion) ‘Reason’327. In both cases the problem is obvious: The 
proclaimed equality of all people is based on rather shaky foundations. Religious societies 
may rest their hopes on an omnipotent God and secular societies may rest their hopes on the 
omnipotent reason, but in both cases the belief says something about the community’s needs 
whilst saying nothing about the foundation of belief.
328
 Nietzsche spots the problematic 
character of ‘the doctrine of equality’. It is supposed to be preached by ‘justice’ (God) itself, 
but is that really the case? What if the metaphysical claim of justice were replaced by a non-
metaphysical claim, a claim produced by the tensions among the different social strata that 
constitute a society instead of a religious belief to the justificatory role of a transcendent 
entity? Nietzsche replaces the democratic belief in equality (Gleichheit in German with all 
the reverberations of ‘uniformity’, ‘identity’, ‘sameness’ that the word radiates) with a belief 
in a kind of equality that is distributed among members of the same class but not among 
members of different classes: ‘equality to the equal; inequality to the unequal’. In the place of 
the horizontality of equality, Nietzsche will place the verticality of Rangordnung (order of 
rank) and with this move he will try to envisage the politics of the future. In what follows we 
will examine the paramount importance that this idea has to Nietzschean politics.  
 
The problem of orientation in Nietzschean politics. Verticality, horizontality or 
circularity? Upwards, downwards or all over? 
 
Sometime in 1884 Nietzsche writes in his notebooks: “In this age of suffrage universel, in 
which everybody is allowed to sit in judgement upon everything and everybody, I feel 
compelled to re-establish order of rank.”329 It is indeed a great distance that separates this 
Nietzsche from the Nietzsche of the perspectival theory of truth, anti-foundationalism, de-
centred subjectivity, distrust to all authorities etc. The problem of the discontinuity between 
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Nietzsche’s political views and Nietzsche’s ‘philosophy’ has troubled commentators for a 
long time, who, in the absence of any satisfactory solution to the problem, usually decide to 
choose a side and go along with it ignoring the apparent contradictions of the whole 
Nietzschean problematic. In that spirit Mark Warren has spoken about the existence of “two 
Nietzsches”, the ‘political’ one and the ‘philosophical’ one who seem to be in opposition to 
each other. Warren continues: “Nietzsche’s own politics…violates the intellectual integrity of 
his philosophical project. Viewed through his politics, Nietzsche’s philosophy becomes crude 
and uninteresting.”330 The above statement is problematic for two reasons. First, it assumes 
the existence on behalf of Nietzsche of some ‘philosophical’ project, but given Nietzsche’s 
explicit renunciation of any systematic character of his work in the notorious TI: 26 (“I 
mistrust all systematisers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity”), 
Warren’s statement is invalid. Second, if Nietzsche does not have a system, as he proclaims, 
then the ‘two’ Nietzsches do not have to reconcile. They simply have to coexist.  
In a similar spirit Keith Ansell-Pearson has drawn attention to the (apparent) distance 
between the authoritarian spirit of Nietzsche’s politics and the liberating effects of his 
philosophy. He writes: “…what strikes one about his [Nietzsche’s] ‘Dionysian’ philosophical 
thinking is the extent to which it undermines the foundations on which his conception of 
political order is constructed.”331 Don Dombowsky332 has rightly pointed out a 
misunderstanding lurking at this conception of the ‘Dionysian’. While the ‘Dionysian’ may 
indeed denote overcoming which again, as Ansell-Pearson notes, “implies the necessity of 
overcoming fixed boundaries, divisions and orders of rank”333, one has to wonder whether 
overcoming serves some purpose (which is not to say that it also serves a telos) or it takes 
place as part of a general picture of life that misunderstands itself for some kind of hippie-
style general licentiousness. This is certainly not the case for Nietzsche, with all of his 
adoration for ‘discipline and command’. Nietzsche places his attention on a different 
conception of the Dionysian, which is for him more fruitful and more possible to aid the 
necessary process of overcoming which is life. His own version describes the kind of virtue 
that every active-nihilist (that is to say: every creator) has to have in life: a desire for 
“destruction, for change and for becoming” as an expression of “an overflowing energy 
pregnant with the future”; but then the same desire to destruction that gives birth to creation 
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and impregnates the future can also express “the hatred of the ill-constituted, deprived, and 
underprivileged one who destroys and must destroy because what exists, indeed all existence, 
all being, outrages and provokes him.”334 Nietzsche calls this human-type ‘our anarchists’. 
The Dionysian thus is an energy directing itself to a changing yet always clearly visible goal. 
To suggest otherwise would be to suggest that human existence lacks a goal
335
. But human 
existence does have a goal which is none other than the overcoming of obstacles (clearly 
defined every time).  
In another, rather neglected, aphorism, Nietzsche describes himself as someone whose 
“nature is designed entirely for brief habits”, for brief habits allow one “to know many things 
and states down to the bottom of their sweetnesses and bitternesses”, while on the other hand, 
‘enduring habits’ (Nietzsche gives the examples of permanent professional position, 
permanent human relations, permanent residence, even an enduring ‘good health’) are like 
‘tyrants’ to every ‘free-spirit’. The aphorism concludes with an interesting thought: “To me 
the most intolerable, the truly terrible, would of course be a life entirely without habits, a life 
that continually demanded improvisation – that would be my exile and my Siberia.”336 The 
Dionysian, then, is clearly the opposite of a life that demands constant improvisation (is this 
kind of life possible at all?) the opposite of a life that exhausts itself in constant attacks on 
illusory enemies; rather, the Dionysian denotes a life aligning itself to the (equally 
impossible) overhuman demand for a “new, tremendous aristocracy, based on the severest 
self-legislation, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artists-tyrants will be 
made to endure for millennia…”337 An aristocracy heralding perhaps “…das Zarathustra-
Reich von tausend Jahren”338? 
While clearly a Dionysian life denotes much more than a state of general permissiveness, this 
does not, however, solve the central political problem of authority, which Nietzsche is not in 
any rush to tackle. While the notion of Rangordung certainly holds a special charm to him, in 
other aphorisms he is quick to disassociate the life of the aristocracies from the lives of those 
who do not belong to them. In D: 124 and especially in BGE: 202, Nietzsche promotes the 
idea of ‘multiple moralities’. A morality here is a way of evaluating which is utilised in order 
to promote specific purposes. It is implied, although not clearly expressed, that differing 
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peoples can have differing moralities and that differing groups (within the same cultures) can 
also have differing moralities. In an unpublished note from 1887, he clarifies: “The ideas of 
the herd should rule in the herd – but not reach beyond it.”339 In another note from 1883 he 
notes that against the levelling effects that the current model of Christian/Western civilization 
had upon humans, his own movement aims at the opening up of all antithesis, of all 
contradictions and of all chasms. Not to connect is the aim but to separate since the tension 
produced by separation presumably is advantageous to culture, as in the case of the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian. “The goal is absolutely not to conceive the latter as masters of 
the former. But two types and species are to exist side by side – separated as far as possible; 
like the gods of Epicurus the one paying no heed to the other.”340 Nietzsche never resolves 
the multiple tensions created by his seemingly contradictory statements. But as we are going 
to suggest later
341
, a final resolution was perhaps never a part of his plans, not only because 
‘resolving’ heralds the collapse of tension and thus the collapse of creativity, but also because 
the purpose of the development of his concepts of ‘agon’ and ‘power’ is precisely to 
safeguard the possibility of an everlasting tension, the possibility of a final non-resolution, 
which leaves the space open for further experimentations and overcomings.  
 
Genius and greatness in German Idealism and Nietzsche. 
 
The notion of ‘genius’ has a long and multifaceted history in German Idealism. Although in 
Kant and Schopenhauer it is mainly linked to issues of aesthetic production, and thus it is not 
the same as the notion of ‘greatness’ to Nietzsche, for whom it refers mainly to a web of 
attributes characteristic of the higher individuals in their separateness from the mass of 
mankind, it is nevertheless also linked to this very Nietzschean notion of the inability to judge 
the exceptional, since the one who is called to judge it, is not himself a part of it, and he can 
thus not participate in the rules according to those judged as the exceptional.  In the ‘Analytic 
of the Sublime’, Kant introduces the notion of ‘genius’ as a way of explaining the 
transcendental conditions of the possibility of the production of fine art
342
. According to his 
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definition: “Genius is the talent (natural endowment) that gives the rule to art. Since talent is 
an innate productive ability of the artist and as such belongs itself to nature, we could also put 
it this way: Genius is the innate mental predisposition (ingenium) through which nature gives 
the rule to art.”343 For our purposes it is important to note that the ‘Genius’ is not “a 
predisposition consisting of a skill for something that can be learned by following some rule 
or other.”344 Thus Genius is unknown to itself, since it obeys only the necessity of nature 
which produces it. Kant is adamant that “if an author owes a product to his genius, he himself 
does not know how he came by the ideas for it; nor is it in his power [Gewalt] to device such 
products at his pleasure, or by following a plan, and to communicate [his procedure] to others 
in precepts that would enable them to bring about like products.”345 It is nature, paragraph 46 
concludes, that uses the Genius as the medium for the prescription of the ‘rule’ of art and 
Genius is a Genius to the extent that he acts as the medium of nature.  
 For Schopenhauer, a ‘genius’ stands above the world of ordinary experience; he has the 
ability “temporarily to put one’s interests, willing and purposes entirely out of mind, and 
consequently, fully to relinquish one’s personality in order to remain as the pure cognitive 
subject”. Schopenhauer uses the metaphor of genius as the ‘clear eye of the world’; it is 
“nothing other than the most perfect objectivity”346. However, the true realm of genius is the 
field of Art, and this is because the Genius can overcome the actual and, through a 
heightening of perception, create a more perfect picture of life than that of conceptual 
thinking; “For this reason imagination is needed, in order to complete, arrange, amplify, fix, 
retain, and repeat at pleasure all the significant pictures of life.”347 Exactly because the 
Genius is able to move beyond the word of individuated Will and grasp the eternal Ideas, true 
geniuses are rare and incommunicable beings. “He is too rare to be capable of easily coming 
across his like, and too different from the rest to be their companion.” The Genius lives a life 
of solitude away from the rest of society which does not understand that which exceeds the 
average. “They [the geniuses] will therefore feel more at ease with their equals, although as a 
rule this is possible only through the works they have left behind.”348 
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In his ‘Lectures on the Philosophy of World History’ and all of its versions, Hegel advances 
the notion of the ‘world historical individual’ as an instrument of the Spirit which will help 
the development of the idea of freedom in its historical unfolding. The Spirit and the world 
historical individuals coincide. “Such are the great men of history: the substance of their own 
particular ends is the will of the world spirit.”349 The need of the Spirit to advance and to 
develop is something existing intrinsically in every individual, but they are too much 
preoccupied with their own interests to realize this need of the Spirit. The great individuals 
fulfil exactly that role. They are “the first to formulate the desires of their fellows 
explicitly.”350 The following passage exhibits in detail both the role of the great individuals 
and why people follow them. “For the spirit in its further evolution is the inner soul of all 
individuals, although it remains in a state of unconsciousness until great men call it to life. It 
is the true object of all men’s desires…they follow these leaders of the souls because they 
feel the irresistible power of their own inner spirit pulling them in the same direction.”351 
Hegel gives as examples of great individuals Caesar, Alexander, and Napoleon. Hegel’s 
admiration for Napoleon is well-known. Regarding the event of Napoleon’s victory in the 
battle of Jena, Hegel wrote: “The Emperor—this world soul—riding on horseback through 
the city to the review of his troops — it is indeed a wonderful feeling to see such a man.”352 
Hegel applauds Napoleon because it is on occasions like that that the Spirit advances to a 
higher level. Something old dies and something new is born. Similarly in the case of 
Alexander, even if many see Alexander’s imperialism as a product of the decline of the Greek 
spirit, the old world dies and a new epoch arises. Commentators sympathetic to Hegel, such 
as Joseph McCarney, have tried to explain the source of the power that the world historical 
individuals possess. “The source of their power is not sheer genius imposing its vision on a 
recalcitrant (unruly) world but a precocious gift of interpretation which reveals the world’s 
own emergent vision of itself. What matters is not the ability to swim against the tide but the 
ability to catch it early and use it full. The great historical figures are servants of a larger 
purpose, not autonomous creators and masters of events. So much is this the case that their 
individuality seems wholly absorbed in their mission: ‘What they are is just their deed; their 
passion comprises the range of their nature, their character.’ Moreover, their lives are utterly 
consumed in its pursuit: ‘When their end is attained they fall aside like Caesar, or are 
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deported like Napoleon’”353 Finally, Hegel is eager to stress that the acts and the deeds of the 
world’s great individuals are not to be judged according to the common morality, because 
their acts overcome every sense of established norms. “The litany of private virtues –
modesty, humility, chastity, liberality, etc. - must not be raised against them.”354 Who is able 
to judge a Napoleon or an Alexander? By whose criteria are they going to be judged? And 
equally, who is going to set limits to their actions? Or more importantly, how are they going 
to be recognized at all?  The degree of similarity between the views of Hegel and the 18 year 
old student Friedrich Nietzsche of the prestigious Schulpforta is extraordinary. In a school 
essay aiming to support the dictatorship of Napoleon III, the young Nietzsche notes: “The 
genius is governed by other and higher laws than the ordinary person, laws that often seem to 
contradict the general principles of morality and law, even though they are the same when 
perceived from the broadest points of view.”355 Nietzsche, despite of all his abhorrence for 
Hegel, continuous the Hegelian problematic regarding both the justification and the possible 
or impossible recognition of great individuals by the rest of society. His stand is the defence 
of an aristocratic stratification of society in the service of the production of exemplary 
individuals and the idealization of greatness, a notion certainly coming from the German 
Romantics even though Nietzsche never acknowledged this.  
An aristocracy, as the word denotes, is the authority (kratos) of those who are aristoi 
(excellent). As we have seen before, ‘the present’ is characterized by Nietzsche as a 
‘kingdom of the mob’ (das Reich des Pöbels)356 in which everyone is entitled to judge 
everything and everyone else without knowledge or training of any kind. Following Plato’s 
critique of democracy, Nietzsche also believes that there is something deeply un-natural in 
the equalization of the value of citizens in modern democracies. By the term un-natural we 
wish to signify exactly that: the situation in the modern democratic West is dire insofar as it 
is against nature. In the infamous BGE: 259, life is described as “essentially a process of 
appropriating, injuring, overpowering the alien and the weaker, oppressing, being harsh, 
imposing your own form, incorporating, and at least, the very least exploiting”357. Life is 
characterized by a constant movement in which the forces that constitute an organism fight 
for their preservation and expansion and in this same passage life is associated with the ‘Will 
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to Power’, the movement that describes a process that takes place in three steps of 
appropriation, incorporation, and exploitation. The last refers to the use for the organism’s 
advantage of a hostile element. The notion of the ‘will to power’ as used by Nietzsche is not 
synonymous with what we could call ‘life’. When Nietzsche uses the word ‘life’ in BGE: 
259, he is using it as a synonym of the ‘will to power’ which is an antonym of the non-
Nietzschean notion of life. What is the difference? ‘Growth’ is one of the components of the 
‘Will to Power’, but it is only in a very limited degree also an element of life whose main 
characteristic is a will to survival not of a will to expansion beyond itself. Unlike 
Schopenhauer’s ‘will to life’ and Spinoza’s ‘conatus’, the main characteristic of the ‘Will to 
Power’ is “precisely not to want to preserve itself”358. The will to preservation, the will to 
sustain the organism in its current form, is for Nietzsche only a characteristic of the herd, not 
of single organisms: “the herd seeks to maintain a type…The herd tends towards standstill 
and survival; there is nothing creative in it.”359 Willing to live, then, in the sense of wanting 
to maintain an organism in biological existence, has absolutely nothing to do with the 
Nietzschean understanding of ‘will to power’/life which can be called thus only insofar as it 
describes that which wants to overcome itself even by putting in danger its own biological 
existence. What is at work in the ‘will to power’ is a “desire to become master, to become 
more, to become stronger”360. Democracy is then un-natural because it prohibits the 
expression of life as a force of appropriation and incorporation, and instead elevates the 
common to the status of aristos, thus taking away the possibility of judgment since all values 
(what Nietzsche is most interested in) occupy the same (Gleich) space as Plato has shown 
with his example of the teacher and the student. Nietzsche’s response to this age of suffrage 
universel is to re-establish the ‘order of rank’ which is part of his grand program of re-
naturalizing humanity. When Rousseau turns his eyes back to the past he sees ‘happy’ 
savages living in a state of nature, in the ‘compassionate’ atmosphere of the pre-civilized 
world. But when Nietzsche sees nature he sees something entirely different, namely ‘order of 
rank’ and ‘pathos of distance’.  
What is the ‘order of rank’? In The Anti-Christ Nietzsche presents the social structure 
developed in Manu-Smrti, the book of laws compiled by the legendary Hindu lawgiver Manu, 
as that social system which is most aligned to the demands of nature. To be sure, the structure 
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of that system is highly hierarchical. At the top of the pyramid stands the highest caste, ‘the 
few’ who find happiness where other people would find their downfall “in labyrinths, in 
harshness towards themselves and towards others…”, and “they relax by playing with vices 
that would overwhelm others”361. In the middle of the pyramid are the “custodians of the law, 
the guardians of order and security”, who are closer to the very few at the top, and they are 
assigned the ‘crude’ work of commanding the ‘mediocre’ which is the grand majority of 
society. What is interesting about Nietzsche’s description of the three classes is what 
legitimates the functioning of the grand majority as a ‘wheel’ for the rest of society. 
Nietzsche says that what differentiates the few from the many is the “the type of their 
happiness [die Art Glück]”362. This is certainly a strange (and very original indeed!) thing to 
suggest: that social stratification is based not on wealth (as Marx would have it) nor on 
intelligence (as racist groups would have it) nor on capacities (as the Neoliberals would want 
it) but on…happiness! For Nietzsche, what makes you happy defines your place in the social 
order. We have seen what makes the ‘few’ happy. They like to experiment, to overcome 
themselves, to be hard on themselves and others, and they play with their vices. They are as 
the nobles are in the first essay of GM; they find happiness in “strong, free, happy action”363, 
and additionally they are ascetics (i.e. internalized in the highest degree) and have used 
ascetic practices to their advantage. In Nietzsche’s biological vocabulary, the ‘few’ behave 
like a ‘single organism’; they have only contempt for their biological existence. They are 
willing to ‘risk their lives’ in the service of the project of overcoming: this is their happiness, 
this is a noble happiness. On the contrary, once again, we see of what the happiness of the 
majority consists: resentfulness for the rights of the ‘few’ and to be stubbornly clinging to the 
value of their petty, uncreative lives. Nietzsche believes that the people par excellence who 
express this type of petty happiness are: “The socialist rabble, the Chandala-apostles who 
undermine workers’ ‘instincts and pleasures, their feelings of modesty about their little 
existences — who make them jealous, who teach them revenge.”364 
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The mention of socialism is not accidental. As a philosophy of life, socialism is the natural 
extension of the democratic mentality. It wishes primarily two things: excessive state power 
and ‘happiness for all’. For the aristocratic liberals, like Jacob Burckhardt, increasing the 
power of the state can only endanger the possibility of the self-development of the individual, 
since one of the principal effects of the centralization of power is the control of it and the 
channelling of it to whatever ends the state considers appropriate. In the same spirit Nietzsche 
also thinks that the aim of the “Caesarean despotic state” that is developed under socialism is 
the “annihilation of the individual”. In a truly libertarian manner he expresses his support for 
“as little state as possible”365, and in TSZ the state has to be left behind altogether if the road 
is to be opened for the Overhuman.
366
 The second thing that socialism wishes is the 
permanent abolition of conflict in human societies. A noble aim for every humanist and the 
fatal stroke to humanity for everyone, like Nietzsche, believing that the only possibility for 
the evolution of individuals
367
 is the preservation and further cultivation of the agonistic core 
of both the human psyche and the human communities.  
  
A note on terminology: What is the meaning of Grosse Politik? 
 
Fortunately, the time of ‘rescuing’ Nietzsche by turning him to a hardly recognizable 
advocate of a ‘blurry’ cult of self-fashioning and a neo-Buddhist eternal self-creation, taking 
place away from the institutions which produce humans, has passed. The scholarship of the 
future will show not only the responsibility of those who failed to listen to Nietzsche’s 
warning regarding the stultifying results of power
368
, but also of all those who wished to turn 
Nietzsche into a ‘safe’ academic subject and an object of discussions going nowhere. It was 
the project of Walter Kaufmann and his followers today (from the whole spectrum of 
philosophical studies) to depoliticize Nietzsche so as to make him digestible, ironically to 
precisely the kind of humanity that Nietzsche believed is not and cannot be his audience: the 
liberal, democrat of today’s fragmented European societies. If Nietzsche speaks at all then 
his voice comes from the future and is directed to the future. It is the voice of justice. But a 
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justice other that what we have been trained to call justice: a misnomer for the revenge of the 
‘barbaric classes of slaves’ in BT which have been trained to consider their existence as an 
injustice, and for that they seek only revenge.
369
 Because justice speaks otherwise and its 
voice is hardly recognizable to present day humans, it can only exist as a demand of those 
who are to come from a time beyond Christian guilt and its ramifications in politics (in the 
form of equal rights for all), in morality (in the form of selected production of humans), and 
in metaphysics (in the form of the belief in binary oppositions). “For when the truth squares 
up to the lie of millennia, we will have upheavals, a spasm of earthquakes, a removal of 
mountain and valley such as have never been dreamed of. The notion of politics will then 
completely dissolve into a spiritual war, and all configurations of power from the old society 
will be exploded – they are all based on a lie: there will be wars such as there have never yet 
been on earth. Only since I came on the scene has there been great politics on earth.”370 The 
above passage, aside from its rhetorical force for the sake of impression, also expresses a 
deep yet unacknowledged movement in Nietzsche’s thought. If there has been a kind of 
politics which creates only lies, then there must be a new kind of politics which will expose 
those ‘lies of millennia’ and will turn humanity from an existence directed to the preservation 
of its biological reality at any cost toward the production of new forms of human existence, of 
great individuals and philosophers of the future who, through their inhuman self-discipline, 
will justify human existence on earth by creating great works of art: themselves as others. 
And yet Nietzsche is adamant: “Every philosophy which believes that the problem of 
existence is touched on, not to say solved, by a political event is a joke – and pseudo 
philosophy.”371 Throughout his writings Nietzsche consistently attacks the association of 
philosophy and culture with a certain kind of politics. Our claim, then, is that Nietzsche 
attacks not all forms of politics but only this kind of politics dedicated to the production of a 
certain type of human (the Christian) and a certain type of European (the 19
th
 century 
nationalist), and that, on the contrary, he privileges the kind of politics which is dedicated to 
multiple productions of humans (a reverse experiment in terms of morality) within a 
continent which will have overcome the petty nationalisms of the 19
th
 century. There are then 
two distinct understandings of politics in Nietzsche, one that can be called ‘petty’ and the 
other which he calls ‘grosse Politik’.  
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Petty politics is a by-product of the civilizing process as defined earlier in this chapter. It is 
this political procedure which is dedicated to the production of a single type (Typus Mensch) 
of human existence primarily through the morality of custom (remember that the problem 
that Nietzsche has with Christian morality is not primarily that it is harmful for this or that 
but that it claims universality – it wishes to be the only morality!). Petty politics is 
inextricably linked to the political institutions of the present (or the political institutions in 
Nietzsche’s time). For this reason, every attack on ‘petty’ politics is simultaneously an attack 
on ‘Germans’ or the politics of the Bismarkean Reich. In aphorism 377 from the fifth book of 
GS, we the good Europeans must oppose German nationalism and racial hatred. We can 
resist ‘petty’ politics because unlike the Germans we are “too well-informed” and “too well-
travelled”. Unlike the urban inhabitants of the modern European cities, we like to wonder ‘in 
mountains, apart’. In EH ‘petty’ politics is associated with an attack on culture: “this most 
anticultural sickness and unreason there is, nationalism, this nevrose nationale with which 
Europe is sick, this perpetration of European particularism, of petty politics.”372 Back to GS: 
377, to this European particularism, we the good Europeans and the philosophers of the future 
know of no home: we are “homeless...too diverse and racially mixed”, and for these reasons 
we are the true heirs “of millennia of European spirit”. 
‘Petty’ politics is a politics which cannot understand political procedure outside the 
framework of the Nation-State. Indeed its pettiness describes the very essence of the state 
thus: “coldest of all cold monsters”373. But it is again the German insistence on turning the 
state into the organizer of every aspect of human activity, and forcing it to speak in the name 
of the people, which is to be blamed. Whereas the Hellenic Will produced society due to “a 
mysterious connection... between the state and art, political greed and artistic creation, 
battlefield and work of art”374, the Germans have only managed, through the success of 
Hegelian philosophy and its “apotheosis of the state”375, to subordinate culture and education 
to the demands of the preachers of the “education of the people” (i.e. those who promote “a 
speedy education” for the sake of future money-earning beings376), and those who “misuse 
politics as an instrument of the stock exchange”377. 
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If ‘petty’ politics is successful in that it created the European of today—a democratized spirit, 
this unparalleled attack on the rank-order of nature, the enemy of everything great, everything 
rare, and everything worth living for—what is to be our response, the response of the good 
Europeans and of those who have not wished the subordination of culture to the politics of 
the day? In The Wanderer and His Shadow our task is “to prepare the way for that still 
distant state of things in which the good Europeans will come into possession of their great 
task: the direction and supervision of the total culture of the earth.”378 ‘Grosse Politik’ is to 
be alas only a very partial but yet very valuable attempt to provide an answer to the greatest 
question in political theory (at least political theory as understood within a Nietzschean 
perspective). To be sure, humanity has bread a number of ‘valuable types’ (höherwerthigere 
Typus), what Nietzsche in Antichrist finds out will be his guiding thought in his later years 
and the main question of a Nietzschean politics: “This more valuable type has appeared often 
enough already: but only as a stroke of luck, as an exception, never as willed.”379 The quest 
for the willed production of the exception is to be the task of the grand politics.  
The term ‘Grosse Politik’ has been associated with Bismarck’s blood and iron politics 
concerning the necessity of the unification of Germany at any cost. The term is very much 
around in newspapers and public debates from 1862 onwards. In BGE: 241 Nietzsche is 
highly dismissive of the need for ‘Grosse Politik’: “This is the age of the masses: they lie 
prostrate in front of anything massive. And the same in politics too. They call a statesman 
‘great’ if he builds them a new tower of Babel or some sort of monstrosity of empire and 
power...”380 In various aphorisms381 Nietzsche associates the ‘Grosse Politik’ with the 
psychological need for power felt by the masses, a need which subsequently paves the way 
for the ‘spiritual impoverishment’ of the nation. When politics is solely understood as power-
politics, then, “the political emergence of a people almost necessarily draws after it a spiritual 
impoverishment and enfeeblement and a diminution of the capacity for undertakings 
demanding great concentration and application.”382 
At the end of his treatise on the constitution of a virtuous character and a ‘good’ life, the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle comes to the realization that any examination on ethical 
matters is destined to remain incomplete insofar as it is not to be followed by the legislating 
                                                             
378 HATH: The Wanderer and his shadow: 87 
379 AC: 3 
380 BGE: 241 
381 HATH: 481, D: 189 
382 HATH: 481 
105 
 
activity inherent both in politics and in ethics. For Aristotle, as for Nietzsche too, philosophy 
is a nomothetic activity, a study and also an experiment on legislation. “...he who wants to 
make men...better by his care must try to become capable of legislating,” says Aristotle, and 
the book X concludes thus: “Now our predecessors have left the subject of legislation to us 
unexamined; it is perhaps, therefore, that we should ourselves study it, and in general study 
the question of the constitution, in order to complete to the best of our ability the philosophy 
of human nature.”383 Aristotle certainly recognizes the interconnection between ethics and 
politics, but we would like to push this connection even more. Tracy B. Strong has 
successfully argued that in Nietzsche the problem of morality is not associated with the health 
of particular individuals but with the health of society as a whole. The first essay of GM 
makes this apparent. There, as Strong argues, the investigation into the origin of moral 
categories “depends on the desire to assert power over another group of people – and under 
slave morality to control and render them predictable”. His conclusion, which we fully accept 
and endorse here, is the following: “all morality is fundamentally a form of politics”384. This 
wider definition of politics helps us to better contextualize Nietzsche’s understanding of the 
necessity of Grosse Politik and the way with which this once-mocked notion comes to be 
internalized by Nietzsche and used for his own purposes. 
Historical research
 
has shown
385
  that from the time of Zarathustra (parts 1, II: 1883) 
onwards, Nietzsche starts to use the term Grosse Politik as either a synonym or a 
precondition for the production of higher individuals. Specifically, there are two very 
interesting passages from the Nachlass of May-July 1885. The first notes that: “The highest 
Europeans, precursors of Grand Politics”386. A couple of aphorisms later we find the 
following: “The new philosopher can only emerge in conjunction with a ruling caste, as its 
greatest spiritualization. Grand Politics, the total government of the earth is near; complete 
lack of principles for that.”387 This Nachlass note is naturally very similar to the notorious 
opening of aphorism 257 BGE: “Every enhancement so far in the type “man” has been the 
work of an aristocratic society...”. One could also add here the draft letter from December 
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1888 to Georg Brandes, where he describes his work The Antichrist as “Grosse Politik par 
excellence”388.  
Commentators agree that from 1885 onwards Nietzsche leaves behind the term Grosse Politik 
as utilized by German nationalistic circles, and starts to use the term in order to describe his 
own vision of a transfigured Western civilization.
389
 Keith Ansell-Pearson notes that it is 
around this time that “Nietzsche embraces a Machiavellian-inspired politics, which believes it 
is able to justify its despotic rule through the cultivation of a higher and nobler culture.”390 
Grand Politics becomes now the principle project concerning the “breeding of a new caste to 
rule Europe”391. And yet the ‘despotic rule’ of which Ansell-Pearson speaks is already 
present in Nietzsche’s thought as early as 1871, and the ‘Greek State’ where Nietzsche had, 
notoriously, justified the necessity of slavery as the precondition of all culture. “The misery 
of men living a life of toil has to be increased to make the production of the world of art 
possible for a small number of Olympian men.”392 The utilization of a type of (Grand) 
politics which is going to safeguard the possibility of multiple human productions against the 
levelling effect of Western/Christian civilization is present even in embryonic form from the 
very start of Nietzsche’s contemplations on culture. Indeed, this type of Grand politics, 
hierarchical in type and authoritarian in style, is judged to be inextricably linked to the very 
character of culture which describes the process of production of great humans (not artworks) 
perhaps necessarily against the well-being of the working masses. ‘Grand Politics’ is then by 
name only utilised late in Nietzsche’s work, while in principle it is present from the very 
start. 
 We have seen that the role of culture is the production of great individuals or true human 
beings, and this means: the cultivation of the conditions which will allow the multiplication of 
the forces constituting the human subject. The petty politics of European particularism is but 
a by-product of an approach to culture concentrating at the monopoly of production of human 
types. In GM the process whereby the inversion of the aristocratic values takes place and the 
new—Judaic in origin—valuation is described as a ‘grand politics of revenge’393. Against 
this most spiritual revenge an unleashing of the dormant forces constituting this field of 
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antithetical powers—the human—is called on. “The time for petty politics is over: the next 
century will bring the struggle for the domination of the earth – the compulsion to great 
politics.”394 Nietzsche collapses on the streets of Turin at the 3 of January 1889. His very last 
notebook, dated December 1888–beginning 1889, is titled ‘Die grosse Politik’, which means 
that Nietzsche spends the last 32 days of his (sane) life writing on the theme of ‘grosse 
Politik’. This is his final testimony. In these few pages the subject of the spiritualization of 
war, found in EH, returns. Taking once more the figure of Anti-Christ, Nietzsche declares the 
war “zwischen Willen zum Leben und Rachsucht gegen das Leben”395 (between the will to 
live and desire for revenge against life). The text is reminiscent of Matthew 10:34 when Jesus 
declares his own version of war: “Μὴ νομίσητε ὅτι ἦλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν• οὐκ 
ἦλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνην ἀλλὰ μάχαιραν.”396 Similarly, Nietzsche begins with: “Ich bringe den 
Krieg.” He brings the war, but neither “zwischen Volk und Volk” (between people and 
people), nor “zwischen Ständen” (between social classes). His war (the ‘grosse Politik’) is 
directed against those taking revenge at life (“Der christliche Priester ist die lasterhafteste Art 
Mensch” — the priest is the most deprived type of man) or against the Christian majority 
(“die Gemeinheit der Zahl” — the nastiness of numbers). The aim of ‘Grosse Politik’ is 
nothing less than the great synthetic act of the future, “die Menschheit als Ganzes und 
Höheres zu züchten” (to breed a higher and complete humanity). In early Nietzsche both the 
act of ‘breeding’ (culture is the ‘production of true human beings’) and the act of synthesising 
(culture is ‘unity of style’) belong to the realm of culture. In later Nietzsche, culture retreats 
and its place is filled by ‘Grosse Politik’. Certainly the two are not the same. They describe 
nevertheless the same willingness and the same fundamental goal toward a reverse 
experiment, through which humanity will produce what couldn’t be produced up to now, the 
Übermensch: “something perfect, completely formed, happy, powerful, triumphant, in which 
there is still something to fear! Of a human being who justifies man himself; a human being 
who is a stroke of luck, completing and redeeming man, and for whose sake one may hold 
fast to belief in man.”397 
We have seen so far Nietzsche’s relentless attack on the current model of culture which is 
dominated by the values of Christianity, as well as the values of a transfigured Christianity, 
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namely the values of the modern democratic West. Nietzsche’s early preoccupation with 
culture as the possibility of setting the West free from the bounds of authoritarian Christianity 
come to be replaced by his new interest in a peculiar kind of anti-politics, which, although 
rejecting the political project of the present (equality, safety, well-being), embraces another 
kind of Über-politics that goes beyond the petty arrangements of the present (what petty 
politics occupies itself with) toward a politics which is going to direct humanity away from 
the West’s final conclusion: the last man, the petty bourgeois. This type of Über-politics is 
going to be founded on the reverse principles of the petty politics of the present. Its aims are 
not going to be ‘equality, safety and well-being’ but rather the production of those conditions 
which will allow the perennial protection of the possibility of conflict as the only way toward 
a creative future.  
 
Second Part: Towards a politics of perpetual conflict. The uncanny Nietzschean 
contribution. 
 
Mapping the history of resistance.  
 
It is hardly surprising that for the author of the essay “A renewed attempt to answer the 
question: ‘Is the human race continually improving?’” politics should aim at the constitution 
of a perpetual state of ‘peace’, which, strangely enough, is already guaranteed by ‘Nature 
herself’ who with her hidden—yet purposeful—plan leads men through the abolition of all 
violence to the final state of the one peaceful cosmopolitan state
398
. Thus spake the Liberal 
thought of all times. Yet for all of his positivism, Kant was never naïve. While he recognizes 
that men—in spite of themselves—work always to fulfil the work of Nature (as Hegel also 
believed) and thus to bring about the final state of peace, yet, in the fascinating fourth 
proposition from the ‘Idea for a Universal History’, he also admits that “...human beings 
would live the arcadian life of shepherds, in full harmony, contentment, and mutual love. But 
all human talents would thus lie eternally dormant, and human beings, as good-natured as the 
sheep that they put out to pasture, would thus give their own lives hardly more worth than 
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that of their domesticated animals.”399 This is quite a powerful statement, and yet for the 
unphilosophical mind it would be hubris to associate the sacred words of the King of 
Königsberg with the words of an American State Department official. However, the 
similarities are eerie. In the final paragraph of his famous essay on the ‘End of History’, 
Fukuyama describes the situation that both Kant and Hegel (through Kojeve) envisaged, the 
final triumph of Western liberalism and the democratic project: “The end of history will be a 
very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely 
abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, 
imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of 
technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer 
demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the 
perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history.”400 Despite their different reasons, 
both Kant and Hegel believed in the necessity (logical for Hegel, moral for Kant) of the 
unfolding of human history toward a final telos. But while for Hegel the ‘mechanical course 
of nature’401 inevitably leading toward the final collapse of all contradictions does not posit 
any significant moral problem, since both the process and the problems raised by it are purely 
logical, for Kant, this otherwise inevitable situation does raise a significant moral problem 
which is no other than, at the end of history or at the time of the cosmopolitan state (call it 
whatever you like), the value of the human beings, so “good-natured [benign] as the sheep 
that they put out to pasture” (gutartig wie die Schafe), will have been decreased to that of the 
illogical animals, a surely paradoxical outcome never intended by Nature whose ‘regulative 
idea’ was always the moral advancement (the ‘perfectibility’402) of humanity. What Kant 
describes is a cultural possibility that in the end gets avoided because the field of history is 
dominated not only by the human tendency toward the resolution of conflicts, but also by 
what Kant calls ‘Nature’ which drives men toward discomfort, i.e. toward action. “Humans 
wish to live leisurely and enjoy themselves, but nature wills that human beings abandon their 
sloth and passive contentment and thrust themselves into work and hardship, only to find 
means, in turn, to cleverly escape the latter.”403 Kant, then, despite his faith in Reason (i.e. in 
the necessity of the moral perfectibility of man) manages to glimpse what Nietzsche made his 
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lifelong occupation to describe: that it is possible that the process of civilization could be 
linked to the gradual taming (Zähmung for Nietzsche) of the human animal and that the 
‘progress’ (for Kant) of humanity is only possible after the recognition of an Ur-antagonism, 
characteristic of the human species, driving humans toward constantly creating and recreating 
themselves and the world around them.  
In the fourth proposition of the ‘Idea for a Universal History’, Kant admits that society 
evolves through Nature’s employment of antagonistic relations among human beings. 
Precisely, Kant describes antagonism as: “the unsocial sociability of human beings, that is, 
their tendency to enter into society, a tendency connected, however, with a constant 
resistance that continually threatens to break up this society.”404 Relations of dependence and 
resistance lie at the core of society and they constitute the only possibility for the 
advancement of the human species. Kant draws a picture of humanity that is not only far 
from being harmonious but that resistance to harmony constitutes the only possibility of 
humanity’s existence at all. History becomes possible because conflict rescues humanity from 
what Fukuyama has called the “very prospect of centuries of boredom”405 lying at the end of 
history. 
The second of the ‘giants’ of classical German philosophy agrees with Kant that what drives 
history is not reason, but rather something other than reason if not entirely foreign to it. For 
Hegel, the unfolding of the idea of freedom, which History is, despite the deterministic 
character of the process, takes place by mobilizing the passions in every man so that progress 
takes place through men’s conflicts with each other. “For it is not the universal Idea which 
enters into opposition, conflict and danger; it keeps itself in the background, untouched and 
unharmed, and sends forth the particular interests of passion to fight and wear themselves out 
in its stead. It is what we may call the cunning of reason that it sets the passions to work in its 
service, so that the agents by which it gives itself existence must pay the penalty and suffer 
the loss.”406  
In his ‘Philosophy of History’ Hegel sees History as traveling from the East (where the 
majority of people are unfree) to the West (where all are free). The final purpose of history is 
the self-realization of the Spirit, i.e. the final collapse of subject and object, since at the end 
of the dialectical unfolding of history the two recognize themselves as being identical. The 
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progress of history is aided by what Hegel calls the world’s great individuals. The role of 
those individuals is to advance Spirit to a higher level and in that way to advance History 
itself. Hegel stresses that every man is a bearer of Spirit, but men as a mass are very much 
preoccupied with their own private interests to assist the progress of Spirit. The world’s great 
individuals give form to men’s inner desires, they express what the common man is afraid to 
express and in that way, by destroying the old order, create the possibilities for the creation of 
the new stage of Spirit’s development407. A great individual belongs to the future, neither to 
the past nor to the present. He exists solely in order to prepare the advent of the future. For 
this reason the great individual is not answerable to the morality or to the laws of the present. 
Morality is for shopkeepers
408
; the great individual belongs to world’s history. Therefore: 
“The litany of private virtues—modesty, humility, chastity, liberality, etc.—must not be 
raised against them.”409 Hegel indeed expresses the distance that the world’s great individuals 
have from the rest of society in very Nietzschean terms. In a Nachlass note from 1887, 
Nietzsche writes: “A man with a taste of his own, enclosed and concealed by his solitude, 
incommunicable, reserved — an unfathomed man, thus a man of a higher, at any rate of a 
different species: how should you be able to evaluate him, since you cannot know him, 
cannot compare him?”410 Hegel and Nietzsche are clearly in agreement when it comes to the 
necessity of the unaccountability of the great individuals. Hegel goes on to suggest that 
history as the unfolding of freedom finds its completion (Vollendung) in the 
Christian/Western world
411
 where freedom in the form of universal human rights gets finally 
established: “For Europe is the absolute end of history, just as Asia is the beginning.”412 
Let us now see what particular form the cunning of reason takes, through which History 
progresses, when it is to be examined with the spectacles of self-consciousness, the 
adventures of which are examined in detail in the ‘Phenomenology of the Spirit’. In the 
much-discussed chapter on ‘Lordship and Bondage’, self-consciousness after having 
duplicated itself understands the need to be recognized by another self-consciousness which 
is not going to be a mirror picture of itself but a free, independent self-consciousness, since 
the fundamental presupposition of recognition is to set the ‘other’ free, or else recognition is 
reduced to brute coercion. One is only recognized by another which is wholly other and both 
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self-consciousnesses must mutually recognize each other, which means to accept the other as 
free.
413
 This is, of course, the final and much-desired state of recognition, but before it a 
battle has to take place between the two self-consciousnesses, a battle where the opposing 
self-consciousnesses have to prove that they are not attached to any particularity whatsoever, 
including life itself. They both have to prove that they are completely and utterly free, which 
means they have no commitments, no attachments to anything external to their own 
existence. A self-consciousness which is attached to life is a self-consciousness which is 
attached to something external to its own self. Hegel thinks that a self (consciousness) is not 
characterized by its commitment to life but by its commitment to its independence; therefore 
life (biological existence) is treated as something accidental or in any case not of particular 
importance to self-consciousness’s development. In Hegel’s words: “…it is only through 
staking one’s life that freedom is won; only thus is it proved that for self-consciousness, its 
essential being is not [just] being … but rather there is nothing present in it which could not 
be regarded as a vanishing moment, that it is pure being-for-self.”414 or as Alexandre Kojeve 
puts it in his own anthropological terms: “…to be for one self, or to be a man, is not to be 
bound to any determinate existence, not to be bound to the universal isolated-particularity of 
existence as such, not to be bound to life.”415 The problem arising from the struggle for 
recognition is of course obvious. Both self-consciousnesses want their freedom, i.e. their 
contempt for every attachment including ‘my’ life and ‘your’ life, to be recognized by the 
other, but if the outcome of the battle is to be the death of the other then recognition cannot 
take place. Self-consciousness finds itself in the paradoxical condition to be compelled to 
preserve the other in life in order to render him able to be participant in a relation where both 
members have to recognize the other.  
But why is Hegel of any importance to our discussion of Nietzsche? Because, as Fukuyama 
has rightly observed
416, in that ‘little’ incident taking place in paragraph 187 of the 
Phenomenology, Hegel introduces a notion utterly alien to the contemporary Western-liberal 
politics: Hegel makes one of the most important human characteristics “the willingness to 
risk one’s life in a battle for pure prestige”417, in a battle for something purely symbolic as is 
recognition. Fukuyama draws our attention to the fact that in the liberal tradition of politics, 
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freedom is considered the absence of restraint. Hobbes famously describes freedom as 
follows: “LIBERTY, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition” where 
‘Opposition’ is further defined as the “external impediments of motion”.418 In this sense, 
from the time one removes an external obstacle—for example, a dictator in an unfree regime 
or excessive working hours in capitalist regimes—which do not allow for the overall 
cultivation of the individual, then the subject can consider himself as ‘free’. But this ‘formal’ 
definition of freedom, typical to the Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition, fails to recognize man’s 
ability to negate nature and by negating nature to form himself as ‘freedom’, i.e. as a being 
undetermined by nature. If man’s most fundamental characteristic is the instinct of self-
preservation, then by his willingness to risk his life in the battle for ‘pure prestige’, he 
announces his passage from the world of ‘objects’419 to the world of (desiring) subjects. As 
Alexander Kojeve has noticed: “All human, anthropogenic desire—the desire that generates 
self-consciousness, the human reality—is finally, a function of the desire for “recognition.” 
And the risk of life by which the human reality “comes to light” is a risk for the sake of such 
a desire. Therefore, to speak of the “origin” of self-consciousness is necessarily to speak of a 
fight to the death for “recognition.”420 This is then the reason for the importance of Hegel 
(through Kojeve and Fukuyama) as (uncanny to be sure and surely much to the dismay of 
Nietzsche himself) a precursor of Nietzsche: Hegel shifts the balance from the constitution of 
a society based on rules “for mutual self-preservation” (the Liberal model) to a society (of the 
future – that announces itself from a not yet existing future) which is willing to risk ‘its life’ 
for an abstract-intangible-uncertain goal, for the sake of establishing itself as a negating 
desire which means, among others, that a desire seeks to establish itself as a desire, as 
something declaring: ‘This is the way things ought to be and this is the way things are going 
to be!’421 As Fukuyama notes: “Beyond establishing rules for mutual self-preservation, liberal 
societies do not attempt to define any positive goals for their citizens or promote a particular 
way of life as superior or desirable to another.”422 Beyond the modern glorification of 
equality, we find ourselves here on entirely new (and awfully dangerous to be sure) terrain;  
terrain in which philosophers are no longer ‘commentators’ but commanders and legislators 
and in which great goals are set and it is required and expected that these be followed to the 
end. The terrain is of course ‘dangerous’ because a ‘great goal’ takes us away from the 
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comfort of our everyday lives and sets upon us certain demands which (very possibly) we are 
unable to fulfil.  
What does a liberal society finally produce? If we follow Fukuyama’s pessimistic view, it is 
the ‘bourgeois’: “…the human being narrowly consumed with his own immediate self-
preservation and material well-being, interested in the community around him only to the 
extent that it fosters or is a means of achieving his private good.”423 The picture is of course 
familiar: the obese, trash TV-watching, passive consumer of the modern democratic West 
may have manipulated the achievements of the Enlightenment (twisting—metaphysical- 
freedom to consumerist freedom—‘I am free’ means then ‘I have the freedom to buy A or B, 
or to vote for A or B’) to his personal advantage; nevertheless it is still highly questionable if 
the passive majorities taking over the West are a new product or the newest manifestation of 
humanity’s need for stability expressing itself through its self-fortification within the walls of 
the familiar idiocy of the status quo. Fukuyama’s conclusion may be misleading (why is it , 
for example, that only liberalism produces the ‘bourgeois’—or something closely resembling 
the ‘bourgeois’—and not the entire history of the West? Nietzsche would ask) but Nietzsche 
had reached similar (although much more radical) conclusions. Thus, while Nietzsche, 
wearing the clothes of a forerunner of the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement, laments the 
sacrifice of education to the shrine of “money-making and world commerce”424 and the 
pursuit of sciences “in a spirit of the blindest laissez faire”425, as well as the glorification of 
‘work’ (according to Max Weber protestant in origin) in modern societies against the 
freedom and playfulness necessary (Hellenic in origin) to the overall cultivation of 
individuals
426
, he also goes further by suggesting, in GM:1, that it is the whole history of the 
Christian-Western world that has produced man as a domesticated animal deprived of his 
most viable instincts, who fosters no more great contradictions, who is not ‘in opposition’ to 
himself: a ‘civilized’-tea-drinker dropping by for a short visit and a bit of harmless gossip. 
“Are we not, with this tremendous objective of obliterating all the sharp edges of life, well on 
the way to turning mankind into sand? Sand! Small, soft, round, unending sand! Is that your 
ideal, you heralds of the sympathetic affections?”427 
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One of the principal problems identified as contributing to the process of turning man into 
sand is the triumph of herd morality over all other possible moralities. In BGE: 202 
Nietzsche recognizes this triumph as Europe’s most immediate and threatening problem. The 
assumption that Nietzsche believed that the solution to the problem of morality will come out 
from morality itself is then wrong. Current (of Christian origins) morality is a closed and 
autonomous system in which every part supports the rest and all the parts support the whole. 
In BGE: 202 Nietzsche makes clear what he has further developed in one of his Nachlass 
notes; that: “The ideas of the heard should rule in the herd – but not reach out beyond it.”428 
The problem with Christian morality is that “it stubbornly and ruthlessly declares I am 
morality itself and nothing else is moral!”429 The triumph of Christian morality resulted in the 
production of a certain type of human (the herd) who has conquered the West and presents 
itself as the only form that humanity can take. What it would be the obvious solution to the 
problem of European morality? To raise a new idol and set it in the place of the old one. The 
supposed solution is naturally problematic for two reasons. First, this is not what Nietzsche 
tries to do (“I do not set up new idols; let the old ones learn what it means to have legs of 
clay.”430), and second, it runs contrary to the fundamental characteristic of the Free Spirit: 
independence. Unlike the fragments of the past, the new humans are not going to inscribe 
their laws on tables made of stone, but their laws will be moulded on the battlefield of 
contest, contest which is going to be the ‘paradoxical’ ground of the humans of the future 
whose justification of existence will lie in their liberation from the final purpose of the 
completion of existence. What form can a politics of becoming take? A politics without a 
final aim and without the prejudice of the preservation of the humans as its sole concern? In 
an unpublished note from 1887 Nietzsche introduces us to the subject: “I have declared war 
on the anaemic Christian ideal…not with the aim of destroying it but only of putting an end 
to its tyranny and clearing the way for new ideals, for more robust ideals—The continuance 
of the Christian ideal is one of the most desirable things there are—even for the sake of the 
ideals that want to stand beside it and perhaps above it—they must have opponents, strong 
opponents, if they are to become strong.—Thus we immoralists require the power of 
morality: our drive of self-preservation wants our opponents to retain their strength—it only 
wants to become master over them.”431 
                                                             
428 WP: 287, KSA: 12:7 [6] 
429 BGE: 202 
430 EH: Forward. 2 
431 WP: 361, KSA: 12:10 [117] 
116 
 
The above aphorism introduces us to the paradoxical and unfamiliar universe of Nietzschean 
politics where generations of scholars lose their balance and eventually fall, trying to walk, 
like tightrope walkers do, between the extremes of the bogeyman called ‘Will to Power’ and 
the needs of the present which demands a ‘timely’ Nietzsche, suitable to the desires and 
demands of those state mechanisms and public opinions that every scholar either serves or is 
depended upon. As we have stressed again in this thesis, Nietzsche is a paradoxical thinker 
profoundly unsuitable for categorizations and attempts to use him for serving the ideologies 
of the day. His voice comes from a future that is not ours, insofar as we belong to a form of 
the human destined to perish due to his perverse (unnatural) history and insofar as he belongs 
not precisely to the future
432
 but to the limit from which he can glimpse (he has made himself 
able to glimpse) the future to come. Especially when it comes to politics, one has always not 
to forget his warning: “It seems increasingly clear to me that the philosopher, being 
necessarily a person of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, has, in every age, been and has 
needed to be at odds with his today: his enemy has always been the ideal of today.”433  
With this in mind, in what follows we are going to examine the kind of politics that Nietzsche 
announces as an alternative to the herd morality (and thus the kind of politics that this 
morality produces) of the present. For that we are going firstly to examine the concept of the 
agon and then the notion of the ‘Will to Power’ and secondly to propose a connection of the 
agon with the ‘Will to Power’, a connection which will allow us to reach two conclusions. 
The first is going to regard the agon as the necessary alternative to the levelling effects of 
modern democratic liberalism in favour of a society based on contest; and the second is going 
to clarify that the much misunderstood Nietzschean understanding of ‘power’ has nothing to 
do with annihilating one’s enemy but with honouring him, insofar as he accepts his 
participation to the agon. For us, then, Nietzschean power announces a verticality of values 
combined with a constant recycling of power between opponents, which has the benefit of 
not allowing power to become the exclusive monopoly of one or the other. By not being 
owned by anyone and simultaneously being owned by everyone, power is let free to be 
expressed as a constituent component of life. Instead of being—exclusively—a principle of 
domination, it becomes—additionally—a principle of incorporation. As we are going to 
demonstrate, incorporation (Einverleibung) changes the very character of what Nietzsche 
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calls appropriation (Aneignung) to such a degree that domination (what ‘Will to Power’ is 
supposed to be) gets transformed into something hardly recognizable, certainly not the 
bogeyman of generations of Nietzsche’s layman readers. 
 
Nietzsche on agonistic power. 
a. On agon 
 
It is in one of Nietzsche’s early texts that we find his most essential contribution to the 
examination of the Hellenic notion of the agon. Discussions about contest are to be found in 
texts before Nietzsche’s own, although the most important contribution is made around the 
same time as Nietzsche’s by his teacher Jacob Burckhardt434. In HC Nietzsche pays particular 
attention to Hesiod’s ‘Work and Days’. While in his ‘Theogony’ Hesiod had referred to Eris 
(strife) as the goddess of discord and strife, in his ‘Work and Days’ Hesiod mentions two 
Eris-goddesses. One is the goddess of senseless destruction; she promotes war and strife for 
the sake of it, because all she knows is to attack without either rules or honour. But the other 
is a force which drives men to compete in a creative manner against each other. Nietzsche 
characteristically writes that: “if someone who lacks property sees someone else who is rich, 
he likewise hurries off to sow and plant and set his house in order; neighbour competes with 
neighbour for prosperity.”435 This example clarifies the difference between the modern 
function of ‘envy’, which is strictly a reactive feeling, and that of the Greek function of it , 
which serves as a propeller of creative action. For Nietzsche the bad-Eris compels men to a 
‘struggle-to-the-death’, whereas good-Eris compels men to ‘contest’. To contest, then, is not 
to exterminate the other, but to be propelled to act and to create something great. 
Following the discussion on Eris, Nietzsche refers to the Hellenic custom of Ostracism. 
Ostracism was indeed a strange custom of the Greeks. Its aim was to send into exile for a 
period of ten years a political figure (a would-be tyrant) who threatened Athenian democracy. 
Throughout the years of its use, ostracism was used both for protecting democracy and for 
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serving political rivalries of opposing political groups.
436
 Nietzsche somehow misses the 
latter and idolizes the former by distorting the function of ostracism which was the exile of 
the would-be tyrant and not the exile of any geniuses
437
. Despite the philological 
inaccuracies, what Nietzsche tries to create, ironically in a very German fashion, is a renewed 
mythologization of the Greek culture; in this he certainly succeeds. His (fictional) 
understanding of ostracism paves the way for his reading of the agon. According to 
Nietzsche, ostracism’s purpose was, by removing the one who was to dominate, to create the 
possibilities for new contests among opponents. In that way at no point one (person) was to 
dominate over any other persons (or ideas). As he notes: “That is the kernel of the Hellenic 
idea of competition: it loathes monopoly of predominance and fears the dangers of this, it 
desires, as protective measure against genius – a second genius.”438  
Nietzsche’s contest, or Hesiod’s good-Eris, promotes a culture of creative antagonism in 
which opponents are called to excel themselves in any given field. The mention of Homer is 
nothing but accidental. Nietzsche stresses that “if we take away the contest from Greek life, 
we gaze immediately into the pre-Homeric abyss of a gruesome savagery of hatred and 
pleasure in destruction.”439 Two things have to be said here. The first is Nietzsche’s absolute 
devotion to Kriegs-Praxis
440
, the rules which ought to govern every contest. These rules are 
set exactly in order to protect the contest from degenerating to a ‘savagery of hatred’. In the 
remarkable opening from ‘Why I am so wise’: 7, Nietzsche introduces his ethics of combat. 
He makes clear from the very start that, unlike what the democratic reading of agon 
supports
441
, here we do not deal with some round-table debate among academics but with 
Krieg (war) in which those involved are not talkative interlocutors but warriors having 
enemies! The aphorism revolves around the possibility of having, of being able to have, an 
enemy. The ‘democratic’ reading of the agon provocatively chooses to ignore what Nietzsche 
says in favour of what Nietzsche ‘should’ have said or of what Nietzsche should mean for us 
today. What is difficult though is to try to think what Nietzsche means by saying: “Being able 
to be an enemy, being an enemy…”442 How do I make myself able to be an enemy? Well, for 
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a start one has to be ‘naturally warlike’443, he has to seek war (conflict) not to avoid it. He has 
to seek conflict because this is how “one tests and challenges one’s own strength with one’s 
equal”444. He also has to attack first, not wait to respond. The attacker is a creator whereas the 
responder is a slave; he reacts instead of acting. Above all he has to have a ‘strong nature’. 
What a ‘strong nature’ means is immediately clarified: it is one which “needs resistances, so 
it seeks resistance”445. I have to build myself in such a way as to always seek that which 
threatens to annihilate me. I have to constantly engage in battles and conflicts where the aim 
is to honour my enemy, by the only way that one honours his enemies: by attacking them! 
Yet, the enemy is not a private person; one does not attack individual cases but only the cause 
that serve those individuals. “I never attack people – I make use of a person only as a kind of 
strong magnifying glass with which one can make visible some general but insidious and 
quite intangible exigency.”446 In individual cases the other has to be treated with the respect 
befitted to the agon. The limits between savagery and contest are clearly defined. The aim is 
not a ‘struggle-to-the-death’447 (notice again the Hegelian terminology) but rather the 
preservation of the conditions of perennial conflict. The attacker has to stop just a bit before 
the extermination of the other. Nietzsche could not be clearer on that!
448
  
The second thing that we have to remark regarding Nietzsche’s mention of Homer is the 
following. Christa Davis-Acampora, in her important “Contesting Nietzsche”, has rightly 
stressed Homer’s importance as Nietzsche’s role model in the contest between what Homer 
inaugurates and what came before him. What comes before Homer? What is this ‘pre-
Homeric abyss’ that, according to Nietzsche, existence is always susceptible to fall into? 
Acampora notes that the answer is to be found in BT where Nietzsche crystalizes the pre-
Homeric wisdom in the words of Silenus: “The very best thing is utterly beyond your reach 
not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. However, the second best thing for you is: to 
die soon.”449 Existence is always on the verge of falling back into this (pre-Homeric) abyss: 
the passive nihilism described in the Nachlass notes as “decline and recession of the power of 
the spirit”450. Acampora notes that both Silenus and Hesiod express a view of life as a 
constant fight against that which man cannot overcome, man’s final defeat in front of the 
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forces of destiny which wants him to succumb to the devastating power of the inevitable.
451
 
At the end we will all die. So what’s the point? There is (perhaps) no human being upon this 
earth that has not had such a thought (at least) once in his life. Silenus’ powerful statement is 
not powerful because of its rhetoric potency; it is powerful because it is true and it is 
powerful because (most) men’s lives consist in a battle with the strength of Silenus’ 
statement. Albert Camus has beautifully captured this archetypical agony of man:  “There is 
but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is 
not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest – 
whether or not the world has three dimensions, whether the mind has nine or twelve 
categories – comes afterwards. These are games; one must first answer.”452 Acampora rightly 
describes Homer as the re-evaluator par excellence; Homer manages, through the 
glorification of the life of the agon, to breathe a new life into questions related to the purpose 
of existence. Homer’s answer to the question ‘Is life worth living?’ is then nothing less than a 
glorious Yes. It is not only that man should never wish something other than life, biological 
existence is of no significance to the kind of life that Homer has in mind! What matters for 
Homer and for the kind of people that Homer describes in his works, is something much 
greater than life as biological preservation, namely glory. Homeric heroes fight not for their 
own personal interest; they fight because it is only through the victory of their people/cities 
etc. that they can achieve personal glory as well. The path to eternal life (which for the 
Greeks meant to be remembered by your people) passes through the great achievements of 
your community, of your polis.  
The agonistic constitution of Hellenic culture is the response to the question that Nietzsche 
asks: “Why did the whole Greek world rejoice over the pictures of battle in the Iliad?” As 
Papagiorgis has noted, the function of war in Homer’s Iliad is radically different from the 
perception of war that we have today. Perhaps that is the reason behind Nietzsche’s insistence 
that we have never understood the above question “in a sufficiently Greek way” and that even 
if we could understand it the knowledge of it would “shudder”453 us! For Homer, then, war, 
far from being a tremendous disaster to be avoided at all costs, is more the laboratory in 
which, precisely because it takes place at the ‘beginning’ of a civilization, the most 
fundamental issues of human co-existence begin to arise. It is on the battlefield, where heroes 
contest with each other, where dealing with questions like those of justice, morality, faith, 
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murder, love, and family becomes an imperative matter because deeds do not yet have 
meaning but it is urgent to acquire one, and it is war that helps the formulation of those (very 
first) values
454
. To think then of war as a necessity, indeed as the more urgent cultural 
necessity, is a truth able to shudder the ‘modern ones’ with all of their resistance and 
abhorrence to everything threatening their material well-being and obviously the ‘choice of 
life’ that this quest for material happiness produces. Have you understood the Greeks? Have 
you understood them the Greek way? No, of course not! Because, as Nietzsche seems to 
believe, that culture has died and modernity represents something entirely different.  
But Homer represents a break with the future as well. This is why he is incomprehensible. He 
does not only represent the necessity for a revaluated past but also the necessity to overcome 
a future that has only managed to produce a “tame man…incurably mediocre and 
unedifying”455. Because humanity does not progress to the better, the ‘future’ is the enemy of 
an exceptional re-evaluator like Homer. Christianity, this “Platonism for the people”456, has 
internalized the once-public arena of the agon; what once was a battle among external 
enemies has now become a battle taking place within man himself. But the crucial 
revaluation of the agon is the utter disrespect on the part of Christianity. While under the 
Greek model the opponent was considered the most valuable part to one’s agon and he thus 
had to be protected, now, with Christianity, the opponent becomes the mortal enemy that has 
to be annihilated. It is not only the ‘evil thoughts’ that a good Christian has to fight against. 
Principally it is man himself, his living flesh, which the good Christian has to fight against. 
The destruction of our most human qualities becomes for the Christian the path to salvation, 
his redemption. Acampora has noted
457
 that the major difference between the Greek and 
Christian models is that because the cultural model of the Greeks was that of an ‘evaluative 
economy that indexes value with risk’, in principle every man could acquire more value even 
by the value of the Gods. In truly Hegelian fashion
458
 for the Greeks, the value of the human 
was determined by his willingness to risk his life in a battle for true recognition! The 
Christian God, on the other hand, takes upon himself the possibility of human redemption by 
sacrificing himself. It is only after God’s sacrifice that the possibility of human redemption is 
opened. Acampora rightly wonders: “If participation in agon is one of the ways in which we 
are human as well as one of the ways in which we create the significance of humanity, then 
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the elimination of the possibility of meaningful struggle (nothing could possibly compare 
with what Christ accomplishes) undermines the mode of value production Nietzsche thinks is 
potentially so creative and perpetually renewable (and thus redemptive in a different 
respect).”459 Certainly reservations have to be raised against Acampora’s suggestion of the 
potential meaninglessness of action under the Christian model. Theosis is for Christianity 
certainly an (almost) impossible task, as it requires the abandonment of man’s very nature 
and the attainment of another one, a task attainable only by very few exceptional individuals: 
the Saints. However, Acampora is certainly right on the revaluating powers of Christianity 
and the change of focus of the agon from an external to an internal battle; and also that under 
the Christian model man needs a mediator on the path to his redemption who plays down 
man’s individual struggle against his opponents. 
What could be the importance of agon, if not to announce the possibility of a re-ordering of 
social-political order through a new understanding of power? As we have already suggested, 
contesters are not interlocutors in round-table conversations but fighters in a battle to death 
for pure prestige. What is at stake in the agon is nothing else than the form that power has to 
take after the millennia of ressentiment that the West had succumbed to under the influence 
of Christianity. What is at stake is the form that power has to take beyond the millennia of 
politics of revenge instigated by the powerless, yet canny, slaves. Unbeknownst even to 
Nietzsche himself, his early reflections on the agon become the laboratory in which his late 
understanding of power will get formulated. If the Greeks were always the cultural model, the 
absolute and unparalleled model, of the West, the kind of power fermented within their 
agonistic culture allowed them to develop an orientation toward the exemplary, which means 
toward that which is not bound to the laws of preservation ruling the world of (every) today. 
As will be shown, it is only through the spectacles of ‘Will to Power’ that agon is to be of 
any value for us today;
 
 and it is also only through the dialectical character of the agon that 
‘Will to Power’ can become a principle of creation instead of degenerating to bygone forms 
of power executed by what now we are called to overcome: the man of revenge, i.e. this 
cultural product [the priest, the teacher, the civil servant] which had been systematically 
trained to manipulate power for the exclusive benefit of his own ‘species’ over and against 
the interests of every other species or form of life. 
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b. On power 
 
 As we have already mentioned earlier in this chapter, the locus classicus of Nietzsche’s 
understanding of power (BGE: 259) has been the object of various misunderstandings, due to 
the overlooking of the important term ‘incorporation’ that Nietzsche uses in his attempt to 
define life. The incorporation of the ‘other’ denotes that life may be ‘growth’, but in every 
case it is a sustainable growth, not the kind that annihilates everything else to serve its own 
interests. At stake here is what Nietzsche could mean by ‘mastery’ or by a ‘master drive’. 
John Richardson has suggested that ‘Mastery is bringing another will into a subordinate role 
within one’s own effort, thereby ‘incorporating’ the other as a sort of organ or tool.”460 
Richardson’s position could be partly justifiable especially due to the allusion of the other as 
a tool, which is in agreement with Nietzsche’s mention of the aristocracy in need of reducing 
‘countless people’ to the function of slaves and tools (Werkzeugen) for the sake of the 
aristocracy itself in the infamous BGE: 258. However, this is not the position that we are 
going to adopt here. The reason is that this definition of mastery contradicts the Kriegspraxis 
(the practise and the rules of war) exemplified in EH: 1, 7. There, the (alluded) definition of 
power is not that of using the other as a tool, but instead of raising the other (the other drive 
when we speak about ‘power’) to the level of the attacker. To render someone powerful 
enough to sustain the attack and perhaps to counter-attack also: this is what to be master 
means. But is that a sustainable position? Is that something that Nietzsche, with all of his 
contradictions and experimentations, could have continuously followed throughout his 
writings? We are going to demonstrate that indeed that is the case and that this position is to 
be of paramount importance for his anti-political politics.  
But Nietzschean power does not ‘emanate’ from some transcendental source; it is the product 
of interaction among individual agents, so the question that we have to ask has to concern the 
individuals which are the sources of power. What kind of subject is the one willing and 
exercising power? “That I must be struggle and Becoming and purpose and conflict of 
purposes: ah, whoever guesses my will also guesses along what crooked ways [krummen 
Wegen] it has to walk! Whatever I create and however much I love it – soon I must oppose 
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both it and my love: thus my will wills it.”461 This will then is the opposite of the other, 
overconfident will manifested in the stentorious Napoleonic cry ‘March forward!’ Our will is 
crooked, that is to say it is a will not sure of itself but rather crippled, indirect, irregular, 
uneven, at times even devious or at least oblique. It is also the opposite of that other 
philosophical will, that of our reverent teacher Schopenhauer, who did only what was 
expected of a philosopher: he adopted and exaggerated a ‘popular prejudice’. In reality will is 
a unity only ‘in a word’. The Napoleonic cry ‘March forward!’ is nothing but a grammatical 
misunderstanding. Will is ‘complicated’462. It is only out of habit (and an unfinished 
grammar) that one believes that a deed is a consequence of our will. The ego that wills the 
will was never there as a substance which caused the deeds. “No subject ‘atoms’”463 but 
instead a ‘constantly shifting’… something. “No ‘substance,’ rather something [Etwas] that in 
itself strives after greater strength, and that wants to “preserve” itself only indirectly (it wants 
to surpass itself).”464 And while in BGE one can still speak about some kind of will, however 
complicated that may be, in the Nachlass notes will disappears altogether: “there is no such 
thing as will”465.  
It has to become clear then that the subject that wills the ‘will to power’ is unambiguous. We 
have only one word, the “synthetic concept of the ‘I’”466, to describe such a ‘multifarious 
thing [vielfachen Dinge]’ as the will. The ‘I’ then does not describe a unity but something 
that is many. In the above mentioned BGE: 19, Nietzsche describes the processes of the will 
as relations of commanding and obeying. “What is called ‘freedom of the will’ is essentially 
the affect of superiority with respect to something that must obey”467, but in every case ‘we’ 
are both the one who commands and the one who obeys, and more than that, we can only be 
as a multiplicity: “Our body is, after all, only a society constructed out of many souls.”468 
Nietzsche was not alone in supporting such a thesis. The idea has been around from the time 
of Goethe and well into the second half of 19
th
 century. In his own copy of Lange’s GM, 
Nietzsche had found and marked the following passage from Goethe: “Every living thing, is 
not a single thing, but a plurality; even insofar as it appears to us as an individual, it still 
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remains a collection of living independent beings.”469 In our chapter ‘Elements of 
Nietzschean psychology’ we have seen that Nietzsche was influenced by Virchow’s 
description of individual organisms as ‘cell states’ [Zellenstaat], although Nietzsche follows 
the non-egalitarian version of the plurality in unity in every given organism put forward by 
Haeckel, who proposed a more hierarchical structure of organisms. But it is not only in 
biology or in literature that we can find elaborations of the possibility of a multiple subject. In 
the late half of the 19
th
 century another idea was very much around as a result of experiments 
in the field of psychology, a then rather loose collection of doctors, magnetizers and 
hypnotists: that of polypsychism. The idea of polypsychism (multiple souls) was put forward 
in an attempt to explain the relation between the dreaming subject and the actual dream, or 
even more complicated phenomena such as multiple personalities. As a term it is first used by 
the French magnetizer Joseph Pierre Durand, but it soon becomes one of the most discussed 
subjects of the emerging dynamic psychiatry. Spiritism had accustomed man to the idea that 
one could be possessed by more than one evil spirit. Later, in the experience of dreams where 
one can identify with multiple personalities, or in the multiple personalities phenomenon, one 
can find the presence of something [Etwas] that is multiple. Ellenberger quotes G.N.M. 
Tyrrell in explaining polypsychism as such: “The personality is a multiplicity in unity of a 
kind which is almost impossible to express in words.” Ellenberg adds: “This multiplicity of 
personalities implies that they belong to ranges of varying depths and are also graded in some 
hierarchic order.” Tyrell continuous: “The lesson is surely that identity of selfhood is not 
depended on numerical separateness in the way that we habitually think it is…Selfhood has 
not the kind of unity which we associate with numerical separateness.”470 But the similarities 
do not stop here. For Nietzsche there is always a master or commanding drive which 
coordinates the multiplicity of drives; unity is achieved through the organization of drives: 
“All unity is unity only as organization and co-operation – just as human community is a 
unity – as opposed to an atomistic anarchy, as a pattern of domination that signifies a unity 
but is not a unity.”471 Tallis explains the structure of the polypsychic individual: “the human 
psyche [was] a community of lesser minds, whose operation was coordinated by a master (or 
executive) mind. The arrangement might be compared to a classical orchestra. Each of the 
individual sections—for example, strings, wind or brass—can function independently; 
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however, they are usually united under the conductor’s baton…This overseeing mind—the 
conductor—is the identity we recognize as ourselves when we introspect.”472 Unfortunately 
we do not have a way to know whether Nietzsche had come into contact with the writings of 
these early researchers of the human psyche. Nevertheless, the similarities are striking and 
indicative of the intellectual climate of the era, so foreign in many respects to our own.  
 It is not our intention here to present the whole range of discussions concerning ‘Will to 
Power’. This has been done elsewhere and with great success.473 Our purpose is to shed light 
on those elements of Will to Power that clarify the distance of the Nietzschean project, 
concerning the understanding of power, from previous or later understandings of it. In 
particular, we would like to stress the interconnection of (Nietzschean) power with the 
undertaking of an agonistic culture and to reveal the deep tension between Nietzsche’s self-
proclaimed faith to hierarchy against the horizontality of power due to its immersion in the 
agon. This power then becomes the precursor of the one proclaimed by Michel Foucault: a 
self-producing ‘strength’ emanating not from a single source but coming from everywhere, a 
positive rather than negative constituent of life itself, not a structure of a social mechanism.
474
 
Don Dombowsky has admitted that ‘strictly speaking’, Nietzsche is an anti-political thinker 
because “he does not foresee an end in violence”475. The proposition is certainly valid, yet 
incorrect. The idea that in the faraway past the human condition was nothing but a ‘war of all 
against all’ and that politics is the procedure which will take humans away from the age of 
barbarism to the age of peaceful coexistence is certainly popular, yet according to Nietzsche, 
it is just another myth of ‘modernity’. There is no such thing as a progress from ‘bad’ to 
‘good’. “Our ‘progress’ represents just one of the consequences of the general waning of 
vitality;”476 humanity does not leave barbarism behind. Only ‘the improvers of humanity’ 
think that something like that is possible. Humanity always seeks to integrate barbarism into 
the process of life so that what was once just ‘barbaric’ is forced to be a part of a rejuvenated 
humanity, of life itself. This is why the last great age of humanity is not that of the 
liberal/democratic West but that of the “wasteful and disastrous Renaissance 
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[verschwenderische und verhängnissreiche]”477. At the end of politics one finds neither 
peace, as the liberals think, nor ‘gruesome savagery’. At the end of ‘politics’ one finds our 
anti-politics (which is still politics) which consists at the regulation of violence within the 
context of the agon, which means within a context that will be able to generate positive forces 
able to overturn the millennia of the monolithic development of humanity and to produce the 
context out of which multiple productions (human, artistic, moral) will be possible and 
justified.  
For what kind of power does Nietzsche, then? Two aphorisms from Daybreak give us a good 
idea of what we think Nietzsche means when he refers to power. In D: 262 we read: “Not 
necessity, not desire – no, the love of power is the demon of men…Take everything from 
them and satisfy this, and they are almost happy.” As in many other passages in D478, power 
here functions primarily as a psychological motivation. Long before it is deemed (by 
Nietzsche’s interpreters) a metaphysical principle, power is what guides and what explains 
the deeds of men. In the above passage the context is that of ‘petty’ politics. Power is 
identified with “The ‘Reich’”479. Presumably those seeking power are those seeking the 
ephemeral feeling of strength over others and those thinking that the state is an answer to the 
problem of culture and one of its main opponents. Another aphorism from Daybreak gives us 
a subtler view on the problem of power: “We are still on our knees before strength [Kraft] 
after the ancient custom of slaves – and yet when the degree of worthiness to be revered is 
fixed, only the degree of rationality in strength is decisive: we must access to what extent 
precisely strength has been overcome by something higher, in the service of which it now 
stands as means and instrument!”480 Three comments: first, certainly Kraft is not Macht481, 
yet they are very close to each other, since in the works of the middle period Macht, except 
from a principle of psychological motivation, is used also to describe the kind of political 
power which borders that of the exercise of force as in GS: 13. Second, we see at the 
structure of the proposition the expression of the very core of the idea of the agon: not 
strength—this would be barbaric (un-Hellenic)—but rationality in strength, i.e. how one 
(opponent, culture) circulates power in such a way as to generate a great work of art (or a 
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great human being, which is the same) which is going to perfect nature, this bad economist
482
. 
Also, the right management of the degree of rationality is important. Presumably an over-
rationalized strength is on its way to losing its vitality and force. Too much rationality 
(Socratism would be the example ere) is going to corrode the foundations of culture by 
removing all of its vital elements. The third point, similar to the second one, is that one (an 
opponent, a culture etc.) has to be aware that strength is something to be overcome. It is not 
there in its own right but only to serve something which overcomes it. We see here 
Nietzsche’s aversion to preservation repeated. Even what I love most, I must deny and leave 
behind, thus my will wills it.  
The dialectic of forces which constitute the Will to Power continue to be expressed at the 
series of the Nachlass notes, where we find Will to Power as having no other goal other than 
that of the safeguarding of the eternal play of forces which constitute it. In a famous Nachlass 
note the world is described as ‘Will to Power’ “—and nothing besides—”: “a play of forces 
and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time 
decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing and rushing together…”483 This Nachlass note 
echoes the findings of physiologist Ludwig Büchner regarding conservation of energy. 
According to Büchner, “nature did not know a stand-still…it was rather a never-ending cycle 
of motion that corresponded to diverse kinds of force. These forces were not able to be 
created or destroyed, but they were interconvertible into one another in such a way that their 
sum was a constant, and force itself was immortal…A force could be transformed into 
another form, but the total amount of force in the world remained equal in amount.”484 Along 
similar lines, Nietzsche describes this world as “a monster of energy, without beginning, 
without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does 
not expend itself but only transforms itself…”485 The Dionysian vision of the world as an 
eternally self-creating and self-destroying flux is nicely expressed in the above passage 
through Nietzsche’s fierce rejection of teleology in favour of the eternal flux of all things. If 
energy is indeed conserved and not lost, then the perennial interplay of forces is guaranteed 
and the agon can transform the play of forces from a play aiming at the domination of one 
opponent over the other to a necessary perennial conservation of the agon itself. The only 
‘thing’ guaranteed under this model is that the world as a monster of never-perishing energy.  
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Keith Ansell-Pearson
486
, and more recently Don Dombowsky
487
, have drawn attention to the 
influence that Machiavelli had exercised on Nietzsche. For both of them Nietzsche is a 
descendent of the Machiavellian school of political theory, particularly regarding the 
relativization of notions of good and evil and also the stress that both place on virtù, a notion 
that depicts a whole range of ideals (such as courage, excellence, strength, and political 
ability), during the Italian renaissance, at least according to Nietzsche’s reading. Dombowski 
lists a series of similarities between Nietzsche and Machiavelli that are particularly useful to 
every student of Nietzschean politics. However, one has to ask whether Nietzsche, despite all 
parallels with other thinkers, had a really developed blueprint of political theory? The answer 
here must be negative. While a treatise like Machiavelli’s The Prince is intended to guide 
those about to hold positions of power through everyday political problems and practical 
solutions, Nietzsche’s response is to attempt a treatise on the politics of virtue! The details of 
the everyday management of power are of no concern to Nietzsche. Ansell-Pearson notes: 
“Nietzsche is concerned…not so much with mastery as with art, not manipulation but 
architectonic, political sculpture rather than political mastery…”488 Nietzsche intended to 
write a treatise on politics, for which we are left with only a Nachlass note which, however, is 
characteristic of the Nietzschean spirit: “This treatise deals with the grand politics of virtue. It 
is intended for the use of those whose interest must lie in learning, not how one becomes 
virtuous, but how one makes virtuous – how virtue is made to dominate. I even intend to 
prove that to desire the one – the domination of virtue – one absolutely must not desire the 
other; one automatically renounces becoming virtuous oneself…”489  
There is no question to us that the Grand Politics of the future will concern the domination of 
virtue, of virtù, of all those ideals which are going to oppose the slavish character of this 
sickly household pet called human. However, and perhaps despite our justifiable rage
490
, 
Nietzschean domination is of a strange character. As we hope we have demonstrated, 
Nietzsche forces power to be expressed within the limits that are set by the agon. In that sense 
the following Nachlass note is of great importance: “The will to power can manifest itself 
only against resistances; therefore it seeks that which resists it.”491 Power depends on what 
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resists it! Without an opponent, power (life) cannot exist. The following from the aphorism is 
concerned with what a successful incorporation may suggest. The proposal is that the other, 
by its incorporation to the same, is going to increase [vermehrt hat] the (now former) same, 
not to destroy it or to infect it. Incorporation is to power what vaccination is for the body. 
With vaccination, the virus, i.e. the alien force, is called to increase the health of the main 
body. Disease becomes the condition of health: “Waste, decay, elimination need not be 
condemned: they are necessary consequences of life, of the growth of life. The phenomenon 
of decadence is as necessary as any increase and advance of life: one is in no position to 
abolish it.”492 Nietzsche’s remarks on various matters of politics can only make sense when 
placed within the perspective of the agon which safeguards Nietzsche’s Kriegspraxis and 
intensifies the dynamic of contradictory forces which constitute the human and its culture(s).  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In an interview from 1976, Michel Foucault notes: “If power were never anything but 
repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to 
obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it 
doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, it 
induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a 
productive network that runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative 
instance whose function is only repression.”493 In one of his many disparaging comments on 
the various failures of the Germans, Nietzsche notes: “You pay a high price for coming to 
power: power stultifies…”494 Nietzsche had nothing but contempt for the kind of power 
administered by state officials or weak personalities using power as a way to cover their 
insecurities. There is power and then there is Power. While Nietzsche severely criticizes the 
former, he idolizes the form of power that serves the destruction of old ideals and paves the 
way to the formation of new forms of human existence. The ‘Will to Power’ is productive 
power insofar as its presupposition is to constantly produce that which resists it. It cannot 
exist (as power) otherwise. In that sense, Nietzsche paved the way for the Foucauldian 
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understanding of power as a productive force encompassing the whole of the social body 
against the traditional Marxian depiction of power as a vertical force of depression.  
Does this mean that one cannot find Nietzschean statements declaring an admiration for the 
kind of destructive power? Certainly one can. BGE: 258 is one of these statements, where the 
glorification of the destructive and barbaric effects of power leaves the scholar unable to 
comment. Yet the overall picture on the problem of power that we have tried to develop in 
this chapter has pushed forward another understanding of power which is much more 
prominent throughout Nietzsche’s oeuvre. Something important is at stake for us. The kind of 
power that we push forward produces the type of human that comes after the human. The 
Overhuman is the locus of the antithetical forces of power that constitute the human and will 
produce the Overhuman condition. We believe that we have shown that the type of human 
which is going to be produced from within the institutionalization of conflict (which the agon 
is) is to be, what Nietzsche calls in BGE: 44, a ‘reverse experiment’, an experiment on how 
the human could be if produced under the reverse conditions from those which have until 
now produced it. A vision of power is the kernel of every theory about politics. Nietzsche’s 
vision of power both overcomes what comes before him and develops the conditions for an 
experiment in politics like no other before him. A note of caution, though; what we have tried 
to do has nothing to do with the postmodern justification of ‘all things being equal’. The 
‘Will to Power’ does not legitimize the lower as modern, as liberal democracies do495; its aim 
is not to equalize value but rather the opposite. The aim of the ‘Will to Power’ is to distribute 
value according to one’s willingness to participate in the agon and also to place the lower in 
the right order of rank. According to this model, humans are getting their value from the 
context (the particular agon which they undertake) in which they develop their creative 
powers. Outside of context, humans do not have value. One has to remember that this would 
be a major difference and a constant source of friction between Nietzsche and ‘us’, the 
modern ones.  
Nietzsche always believed that the most typical of the characteristics of the mediocre is that 
they wish to extinguish, to abolish the other. The mediocre are caught up in a grand 
enterprise for the purification of existence where nothing “harmful, evil, dangerous, 
questionable, destructive would remain.”496 But ‘we’, free spirits and philosophers of the 
future, know better. Our vision for what comes after the human is different. In a remarkable 
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Nachlass note from 1887, Nietzsche notes: “Our insight is the opposite of this: that with 
every growth of man, his other side must grow too; that the highest man, if such a concept be 
allowed, would be the man who represented the antithetical character of existence most 
strongly, as its glory and sole justification-”497 Nietzschean politics tries exactly that: to 
glorify and justify the ‘antithetical character of existence’. Its vision is not consistency. Its 
aim is not to preserve the old but to do away with it and to prepare the new. It is the kind of 
dangerous politics because it says: Enough! Let’s play now! 
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Nietzsche on the genealogy of Guilt and the future of Innocence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter we are going to examine one of Nietzsche’s most provocative and most 
neglected texts, when it comes to the examination of overhuman thought: On the Genealogy 
of Morality. In the preceding chapters we concentrated on Nietzsche’s preoccupation with 
collective enterprises (like cultures and political communities), whereas in this chapter we are 
going to follow Nietzsche’s attempt to describe the genesis of the human soul as an inner 
space of conflicts and contradictions. We will argue that this genesis takes place in the three 
steps or essays which comprise GM. At first, we will argue for the interdependent relation 
between nobles and slaves, an interdependence which is established by the ambiguous figure 
of the priest. Then we will argue that through the process of what Nietzsche calls 
internalization [Verinnerlichung], we witness the genesis of a type of animal which, despite 
being in conflict with itself, is able to give birth to its history precisely because of this 
conflictual space of its genesis. This history describes the unfolding of the dramatization of 
the webs of contradictions which comprises and eternally creatively destabilizes the human 
animal, rather than history as the progress of a necessarily unambiguous rationality, as Hegel 
would want it. Our central claim would be that with his GM, Nietzsche suggests that in a first 
level the conditions that have brought about the human animal could also function as the 
incubator for the genesis of the Overhuman. However, in a second level Nietzsche also 
recognizes that an educational process is also needed (cultivation of atheism, rehabilitation —
re-naturalization—of asceticism) if the Overhuman is to evolve out of its human origins. GM, 
more than any other of Nietzsche’s texts, describes the necessity of the interdependence 
between the human and the Overhuman and as thus it is invaluable to our investigation. 
[Man’s] superiority over the other 
animals may come down to his 
capacity for neurosis. 
Freud, Introductory lectures on 
psychoanalysis 
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Introducing Genealogy. 
 
GM is a text haunted by the future; not a future in the sense of an end-point to be found at the 
end of a process, but rather a future as a promise of a healing which will restore the lost 
strength of the body and the lost possibilities of the human animal. For that to be done, 
though, an exhaustive examination and critique is needed which will reveal the multiple 
moments of origins of the social phenomena under investigation. In GM we see, more than in 
any other of Nietzsche’s writings, the kind of historical philosophising designed to combat 
the mistakes and misunderstandings of the metaphysical tradition of philosophy. In HATH: 2 
Nietzsche had criticized philosophers for their ‘lack of historical sense’ a lack which has led 
them to an examination of the human outside of the historical, social, environmental, or other 
conditions that had brought them about. ‘Philosophy’ is accused of examining the human 
from a position where, peculiarly, the human is nowhere to be found. The ‘view from 
nowhere’ is a projected myth that only reveals the needs and the wills of the various groups 
that founded it, but does not reveal much about the human, which is for Nietzsche only to the 
extent that it is the product of historical development. “…Everything has become: there are 
no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths. Consequently what is needed from now 
on is historical philosophising and with it the virtue of modesty.”498 
For Nietzsche this new ‘historical philosophising’ aims principally to expose precisely the 
extent to which humans have come to be in such a way and not in some other way. 
Genealogy will uncover not just the fact of human domestication, but the wide extent of such 
a domestication. Eventually the whole of Western culture will be accused of having produced 
a toothless, gutted animal from which every possibility of a future has been removed. But the 
response to “millennia of conscience-vivisection and cruelty to the animal-self”499 is not 
going to be simply the following of some other path. What we have come to call the ‘human’ 
is a name-tag for a long story of submission; to pretend that one is somehow able to jump 
over this history is to fundamentally misunderstand both the role of culture in the history of 
human communities and the multiple ways which this history gets internalized by the 
humans. Nietzsche’s paradoxical suggestion is that because humans are the products of 
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antithetical forces, they create themselves; their history also becomes a continual field of 
conflict. Because humans can still harbour wills fighting against the walls of their ‘torture-
chambers’, humans can still claim the possibility of a future history of histories, a perennial 
unfolding of human potentialities depicting the contradictory constitution of the humans. It is 
from the depths of sickness that humans get to create themselves despite their sickness. This 
too reveals precisely the extent of Nietzsche’s love and concern for the humans500 and thus 
also the extent of the debt of the Overhuman to the human. Genealogy expands and analyses 
Zarathustra’s pronouncement that “…only a jester thinks: ‘The human can also be 
overjumped.’”501 Although Genealogy is a long accusation of the specific route that the 
psycho-cultural development of humanity has taken, it is also a testament to the importance 
of that history which has provided humans with all the instruments necessary to their torture, 
allowing them thus to produce history and themselves in it as perennially unsettled, 
discontent, and of course homeless.
502
  
GM expresses its polemical character stylistically also. To be sure, a polemic indicates 
neither an academic text nor a dispassionate examination. Genealogy is what it says it is
503
: 
eine Streitschrift! The English translation of Streitschrift as a ‘polemic’ conveys precisely the 
message that Nietzsche wants. A polemic
504
 is not just a ‘spirited’ argumentation but a 
straightforwardly aggressive one. The intention of a polemic is not persuasion but victory. As 
Nietzsche himself warns later in his life, in the Genealogy Dionysus is at work and, as is well 
known, “Dionysus…is also the God of darkness.”505 Genealogy is a text rising out of the 
fumes and agonies of battles. Its audience are warriors. For these reasons we are going to 
treat Genealogy as a manifesto; a manifesto drawing our attention to the history of the 
psychological constitution of the domesticated animals that humans have become and 
possibly, through that history, a manifesto expressing the need for multiple alternative 
productions of human animals, for the need for the creation of futures instead of a future.  
                                                             
500 This has nothing to do with the metaphysical presuppositions of ‘humanism’ with all of its dependence on 
transcendental signifiers. Nietzsche’s love of the humans is directed toward an attitude of respect for the 
animality (strength, independence, and unruliness in relation to demands of authorities) of the human animal. 
501 TSZ: On old and new tables: 4 
502 A self-inflicted state of homelessness was one of the virtues that the ancient Cynics promoted as a way of 
freedom from the bounds of civic life and necessary to their intellectual independence. Nietzsche also sought 
liberation from the ‘enduring habits’ that capture one to a stable and complacent life. On the relation between 
Nietzsche and ancient Cynicism see: Braham, R. Bracht. “Nietzsche’s Cynicism”. In: Bishop, Paul (ed.). 
Nietzsche and Antiquity – His reaction and response to the Classical Tradition. New York: Camden House. 
2004, pp. 170-181  
503 Much to the dismay of ‘commentators’ who like to treat GM as a ‘neutral’, dispassionate text.   
504 From the Greek: polemos (war) 
505 EH: Genealogy of Morals 
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Thus we have the paradoxical character of Genealogy: a polemic, haunted by the ghost of 
Übermench, expressing the need for a regained innocence. The Overhuman conceptually 
makes a sudden appearance in I: 12; however, it is there throughout Genealogy as a future 
promise of that which has to come after the decline of the present. Alongside the Overhuman, 
also as a promise coming from the future, the faith in the possibility of a second innocence is 
announced, again only as a passing remark, as if Nietzsche has no faith on the possibility of a 
final ‘victory of atheism’506 which will restore the human’s faith to earth.  
 
 The world turned upside down: The revolt of the slaves. 
 
In the novel La Virgin de los Sicarios, Colombian writer Fernando Vallejo describes life in 
the ‘capital of hate’, the city of Medellin, former home of the infamous drug lord Pablo 
Escobar. In the city where death reigns supreme, a wrong look can cost you your life and a 
complaint to the taxi driver to lower the sound of the unbearable pop music can leave you 
with your bones broken and your head shattered on tarmac
507
. So what? The women from the 
comunas of Medellin will never stop producing ruthless killers who will populate the streets 
of this abomination of a city until they all kill each other in a delirium of hate, “in the 
delirium of an absurd life”508; as the writer says, the wretched citizens of Medellin are 
consumed by their hate, completely unable to envisage a life beyond that of a bellum omnium 
contra omnes. 
Why should we read the First Essay, we free-spirits and inhabitants of a post-apocalyptic 
world where the slaves have won? Because the story that Nietzsche tells is a very interesting 
one. Because, unlike the citizens of Medellin, this part of humanity which Nietzsche calls 
‘slaves’ has managed to do something really remarkable: the slaves have made hate creative, 
and this creative hate has given birth to new ideals and those ideals created new values, 
values that came to replace the old ones: the values of the world before the victory of the 
slaves. In the First Essay Nietzsche will ask the following questions: How did the West fail to 
recognize that what it calls morality is just the representation of the interests of a particular 
group: the slaves? How did this ‘herd morality’ become the dominant mode of valuation, so 
dominant that it has come to be identified with morality itself? This is of course familiar 
                                                             
506 GM: II, 20 
507 Vallejo, Fernando. Our Lady of the Assassins. (trans.) Paul Hammond. London: Serpent’s tail. 2001 
508 Ibid, p. 26 
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territory for Nietzsche. Genealogy continuous where BGE left off, and specifically, GM: I 
continues where BGE’s chapter The Religious Character left off. But, whereas the approach 
in BGE is historical, e.g. the last slave revolt in morals is identified with the French 
Revolution, the approach in Genealogy leans toward the psycho-cultural aspect of human 
genesis. The slave revolt is examined not as a historical event but as a stage in the 
development of the psychological constitution of the human. Who is then the slave and what 
is the nature of his hate?  
Unlike the Biblical version that wants the ‘beginning’ to be identified with light, our values 
lie in those ‘dark corners of the soul’ of which St. Augustine spoke509. English moralists, with 
all of their naïve faith to all things human, may have believed in the final victory of the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number, but for Nietzsche we are at the mercy of the most 
pathetic and of the lowliest. Our morality is the product of our ressentiment, that which we 
cannot achieve for ourselves and thus we create an imaginary revenge against those who can 
achieve it. This kind of morality is a slavish morality, Nietzsche insists, and it has to be 
placed before the other type of morality, which Nietzsche calls ‘noble’, so it can be properly 
judged. The First Essay begins by turning upside down our conceptions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. 
‘Good’ is not the product of what is useful, as the English moralists had thought, but rather is 
the right to a ‘pathos of distance’ that some higher or noble individuals have against what is 
lower in society. The terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are hierarchical descriptions of ways of life, not 
expressions of approval or disapproval of selfless acts. The latter became possible only after 
the ‘decline of aristocratic value-judgements’ where the value-judgment was characterised as 
good or evil, respectively, according to its usefulness to the recipient of the act
510
. Morality as 
we know it today begins when these lower parts of society begin to experience their own 
existence as unjust and seek to overturn the ‘traditional’ mode of valuation. “The beginning 
of the slave’s revolt in morality occurs when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives 
birth to values: the ressentiment of beings denied the true reaction, that of deed, who recover 
their losses only through an imaginary revenge.”511 According to Nietzsche, ressentiment is 
not the monopoly of the slave but also occurs in noble natures. So what is the difference? As 
                                                             
509 Augustine, Saint. Confessions. Henry Chadwick (trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1992. Chapter 
VIII 
510 e.g. I am poor. I am in need of charity. I name the act of charity ‘good’ because it is useful to me. After time 
and with the habitual praise of the act it is deemed ‘good’, a universal value that everyone ought to respect. 
511 GM: I, 10 
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SOED informs us, resentment
512
 is “An indignant sense of injury or insult received or 
perceived, a sense of grievance; (a feeling of) ill will, bitterness, or anger against a person or 
thing.”513 The point that we have to stress is that ressentiment is frustrated action and its birth 
place is sensitivity. Robert C. Solomon draws attention to the association of ressentiment 
with feeling rather than with action. “Because resentment is thus frustrated as action and in its 
expression, it becomes more pronounced as a feeling (from the Latin “resentire”, to feel) – a 
strong, often bitter feeling that also indicates sensitivity and vulnerability.”514 Ressentiment 
does appear in nobles. “For the ressentiment of the noble human being, when it appears in 
him, runs its course and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, therefore it does not poison-
”515. I: 10 describes the difference between the nobles and the slaves as that of the orientation 
of the valuing process. Noble is the one who says ‘Yes’ to himself and his actions, slave is 
the one who says ‘No’ to every external stimuli, to everything that is not about or of ‘his’ 
own self. Slave morality, then, is simply reaction (to external stimuli), not action (coming 
from itself alone); slave morality needs an opposing world against which will affirm its own. 
In this work we are familiar with setting up obstacles and willingly creating contradictions. 
These are the characteristics of the Overhuman himself. The slave has already set the path for 
his first victory over the noble who, let us not forget, is not praised by Nietzsche. The noble 
in Genealogy
516
 may appear to enjoy the results of his resistance to internalization, but he 
does so only with the way of the beast and not the way of man. He has the ‘innocent 
conscience of the beast’, and on his way leaves a “hideous succession of murder, arson, rape, 
torture”517. The noble is closer to the beast than to man. He appears to be more a type of a 
proto-human than a fully developed human. As Nietzsche will make clear in the Second 
Essay, it is only with the development of ‘bad conscience’ that human proper is developed. 
                                                             
512 Nietzsche uses the French word ‘ressentiment’. Despite their minute differences, the French word and its 
English and German analogues mean basically the same. For a discussion of etymology see Rüdiger, Bittner. 
“Ressentiment” in: Schacht, Richard (ed.). Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 1994, p. 128; Solomon, Robert C. “One Hundred Years of Ressentiment” in: Schacht, Richard (ed.) 
Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality. Ibid. p. 103; Clark, Maudemarie and Swensen, Alan J. end notes 19:3, p. 135 
in: GM. 
513 Shorter Oxford Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sixth Edition 2007, p. 2543 
514 Solomon, Robert C. “One Hundred Years of Ressentiment” Ibid. p. 103 
515 GM: I,10 
516 ‘Nobility’ is of course a key Nietzschean concept with a very rich history. Here we refer exclusively to the 
‘original nobles’ of the First Essay, the creatures which exhibit what Ridley calls the “lowest degree of 
internalization”. Ridley, Aaron. Six character studies from the ‘Genealogy’. New York: Cornell University. 
1998, p. 131. For the rich history of the ‘Noble’ in Nietzsche’s thinking see: Burnham, Douglas. The Nietzsche 
Dictionary. London: Bloomsbury. 2014, pp. 239-243 
517 GM: I, 11 
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At these initial stages the ‘original’ noble has an inner world “thin as if inserted between two 
skins”518; he is not deep enough so as to count as a human.  
The ‘slave’s revolt in morality’ takes place with the aid of a ‘priestly aristocracy’. The slaves 
suffer all kind of humiliations from the nobles. Due to their physical weakness they cannot 
rise against their oppressors; therefore, they need a tale according to which their own way of 
life is superior to that of their masters. Weakness becomes a virtue, poverty also, imagining 
instead of acting and so on. This tale is provided to them by the priest who comes to give 
meaning to the otherwise meaningless suffering of the slaves. In GS: 353 Nietzsche explains 
the function of the priest in relation to the meaning-giving activity upon the lives of the 
slaves. “The true invention of religion-founders is first to establish a certain way of life and 
everyday customs that work as disciplina voluntatis while at the same time removing 
boredom; and then to give just this life an interpretation that makes it appear illuminated by 
the highest worth, so that henceforth it becomes a good for which one fights…”519 As 
Nietzsche will go on to explain at the notorious GM: III, 28, what man needs more than 
anything is a story that will help him endure suffering, a story that will give meaning to 
suffering. The priest alleviates suffering by offering an interpretation that will make existence 
meaningful. Before the arrival of the priest on stage, the earth was populated by the nobles 
(the proto-humans), the slaves (defeated animals on the verge of extinction due to the 
perceived meaningless of their suffering), and the priests (a curious case, since Nietzsche 
never explains their exact relation to the rest of the nobles). At the case of the noble (beasts) 
and the slaves, things are not of particular interest. There is no expectation for some kind of 
psychological evolution of the animal man. The noble will go on to rape and kill and the 
slave will survive always at the edge of extinction. But the priest, by assisting the slave to 
overturn the ‘traditional’ mode of valuation, by assisting that kind of being who needs (and 
because he needs he creates) an external world to resist, initiates the process of the genesis of 
the human proper. “It was on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of human existence, 
the priestly form, that man first became an interesting animal, that only here did the human 
soul acquire depth in a higher sense and become evil – and these are after all, the two basic 
forms of the previous superiority of man over other creatures!...”520 
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How does ressentiment work? Lacking opposition the noble is ‘upright’, ‘honest’, ‘straight 
with himself’; what he wants he grabs, and not much effort is involved. The opposite is the 
case for the slave. Fighting always against an opponent stronger than him, he has to learn to 
survive by constantly practicing his intelligence. He cannot afford a face-to-face fight. He is 
weaker; thus, he has to improvise. With great literary skill Nietzsche describes the workings 
of the slave’s soul: “His soul looks obliquely at things; his spirit loves hiding places, secret 
passages and backdoors, everything hidden strikes him as his world, his security, his balm; he 
knows all about being silent, not forgetting, waiting, belittling oneself for the moment, 
humbling oneself.” The picture of the grovelling slave is of course nauseating, yet Nietzsche 
concludes that “A race of such human beings of ressentiment in the end necessarily becomes 
more prudent [klüger] than any noble race.”521 The slave will make prudence his ‘primary 
condition of existence’, as without it he could not exist. The noble, on the other hand, 
however careless may he may be, is closer to a love for humans because of this carelessness 
than to the poisoning ressentiment of the slave. The noble’s nobility lies in the fact that he 
does not take both himself and the others seriously enough
522
: “that is the sign of strong, full 
natures in which there is an excess of formative, reconstructive, healing power that also 
makes one forget…”523. The slave cannot forget; memory tortures him like a burning stick on 
his flesh. At this moment, the moment of the unbearable pain, the slave becomes a creator. 
He creates an opposite: the evil one, the one against whom the slave will direct his whole 
existence. And since the noble is the ‘evil one’, the slave cannot but understand himself as the 
‘good one’. The slave revolt in morals has begun.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
521 GM: I, 10. Clark & Swensen translate klüger as ‘prudent’ whereas Diethe as ‘intelligent’. 
522 One could argue of course that this happens because the noble is in a position of power. He can afford not to 
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Making guilty I524.  
 
In what follows we are going to shed light to the process of the production of guilt proper (or 
existential guilt), and to link the process of this production with the cultural institution of 
Christianity. We are going to argue that to disregard this connection is to fundamentally 
misunderstand the history and the ideological foundations of what we call the ‘Christian-
West’. Contra Ridley, we are going to show that a ‘change in consciousness’ could only be 
achieved through the persistent cultivation of cultural institutions which are based on 
principles other than those which have produced man as he is today, i.e. as a docile, tamed 
animal. The (questionable in every case) demise of the belief in a transcendent God in the 
modern West does not necessarily mean that the Christian ‘system’ has also perished, even if 
Nietzsche himself erroneously thought so on his attack on the ‘English flat-heads’ (via 
George Elliot) in TI: ix,5. The challenge will be for us to show that the psychological 
unfolding of man, as this process gets unfolded in Genealogy, harbours possibilities so far 
unexplored and reveals a picture of the human much more complicated and Zukunftvolles 
than we have previously thought.  
                                                             
524 Among Nietzsche commentators there is (almost) a consensus in treating the ‘sovereign individual’ as the 
closest description we could get of Übermensch. However, Christa Davis Acampora has persuasively argued in 
an influential essay that this cannot be the case. Her arguments are as follows: 1. In GM: II, 1 Nietzsche 
(continuing his meditations on the right balance between the historical and the unhistorical in UM: On the Uses 
and disadvantages of history of life, 1) celebrates the active force of forgetting as a precondition of acting. 
Promising requires a temporary suspension of the power of forgetting, yet the equitation of sovereignty with 
promising ignores Nietzsche’s persistent idolization of becoming over being. In short, promising requires a high 
degree of consistency (in all matters) which Nietzsche simply never held. 2. Following Hatab, Acampora agrees 
that autonomy in this passage describes ‘the modernist ideal of subjective autonomy’, a by-product of the 
Christian heritage which assigns free will to subjects so as to legitimize punishment. Hatab notes that 
“‘Autonomy’ is something that Nietzsche traces to the inversion of master morality; freedom in this sense 
means ‘responsible,’ ‘accountable,’ and therefore ‘reformable’ – all in the service of convincing the strong to 
‘choose’ a different kind of behaviour. (GM:1, 13)” Hatab also notes that the ‘power over fate’ that the 
sovereign individual claims to have does not ‘square with’ Nietzsche’s celebration of ‘amor fati’ in EH II, 10. 3. 
Nowhere else in his writings does Nietzsche refer to the notion of sovereign individual. Acampora finally 
suggests that the sovereign individual, rather than being an appearance of Übermensch, signals the end-point of 
the humanizing process, of the process where man is produced as reliable, regular, necessary; in short, as a 
‘household pet’. For that reason Nietzsche calls for the overcoming of the sovereign individual in favour of the 
Overhuman. Since we are in complete agreement with Acampora’s (and Hatab’s) position, we have chosen not 
to examine the ‘sovereign individual’ in our treatment of the genesis of the human, laying down the possibilities 
for the production of the Overhuman. See: Acampora’s essay “On Sovereignty and Overhumanity: Why it 
matters how we read Nietzsche’s Genealogy II: 2”. In: Acampora, Christa Davis (ed.). Nietzsche’s On the 
Genealogy of Morals. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2006, pp. 147-162. Also, Hatab’s 
position regarding the sovereign individual is explicated in: Hatab, J. Lawrence. A Nietzschean Defence of 
Democracy. Chicago: Open Court. 1995, pp. 37-38. 
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Let us return to the text of the second essay so as to examine the genesis of the notion of 
guilt. But before doing this, several steps have to be taken. The essay opens with the 
paradoxical suggestion that the real problem of man was always his attempted breeding as a 
promising animal. Why Nietzsche is making ‘promising’ the cornerstone of man’s whole 
existence? The answer is that the function of promising produces man primarily as a creature 
of time and secondarily as a responsible agent. Through ‘promising’ man learns to remember 
and honour the past (through the promise once given), he also learns to anticipate the future 
(through projecting the consequences of his ‘promising’ into the future) and finally by 
binding in the present one’s will to the future through the promise once given. The world of 
culture demands from man a certain control over the future. Unlike the non-human animals, 
man is the animal who builds libraries and these libraries represent the will’s memory, which 
assists man in the management of his everyday life within the bounds of culture and 
civilization. Nevertheless, it is still ironic that for Nietzsche man is, like every other animal, 
an animal which for the most part is ‘necessarily forgetful’525, since ‘active’ forgetfulness 
helps the organization of his inner life and the expulsion from the mental apparatus of all the 
unnecessary information. But man is the animal who breeds contradictions — he is not just a 
contradictory animal, he breeds contradictions. This forgetful animal then “has now bred in 
itself [hat sich…angezüchtet]”526 the opposite faculty, that of memory, which will allow him 
to exercise a certain degree of control over the future. Nothing, of course, is without its cost. 
Through the function of promising, man trains himself into a regimen of regularity. The man 
who has the right to promise and is thus the master of (his) time is the man who has trained 
himself into becoming regular and reliable. He is the opposite of the man after his temps 
perdu. He is the one who does not allow a waste of time but the one regulating the 
management of time. The one who wastes time is irresponsible; this man is after 
responsibility. Nietzsche describes this process: “In order to have this kind of command over 
the future in advance, man first have learned to separate the necessary from the accidental 
occurrence, to think causally, to see and anticipate what is distant as if it were present, to fix 
with certainty what is end, what is means thereto, in general to be able to reckon, to calculate, 
— for this, man himself must first of all become calculable, regular, necessary, in his own 
image of himself as well, in order to be able to vouch for himself as future, as one who 
promises does!”527 To become reliable, man has to forge himself into the ‘morality of 
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custom’ which Nietzsche explicates in D: 1, 9. There, morality had been identified with the 
unquestionable ‘obedience to tradition’528. Morality represents the ‘middle ages’ of man’s 
development, but the task is the passing from the gregarious and calculable animal of 
morality to the incalculable individual of the ‘new’ Enlightenment529; a type of human which 
will overcome morality’s restrictions and commands, but which also will produce himself 
beyond the calculability and predictability that culture commands.  
How does man ‘breed’ memory? Although the suggestion in 2:1 is that memory springs out 
of man himself without the influence of an external force
530
, in 2:3 Nietzsche goes on to 
suggest that man’s prehistory (that is to say, the history of the human animal before the 
genesis of the human proper, i.e. the internalized human animal) is marked by mnemo-
technique. As we have suggested before
531
, the finale of man’s short walk upon the earth is 
not going to be marked by some great battle or a revolutionary discovery, but rather is going 
to be a moment of slow disappearance within future centuries of boredom. In the words of 
T.S. Eliot, the world ends “not with a bang but a whimper”532. The West is going to be 
exhausted by the political implementation of the secret of millennia of human struggle: man’s 
quest for happiness, which has finally produced what Nietzsche calls the ‘last human’. The 
West today has reached a point where it is insulated against its own history. The West 
ignores, Nietzsche suggests, that what gave birth to the human proper, i.e. to the internalized 
animal that is man, is, among other things, a long training in non-voluntary suffering. 
Suffering is central to Nietzsche’s explication of the rise of bad conscience and the 
prevalence of the ascetic ideal, which in Freudian terminology is nothing other than a case of 
masochism, i.e. sadism turned against itself. In 2:1, suffering describes the process of 
forcefully civilizing the human animal by using the most deplorable methods of torture. In an 
era like ours where humans are protected
533
 against the use of physical punishment by the 
legal system and against psychological pain through the medicalization of the most basic of 
human emotions (love, pain, guilt, etc.), which renders affective experiences manageable to 
                                                             
528 “...morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than obedience to customs, of whatever kind they may be; 
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531 See our Second Chapter of this thesis: First Part: Diagnostics of the present 
532 Eliot, T.S. The Hollow Men. Available online. http://aduni.org/~heather/occs/honors/Poem.htm [Accessed: 
04/07/2014] 
533 Protection is of course in place as long as exceptions are allowed. See Guantanamo Bay.  
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an ever-weakened will, it is hardly imaginable that humans had to be forged for millennia 
through the most terrible punishments. Boiling, burning, crushing, drowning, kneecapping, 
whipping, and cutting are but a few of the methods employed throughout millennia of human 
history in order to turn the free savage into the domesticated animals that we have become
534
. 
Nietzsche’s suggestion that “only what does not cease to give pain remains in one’s 
memory”535 may be one of his usual rhetorical exaggerations, but nevertheless it describes the 
process according to which someone comes to ‘reason’—which means the alignment of one’s 
affects to the ‘social straightjacket’.  
Punishment is, though, one of the two ‘dismal things’ [düstere Sache] which haunt man. 
Although punishment is treated by Nietzsche as the birthplace of conscience, now is the time 
to investigate the origins of “the consciousness of guilt, the entire ‘bad conscience’”536, which 
in II: 4 are treated as one and the same phenomenon. According to Nietzsche’s etymological 
explanation, ‘Schuld’ (guilt) is linked to ‘Schulden’ (debts), which leads him, surprisingly 
independently of Marx, to base the genesis of the moral term (ideology in Marxian 
terminology) on its material conditions. The relation between a creditor and a debtor is used 
to explain the creation of the notion of responsibility from non-moral origins, and 
responsibility itself is used as an explanation of the production of the legal notion of the 
person. The Marxian-sounding claim concerning the precedence of materiality over ideology 
is repeated in II: 8, where Nietzsche actually says much more than that. He says that these 
primitive material relations arose prior to the formation of a social unit. “Purchase and sale, 
together with their psychological accessories, are older than even the beginnings of any 
societal associations and organizational forms”537. We need to be careful here, as Nietzsche is 
making two claims: first, that ‘purchase and sale’ is the most primordial relation of the 
human animal. This relation creates a certain type (Typus) of man (this is extracted by the 
relation of this sentence to the previous one), i.e. that of the ‘calculating animal’. The second 
claim is that this calculating animal need not be the product of social interaction, but is in fact 
prior to it. II: 8 proposes that it is on the base of the distinction between the function of 
calculation and that of the absence of it that human animals are to be distinguished from non-
rational animals. We have to be careful in how we interpret Nietzsche’s employment of 
rationality in the pre-social history of man. Nietzsche is not telling us that man is simply a 
                                                             
534 More on the interesting history of torture one can find in: Donnelly, P. Mark & Diehl, Daniel. The Big Book 
of Pain – Torture and Punishment Throughout History. Gloucestershire: The History Press. 2011. 
535 GM: II, 3 
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rational animal. He is telling us that the origins of the animal of ‘purchase and sale’, of 
contractual relations and subsequently the feelings of guilt produced by the (possible) failure 
to honour those obligations, are to be located in these primitive calculations. A man who fails 
to honour his obligations is indeed tortured by feelings of guilt generated by a logic of 
calculation between debtors and creditors. There is nothing particularly wrong with this 
proto-rationality. Insofar as one succumbs to the story of capitalist production, this proto-
rationality assists the genesis of capitalist relations. However, this proto-rationality suffers 
from a serious deficiency. Relations of material exchange may have been established, but as 
Nietzsche insists, the human is to be found somewhere else, beyond the relations of material 
production
538
, namely in spirituality (the space of the ‘inner world’) which, despite being a 
stage that human animals have to eventually leave behind
539
, is also a stage that has 
constituted humans the way they are. Up to this point Nietzsche has explained the origins of 
contractual relations and the legal form of personhood that those relations produce. Now he 
has to explain the most difficult thing, the genesis of the human. To do this he needs to give a 
future to the calculating animal so that it can produce, through a series of conflicts, tensions 
and contradictions, a history for itself and for its species. This role is to be assigned to bad-
conscience described as “something so new, deep, unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory, and 
full of future” that even “the appearance of earth” will get “essentially changed”540. 
 
Interception. Reading Freud - Understanding Nietzsche. 
 
In 1930 Freud publishes one of his seminal works: Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (translated 
as: Civilization and Its Discontents). Following Kant’s warning concerning the anti-social 
character of human nature
541
, Freud exposes culture as a mechanism construed in order to 
control man’s ‘inclination to aggression’. Civilization is seen as based on a fundamental 
tension. On the one hand men are pleasure-seeking animals striving to gratify their most 
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making’ mentality is rejected due to its profound disregard to all culture not conceived as entertainment and for 
producing a type of man which strives after (material) security. For Nietzsche’s critique of capitalism see 
Kilivris, Michael. “Beyond Goods and Services: Toward a Nietzschean Critique of Capitalism”, KRITIKE, Vol. 
5, No. 2 (December 2011) 26-40, available online:  
http://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_10/kilivris_december2011.pdf [accessed: 28/05/2014] 
539 AC: 14 
540 GM: II, 16 
541 Kant, Immanuel. Idea for a universal history. In: Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual Peace and other writings on 
politics, peace, and history. Pauline Kleingeld (ed.), David L. Colclasure (trans.). New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 2006, p. 6 
146 
 
primitive desires, and on the other hand it is those uncontrolled desires that lead to distructive 
strife among members of a community. Civilization comes to exchange pleasure with the 
guarantee of security and the prolongation of man’s biological existence. However, repressed 
desires can only lead to man’s discontent over life within the bounds of culture. Man 
becomes effectively a neurotic animal and the history of mankind becomes the history of a 
collective neurosis.
542
  
A neurosis, then, is the result of a desire that has become inhibited due to the control that 
culture exercises upon the primitive aggressive instincts of man. Aggression is Freud’s 
prerequisite, the element that helps him to build a “history of the development of the 
individual”543. Freud describes the path that aggressiveness takes in three steps. At first 
aggressiveness gets internalized; “it is, in point of fact, sent back to where it came from – that 
is, it is directed towards his own ego”. Once sent back to ego, aggressiveness gets attached to 
a part of ego that has been split up from it, that of the super-ego which has now taken the 
form of consciousness. Finally, aggressiveness has become an internal part of the super-ego 
and ready to exercise its harsh authority against ego itself
544
. Man proper gets born, a being 
split between two fundamental forces fighting against each other. What is interesting for us is 
then to note that for Freudian psychoanalysis, neurosis becomes the distinctive characteristic 
of man and differentiates him from the rest of the animal kingdom. In Freud’s words: 
“[Man’s] superiority over the other animals may come down to his capacity for neurosis.”545 
Guilt is the name given to the tension between the demands of the internalized authority 
(super-ego) and the desires of the ego, and conscience is called “the result of instinctual 
renunciation”546. Freud believes that the fundamental problem of civilization is the sense of 
guilt that has been inflicted to man through the workings of the super-ego. He arrives at the 
bleak conclusion that “the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness 
through the heightening of the sense of guilt.”547  
Psychoanalysis ‘fame’ among the general public lies in its stressing of the role of sexuality in 
the life of the humans from infancy to later age, despite of the fact that the ‘public’ never 
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547 Ibid. p. 134 
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quite understood what psychoanalysis really meant by this overused term. In the 
revolutionary Three Theories on Sexuality, Freud detaches sexuality from the function of the 
genitals
548
 and turns it into an all-encompassing term which, after 1920, will come to coincide 
“with the Eros of the divine Plato”549. In Psychoanalysis sexuality refers to a system of 
pleasures rather than to biological functioning. As Laplanche & Pontalis note, sexuality 
“embraces a whole range of excitations and activities which may be observed from infancy 
onwards and which procure a pleasure that cannot be adequately explained in terms of the 
satisfaction of a basic physiological need…”550 This system of pleasures manifests itself for 
the most part in the life of infants. The infant is the pleasure-seeking animal par excellence. 
Unbound by the restrictions posed upon it later in his life by the reality-principle, the infant 
seeks pleasure at every part of his body (by sucking its thumb, by using its mouth, by 
controlling its bowl activity etc.). Infantile sexuality is a pre-civilized, pre-moral, necessarily 
narcissistic activity which has as its sole aim the satisfaction of the infant’s desires and 
nothing else. Children are ‘polymorphously perverse’551 in Freud’s famous dictum. However, 
the pleasure-principle governing the lives of infants has to give way to the reality-principle 
governing the lives of adults. Pleasure has to make room for culture. As Norman O. Brown 
notes, in adult sexuality “sexual satisfaction is diverted and exploited for the purpose of 
maintaining a socially useful institution [that of the family]”; furthermore, “what was 
originally a much wider capacity for pleasure in the body has been narrowed in range, 
concentrated on one particular (the genital) organ, and subordinated to an aim derived not 
from the pleasure-principle but from the reality principle, namely, propagation.”552 The 
‘genital organization’ of sexuality turns sexuality to a culturally useful institution, yet it 
deprives adults of a whole universe of bodily pleasures
553
. The result of the frustration of 
desires is of course neurosis and the substitution of pleasure with the devious pleasure derived 
from neurotic symptoms. Could man ever return to pleasure i.e. to the world of infantile 
sexuality? Such a suggestion would be absurd. There is simply no way for man to deny 
civilization and to return to something which was never there anyway: to a hospitable nature, 
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which is nothing other than a quite popular bourgeois prejudice.
554
 Nevertheless, childhood, 
i.e. the pre-civilized, ‘innocent’ state of humanity, “remains man’s indestructible aim”. In his 
brilliant examination of psychoanalysis, Brown concludes that “Our indestructible 
unconscious desire for a return to childhood, our deep childhood fixation, is a desire for a 
return to the pleasure-principle, for a recovery of the body from which culture alienates us, 
and for play instead of work.”555 Freud’s model of the decentralized sexuality is based upon 
Nietzsche’s model of a decentralized self where instead of a centre, a unified will, we are met 
with loci of power perennially competing against each other.  
As all things in both psychoanalysis and Nietzschean studies, innocence is an ambiguous 
concept. It does not denote some sort of naïve absence of knowledge, but rather the moment 
of its return. Innocence is there as long as it is regained, as long as it has come back from 
someplace else. Man, then, is the animal which has left innocence behind; he has ventured 
into the world of culture only to come back to where he started from, but nevertheless has not 
remained the same, because man returns to where he started from changed. That is the reason 
why in Genealogy Nietzsche does not advocate some sort of naïve naturalism but a second 
innocence
556
, an innocence that will come back after having experienced the fatality of all 
things human and especially the fatality of the world of culture. We have discussed Freud 
because he teaches us two things in relation to Nietzsche’s treatment of the genealogy of 
morality. The first is the notion of the inverted instinct, which is a reverberation of 
Nietzsche’s suggestion of the genesis of bad conscience, and the second is the notion of an 
innocence that has to be regained if it is to be innocent. Both concepts are crucial for an 
understanding of the workings of the Second Essay, a work more closely related to 
psychology than any other in Nietzsche’s oeuvre. 
 
Making guilty II. 
 
Let us return now to the phenomenon of bad conscience examined in the Second Essay. Like 
Nietzsche’s descendant Freud, Nietzsche regards bad conscience [das Schlechte Gewissen] to 
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be the outcome of man’s confinement within the bounds of culture. The passing of humanity 
from a wandering life to the life of culture is described as an event equivalent to the transition 
of the first animals from the sea to land. Nietzsche describes this transition as having 
tremendous consequences to the type of animal which underwent it. We have to speak 
essentially of a change so radical in nature that it endorsed the production of an animal quite 
different from the one before. What happened to man, this formerly free-roaming animal, 
when he confined himself within the, undoubtedly comfortable, bounds of society? Nietzche 
explains the process of what he calls the ‘internalization [Verinnerlichung] of man’ as such: 
“All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn themselves inwards- this is 
what I call the internalizing of man: thus first grows in man that which he later calls his 
‘soul’.”557 The instincts of the formerly wild animal/man have to turn inward because man is 
not going to risk the benefits of society. For that he has to become something that previously 
was not: reliable, regular, necessary. The transition from the life of nature to the life of 
culture is to be a long process of normalization, of getting accustomed to the ‘morality of 
custom’ and to the demands of promise-keeping which force humans to get incorporated in 
the economic logic of society. As Simon May notes: “Becoming a citizen demands the self-
mastery to participate in what is effectively a debtor-creditor relationship writ large, with the 
individual as the debtor and society, with its many benefits as the creditor.”558 
‘Internalization’ is a key process which helps us to fathom the genesis of the human animal 
out of the beasts of prey formerly roaming free, unbounded and with externalizing instincts in 
nature. ‘Internalization’ does not just indicate the turning of cruelty against itself, but also 
inaugurates a procedure which will give birth to a kind of being which could be called human 
as opposed to the creature that (the human) was up to that point. But ‘internalization’ gives 
birth to a rather strange being, i.e. to that being which has turned itself against itself and that 
it exists only insofar as it turns itself against itself. We are present at a key moment of 
Nietzschean anthropology! Nietzsche, while trying to define the experiment called ‘man’, 
also gives directions to the kind of being which he has called Übermensch. This is because 
the human, as Nietzsche tries to define it, has been hardly given a chance within the bounds 
of Western/Christian civilization, a civilization aiming at the extermination of the antithetical 
forces constituting the human in favour of the unconditional obedience to the ascetic 
paradigm of Christian metaphysics. Instead of Christian askesis, Nietzsche incorporates into 
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the process of the genesis of the human all those forces which, by competing against each 
other, will give birth to a monstrous energy which will generate the human. Let us pay 
attention to the way Nietzsche describes this process and also to the rhetorical force of the 
text itself: “The man who, for lack of external enemies and resistance, and wedged into an 
oppressive narrowness and regularity of custom, impatiently tore apart, persecuted, gnawed 
at, stirred up, maltreated himself; this animal that one wants to ‘tame’ and that beats itself raw 
on the bars of its cage; this deprived one, consumed by homesickness for the desert, who had 
to create out of himself an adventure, a place of torture, an uncertain and dangerous 
wilderness – this fool, this longing and desperate prisoner became the inventor of ‘bad 
conscience’.”559    
For those who have visited a zoo the picture is familiar, although instead of  humans  we have 
seen pumas, tigers or lions, captivated within cages ‘beating themselves raw on the bars of 
their cages’. But the picture is also familiar because it depicts a moment of what Freud has 
called ‘psychical conflict’, the birth place of neurosis. Freud characterises this ability of man 
to be able to exist as neurotic as the moment of superiority of man against all other animals. 
Like Freud, Nietzsche also makes the moment of ‘internalization’ the primary moment of the 
process of the genesis of man. The result of the process of socialization, whereby man had to 
forcefully be separated from his old, natural instincts, created in man a terrible sickness. The 
social/logical/calculable human animal that we have been trained to call man is an animal 
which is from the very beginning sick. The name of this sickness is bad conscience. 
However, and here lies the difference of the human from the non-human animals, this was a 
strange kind of sickness, more like a pregnancy than a straightforward sickness. “An animal 
soul turned against itself, taking sides against itself, something so new, deep, unheard of, 
enigmatic, contradictory, and full of future [Zukunnftvolles] had come into being that the 
appearance of the earth has thereby essentially changed.”560 
Bad conscience, “this instinct for freedom, forcibly made latent”561 is then highly invested 
with contradictory forces. As psychoanalysis has taught us, conflicts are concentrations of 
psychic energy seeking to be discharged. Bad conscience may be an instinct turning back 
onto itself, but the conflict created by this ‘turning back’ has also created something 
tremendous, full of future which changed, Nietzsche suggests, the very ‘appearance of the 
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earth’. The being created out of this conflict is nothing other than the human itself: A moment 
of conflict, a contradiction, an enigma. But what was an enigma at the moment of its birth 
has to get normalized and fitted to the ‘social straightjacket’. As we have previously seen, it 
is through punishment that the human animal gets tamed. But now we witness a type of 
punishment which turns back on itself. Through bad conscience man has turned “hostility, 
cruelty, pleasure in persecution”562 against himself. He has become the kind of animal that 
finds pleasure in inflicting pain upon himself. And yet, bad conscience has made something 
‘beautiful’ out of the inward turning instincts. As Nietzsche insists, we can only understand 
bad conscience as a peculiar kind of sickness the same way and to the extent that pregnancy 
can be considered a sickness. To be sure, bad conscience produced a set of ideals; this is its 
positive side. Like the pregnant woman bad conscience brought into life, there may be 
something entirely new which is able to shape history and the humans in it. However, this set 
of ideals is far from being positive, i.e. life enhancing, and here lays the negative side: the 
monstrous birth. The value of the un-egoistic, the main pillar of Christian culture, has its 
origins in the pleasure that the human animal finds on inflicting cruelty upon himself. The 
pleasure of selflessness, self-denial, self-sacrifice is rooted in the initial cruelty that the 
inward-turned instincts exercise upon the individual which has to undergo the shock from the 
demands of its socialization. Bad conscience, because and not despite of its negative aspects, 
initiates a process whereby the things it produces will come later to question their own status, 
since, as Nietzsche will stress later, “All great things perish through themselves, through an 
act of self-cancellation…”563. This is then the reason why bad conscience is pregnant with 
future instead of being a process which, like neurosis, gets inhibited and paralyses the 
individual. 
The above is a key point if we want to understand the nature and the scope of the ascetic 
ideal. The 18
th
 paragraph of the Second Essay is crucial because it stresses that the ascetic 
ideal is not just the product of a degenerate
564
 culture. If this were the case, a change of 
culture would have liberated individuals from their dependency on ascetic ideals. What the 
18
th
 paragraph does, though, is stress that the ascetic ideal is also the product of the human 
being within whom bad conscience has been positioned. The human then cannot avoid some 
sort of asceticism, since the need is created from ‘within’ the individual’s ‘self’. Thus 
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Nietzsche stresses that: “bad conscience, the will to self-maltreatment, first supplies the 
presupposition for the value of the unegoistic.”565 As we will see later, the ascetic ideal is not 
only a sign of a degenerating culture, but also what Nietzsche in the Third Essay calls a 
healing instinct of a degenerating life
566
. Ascetic ideals become the protective shield of a fast 
degenerating life. Abstinence, renunciation, mortification of the natural instincts seek to serve 
ideals of an imagined beyond and of a reward eternally delayed. The slave, or what they call 
today the ‘modern man’, has produced both from within and from without the principles of 
his self-punishment.  
We have seen the development of what Nietzsche calls bad conscience [schlechtes 
Gewissen], which is the product of man’s forced confinement within the limits of culture, yet 
there is another form of conscience at work which Nietzsche calls the consciousness of guilt 
[das Bewusstein der Schuld]. The consciousness of guilt chronologically follows the 
establishment of bad conscience. Unlike bad conscience, which is both the product of the 
inward turning instincts of the humans and the humans’ will to self-maltreatment, and of the 
culture which persistently cultivates the self-heating instincts of the animals of culture, the 
consciousness of guilt is the product of civilization alone (although such a claim has only a 
relative value since products of civilization are being regularly internalized to the degree of 
their practical identification with what comes prior to them). 
The question of the consciousness of guilt was left in the air already in the Second Essay’s 
4th paragraph, where it was first posed but left unanswered. Paragraph 19 continues from 
where things were left. Through the—previously examined—etymological relation between 
guilt and debt [Schuld], Nietzsche offers an anthropological explanation of the infinite debt of 
the humans to the Gods. His syllogism is based on the power of tradition over human 
communities. According to this explanation, every present generation acknowledges a ‘legal’ 
obligation to its forefathers. A community recognizes that it is only because of the infinite 
sacrifices and struggles of their ancestors that it can exist. Theology is a case of ‘ancestor 
worship’567, and the debt that the community feels that it owns to its ancestors increases the 
more the power of the community increases. Gradually ancestor’s worship reaches a point 
where individuals from long lost past become an idea and the continuation of the blind 
obedience to this idea becomes an ideal. What was previously a rather straightforward 
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commitment to honour the community’s founders and protectors becomes now a commitment 
to honour all that tradition commands. But it is not a just a case of obedience to tradition, 
which is after all what morality is. The key to the problem of intertwining the past with debts 
is that the obligation to honour your ancestors has become divinized. It has been equated with 
a blind faith to honour your debts not toward a finite institution which it would give to your 
obligation the character of a contractual obligation, but it becomes an obligation toward an 
infinite creditor, or rather for the first stage, to a number of infinite creditors, the Gods. When 
do obligations to infinite creditors end? Unlike contractual obligations where the amount of 
debt sooner or later can get (in principle) repaid, obligations toward infinite creditors bind 
individuals or cultures to an infinite demand to repayment. Nowhere is this idea more 
apparent than at the case of Christianity, in with the invention of the concept of sin has forced 
the transformation of finite contractual debts to an irredeemable debt (in the form of guilt) 
which humanity is never going to repay.  
 
 A Note on Sin. 
 
In paragraph 23 Nietzsche makes the suggestion of a possible rehabilitation of a Greek-
inspired minimal notion of sin, in the form of foolishness or a non-moralized failure. His aim 
is the discharge of the Christian notion of sin which has captured humans into a web of 
infinite obligation toward an infinite creditor. We need to be liberated from those suffocating 
obligations which have been based on the assumption of humanity’s original sin. In the 
Greeks, Nietzsche finds a way to keep both a minimum of accountability, necessary for the 
implementation of one’s civic duties, and a way to detach obligations from their dependence 
to a transcendent and unaccountable creditor. Instead of burdening humans with obligations, 
this minimum notion of (de-moralised) ‘sin’ will redirect humans to their civic life and the 
life of the human communities within which they live and ultimately perish. It is a kind of a 
‘return to the earth’ which re-establishes the humanness568, which is to say the earthliness, of 
man against his long attachment to things beyond τα φυσικά.  
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It is in Aristotle’s Poetics that we find the classical understanding of ἁμαρτία569 as some 
‘great fault’ (or ‘error of judgement’) on the part of the protagonist which will set into action 
a series of events leading eventually to his downfall. Unlike Augustine’s determination to 
assign a free will [liberum arbitium] to humans so they can be held responsible (i.e. 
punishable) in the eyes of God, the Greeks didn’t live with concepts of either free will or 
moral responsibilities. Caught between Olympians and Chthonic
570
, deities the mortals
571
 are 
simply the “subject to their competing powers” and their lives “dwelled in the ambiguity of 
sacred tensions: passion and moderation, natural drives and culture, malevolence and 
benevolence, death and life”572. Since mortals are caught between Godly forces that they can 
neither control nor influence, responsibility for their wrongdoings—or for their errors of 
judgments—lies with those who have guided the lives of the mortals, i.e. the Gods and not 
with the mortals themselves. In this way the Greeks managed to avoid the burden of an 
infinite debt toward God and the inertia which is the result of excessive responsibility. 
Instead, they devoted their lives to all sorts of adventures which allowed them to set up in 
every corner of the known world “unperishing monuments in good and bad”573 celebrating 
the whole of the human being instead of a part of it (the ‘moral’, the ‘good’, the ‘rational’ 
etc.), succumbing to nothing, freeing their multiple wills to power, to growth, to expansion to 
flourish, and thus revealing the magnificent depths of that spiritual animal which is man.  
With the arrival of Christianity, ἁμαρτία comes to acquire a meaning which was foreign to 
both the ancient Greeks and the Greeks of the Roman period. The Greek Fathers explain the 
fall of Adam from the state of grace as an abuse on the side of the humans of their free will 
and do not ascribe any notion of hereditary sin to the rest of humanity due to the fault of 
Adam. Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa “both taught that infants are born 
without sin”574. Additionally, John of Damascus utterly dismisses the idea of debt toward 
God and notes: “…from the time that God, the Son of God, who is unchangeable by reason of 
His Godhead, chose to suffer voluntarily, He wiped out our debt, by paying for us a most 
admirable and precious ransom”575. And while the Eastern Church develops a Christian 
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practice free of debts
576
, in the West, Augustine raises the concepts of universal sin and 
transmitted guilt into pillars of his City of God. Origen
577
 captures the idea nicely: “Everyone 
who enters the world may be said to be affected by a kind of contamination….By the very 
fact that humanity is placed in its mother’s womb, and that it takes the material of its body 
from the source of the father’s seed, it may be said to be contaminated in respect of both 
father and mother.”578 For Augustine “original sin [ex originali peccato]…was committed by 
free will [liberum arbitrium]. For this reason our guilty nature is liable to a just penalty.”579 
Nowhere else is this sense of Augustine’s insistence on responsibility captured so well as in 
the well-known scene from Matthew 27-28 where Christ has been placed in front of Pilates. 
The scene is as such: Before the clamouring crowd, the prefect of Judaea makes his last 
attempt to save the life of a rather eccentric, and certainly not right in his head, man who 
claims to be the son of God. The crowd is nevertheless adamant. ‘Let him be crucified’ they 
shout. Since Pilates knows that a governor should not oppose his people in such petty 
matters, he gives in to their wishes. Crowds need their shows, how else can they keep silent 
when it comes to serious matters? He nevertheless feels uncomfortable with punishing a 
harmless eccentric; he wants to have nothing to do with His punishment, “I am innocent of 
the blood of this just person”, he declares. But the crowd wants nothing less than blood. “So 
be it” it responds to Pilate, “Τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ τέκνα ἡμῶν”580. The type of 
guilt that God’s people have assumed is not the usual kind. It is neither the guilt that we feel 
when we fail to keep our promises nor regret over unfulfilled obligations. It is what Mathias 
Risse has called: “…a persistent feeling of imperfection…” and “…a condition that shapes 
one’s whole existence”581. The birth place of this type of guilt (what Simon May calls 
moralized guilt and what Risse calls existential guilt) is Christian civilization. 
The Judaic ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς then does not just denote a linguistic eccentricity. It lays a whole cultural 
universe away from Greek ἁμαρτία. While Jewish crowds rush to assume responsibility, the 
noble Greek, as Nietzsche notes, believes that it is Gods who ‘have beguiled’ the humans and 
thus it is Gods, not the humans, that are the ‘causes of evil’ and since they are evil they take 
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upon themselves guilt. Man is rescued! “…these Greeks used their gods precisely to keep 
‘bad conscience’ at arm’s length, to be able to remain cheerful about their freedom of soul: 
that is the reverse of the use which Christianity made of its god.”582  
 
Making guilty II (continued) 
 
The process whereby bad conscience develops into consciousness of guilt is called by 
moralization by Nietzsche. Janaway explains: “Moralization is the elevation of feeling guilty 
into a virtue, its incorporation into what the morally good individual is or does, into a 
conception of the kind of person one should be, by means of the rationalizing metaphysical 
picture in which the individual’s essential instinctual nature deserves maltreatment, because it 
stands in antithesis to an infinite creditor.”583 Moralization is a key process to the 
understanding of the development of the type of human being that the Western-Christian 
civilization has cultivated. In a recent debate between Mathias Risse and Aaron Ridley, the 
question of whether the process of moralization can take place independent of transcendental 
presuppositions (i.e. from the existence of God) or not was closely examined. From the way 
that we have developed Nietzsche’s rationale of the development of bad conscience thus far, 
it is clear that for us Nietzsche refers to two types of consciousness with the second 
(chronologically) of them, i.e. the consciousness of guilt, being the outcome of the influence 
of Christian civilization. Ultimately what is at issue here is the extent of the influence of 
Christian civilization upon the development of a certain type of ‘soul’, the Western soul, i.e. a 
type of inverted existence which exists only as long as it turns against itself in a perennial 
masochistic crescendo. If, in principle, a type of consciousness which is independent of guilt 
could be developed and cultivated, then Nietzsche’s demand for a second innocence could be 
possible. If not, humanity is destined to remain forever trapped in a logic of debt and eternal 
repayment.  
Ridley
584
 firstly argues that at the first stage of its development, bad conscience is not 
characterized by a sense of ‘inward pain’ due to its debt to a creditor. The fact that one 
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‘owes’ is experienced simply as a kind of inconvenience. Moralization signifies the process 
whereby humans, due to their confinement in society, start to redirect the instincts of cruelty 
toward themselves “out of pleasure in making-suffer”585. Someone says to himself: I am in 
debt—I am to be blamed for my debts—I ought to have done otherwise—I failed. This is, for 
Ridley, the genesis of guilt proper. Ridley subsequently suggests that Nietzsche makes clear 
that “one might in principle…learn to feel guilty about belief in God, a possibility that plainly 
presupposes the essential independence of guilt from God.”586 The passage that supports his 
argument is the following: “For all too long man has regarded his natural inclinations with an 
‘evil eye,’ so that in him they have finally become wedded to ‘bad conscience.’ A reverse 
attempt would in itself be possible – but who is strong enough for it? – namely to wed to bad 
conscience the unnatural inclinations, all those aspirations to the beyond, to that which is 
contrary to the senses, contrary to the instincts, contrary to nature, contrary to animal…”587 
There is nothing wrong, in principle, with this wonderful passage. One could in principle 
learn to wed bad conscience with unnatural inclinations. The foundation of an immanent 
culture is the task of Nietzsche’s interest in re-interpreting cultural practices through the 
reversal of the traditional modes of valuation. However, Ridley conflates guilt, which can 
only be the product of the Christian interpretation of existence, with bad consciousness in its 
‘raw’ state, i.e. in its pre-moralized form. He writes: “…he [Nietzsche] quite evidently does 
regard “the consciousness of guilt” as separable…from the concept of God”588. Yet Nietzsche, 
in the passage mentioned above (which Ridley comments on), does not refer to the 
consciousness of guilt [Bewusstein der Schuld] but to bad conscience [Schlechtes Gewissen]. 
Bewusstein der Schuld is used by Nietzsche in order to describe this type of guilt which is the 
product of Christian civilization, and it is, as Mathias Risse rightly notes, this type of guilt 
Nietzsche is interested in, since it allows him the opportunity to attack the “Christian sittliche 
Weltordung”589. In GM:III, 20, Nietzsche refers to this particular type of guilt as the most 
ingenious product of the priestly reinterpretation of existence. “Only in the hands of the 
priest, this true artist of the feeling of guilt, did it take on form – oh what a form! ‘Sin’ – for 
thus reads the priestly reinterpretation of the animal’s ‘bad conscience’…”590  
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Christian civilization is then the mechanism of transformation of bad consciousness from a 
legal obligation, and the subsequent discomfort that the failure to honour this obligation 
entails, to a permanent feeling of guilt toward an infinite creditor. “The rise of the Christian 
god as the maximum god that has been attained thus far therefore also brought a maximum of 
feelings of guilt [Schuldbewussteins] into appearance on earth.”591 Nietzsche suggests that 
this process of ‘loading up’ the human with guilt has come to an end and that now a reverse 
process has begun. If Christianity is responsible for the accumulation of debt/guilt, then it 
must be inferred that a decline of faith will eventually bring about a decline in the quantity of 
guilt which will accordingly generate a type of human unknown to the Christian West. The 
suggestion is thus quite simple in its conception, but also wide ranging in its consequences: 
“…the perfect and final victory of atheism might free humanity from the entire feeling of 
having debts to its beginnings, its causa prima. Atheism and a kind of second innocence 
belong together.”592  
We have seen that Nietzsche develops two quite distinct notions of conscience, bad 
conscience and the consciousness of guilt. A cultivation of the cultural conditions which will 
bring about the demise of the consciousness of guilt will be brought about by a persistent 
interrogating attitude in matters of faith. Ultimately one has to embrace a type of life that 
does not rely to transcendental presuppositions for its justification. One has to assume the 
role of Hamlet and gaze into the “true essence of things”, “the terrible truth [die grauenhafte 
Wahrheit]”593 of an existence devoid of any transcendental foundation and of any 
transcendent consolation, so as to embrace wholeheartedly a ‘natural’ existence, i.e. 
“indifference itself as a power”594, an existence beyond the externally imposed concepts of 
‘good’ and ‘evil’. But the embrace of atheism is not enough, because Christian morality has 
found a way to survive even after the demise of the faith in God. The values of Christianity 
do not necessarily need a belief in God to survive. Nietzsche notes that this was the 
astounding work of those moralizing atheists, the English. “They are rid of the Christian God 
and are now all the more convinced that they have to hold on to Christian morality…”595. 
Nietzsche discovers in utter amazement that although Christianity is a system from which if 
you remove its central tenet, the belief in God, then the morality which the system supports it 
should fall too, this unfortunately has not happened. The English, this nation de boutiquiers 
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according to the famous quote by Napoleon, have got rid of God, through Darwin, and yet 
they got stuck to a morality wholly Christian, where all the main principles of Christianity 
have remained untouched (belief in progress, pity, humanism through blind faith to the 
fiction of the unchangeable human nature, etc.). Despite the rhetoric, this is not an attack on a 
people. It is an attack to a cause that has become victorious
596
 and has conquered the West at 
the expense of every other alternative.  
 
Askesis contra ascetic ideals. The challenge of the Third Essay. 
 
The Third Essay makes clear that one must fight against a large number of demons in order to 
reclaim the life that was forcefully removed from this docile animal that man has been trained 
to be. Apparently Gods die may deaths, and most of the times those deaths are not even 
final
597
.The Third Essay is an investigation into the “immense power of the ascetic ideal”598, 
an ideal which can make sense more as a spectre, a phantasm, a powerful leftover from the 
time of the omnipotence of Gods, or rather, from the time of the omnipotence of the one 
supreme God of Christianity. The immense power that the ascetic ideal has exercised upon 
humanity has blocked all exits out of the current paradigm of the Platonic-Christian tradition, 
with all of its dogmatic faith in logos, either in the form of Ideas remote from the activity of 
the senses or in the form of the transcendent Logos again unapproachable by the petty 
materiality of the sinful human condition. Let us pay attention to the rhetorical force with 
which Nietzsche tries to convey the message of desperation regarding humanity’s state: 
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Γιατί τα σπάσαμε τ’ αγάλματά των, 
γιατί τους διώξαμεν απ’ τους ναούς των, 
διόλου δεν πέθαναν γι’ αυτό οι θεοί. 
Ω γη της Ιωνίας, σένα αγαπούν ακόμη, 
σένα η ψυχές των ενθυμούνται ακόμη. 
 
Σαν ξημερώνει επάνω σου πρωί αυγουστιάτικο 
την ατμοσφαίρα σου περνά σφρίγος απ’ την ζωή των· 
και κάποτ’ αιθερία εφηβική μορφή, 
αόριστη, με διάβα γρήγορο, 
επάνω από τους λόφους σου περνά. 
Ionic 
 
Even though we have broken their statues,  
even though we drove them out of their temples,  
in no wise did the gods die for all that. 
O land of Ionia, it is you they love still, 
it is you their souls still remember. 
 
When upon your dawns an August morn,  
some vigour of their life pervades your atmosphere, 
and once in a while, an ethereal, youthful form,  
indistinct, in rapid stride, 
passes above your hills. 
 
C.P. Cavafy. The Collected Poems. Evangelos Sachperoglou. (trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2008, p. 
71 
598 EH: Genealogy of Morals. 
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“Read from a distant star the majuscule script of our earthly existence would perhaps tempt 
one to conclude that the earth is the true ascetic star, a nook of discontented, arrogant, and 
repulsive creatures who could not get rid of a deep displeasure with themselves, with the 
earth, with all life and who caused themselves as much pain as possible out of pleasure in 
causing pain — probably their only pleasure.”599  
What makes Nietzsche characterize the whole planet as an ascetic star? Why does he not 
characterize humanity as being ascetic or certain civilizations as more prone to ascetic 
practices? Why must he resort to such an extreme (even for Nietzschean standards) portrayal 
of his view? Has the entire earth been soaked to such a degree in ascetic ideal so as not to be 
able to exist otherwise than as ascetic? If this is the case, then has the Third essay a positive 
message to convey or rather do we all stand in front of a rather bleak future? Can we even be 
aware that this is the future we are heading toward if we have become all victims to ascetic 
ideal? 
To begin with, some etymological clarifications are needed. There are three notions related to 
the ascetic ideal that one can find (implicitly or explicitly) in the Third Essay: askesis, 
asceticism, and the ascetic ideal. Askesis (exercise) refers to “the practice of spiritual 
exercises – [which] already existed within the philosophical tradition of antiquity.”600 By 
spiritual exercises we mean “practices which could be physical, as in dietary regimes, or 
discourse, as in dialogue and meditation, or intuitive, as in contemplation, but which were all 
intended to effect a modification and a transformation in the subject who practiced them.”601 
Spiritual exercises were inextricably linked to the particular model of Greek philosophy, the 
training of which “…intended not simply to develop the intelligence of the disciple, but to 
transform all aspects of his being – intellect, imagination, sensibility and will.”602 There were 
all sorts of spiritual exercises depending on the views of every philosophical school (Platonic, 
Cynic, Pyrrhonian etc.). From those sets of exercises, the Platonic in particular stressed the 
importance of renouncing the “pleasures of the body”603 a body which was an obstacle to the 
contemplation of the divine logos.  
Christianity’s intellectual womb is Platonism. The first Christians adapted Platonic spiritual 
exercises for their own purposes, which were not much different from those of their Greek 
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contemporaries. Asceticism in Christianity is fundamentally based on the separation of the 
body from spirit as “a precondition for the vision of God”604. Clement of Alexandria observes 
that “true piety toward God consists in separating ourselves, irrevocably, from the body and 
its passions; perhaps this is why Socrates rightly calls philosophy a “training for death” – for 
we must renounce the senses in order to know true reality.”605 The long history of 
Christianity is filled with stories of flesh mortification so that the spirit can liberate itself 
from its earthly prison and be able to communicate with the divine Logos. A by-product of 
asceticism is what Nietzsche calls the ascetic ideal, and he particularly examines it in the 
Third Essay. The ascetic ideal denotes the type of life that the priest, in Nietzsche’s 
genealogy, has imposed upon the masses of the physically weak members of society. It is 
ascetic because the weak masses have only one way to counterattack the stronger members of 
society: by waiting and by inventing an imaginary revenge (i.e. not a direct but an indirect 
attack) as in the case of the turning upside down of the former physical and now moral 
valuations of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and it is an ideal because it is a self-sufficient system which 
cannot accommodate any other alternative view of reality other than that that the ascetic ideal 
has created. The ascetic ideal is a “closed system of will, goal, and interpretation”.606 
Before examining further the ascetic ideal and what it means for those upon whom it has been 
imposed, let us revisit Nietzsche’s ambivalent relation to asceticism. In Christian asceticism, 
individuals are called to endure a life of self-renunciation in the hope of some imagined 
future reward. The idolization of an imagined future can only be possible with a simultaneous 
degradation of what belongs to the here and the now of humanity. Since what exists here has 
been deprived of its value through a tremendous system of domination which we have come 
to (erroneously) call civilization, individuals have only the future to look toward and all of 
their hopes are to be placed to an imaginary goal, always on the way to being achieved, but 
never actually achieved.   
Nietzsche, being an extraordinary classicist, finds a way to look beyond Christian asceticism 
toward what askesis used to signify. He finds then that the connection between asceticism 
and Christian renunciation of the self may be logical yet not necessary. In principle 
asceticism could be linked to ancient askesis once more, thus bypassing the negative 
consequences that Christian asceticism had upon humanity. In a revealing Nachlass note 
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from the autumn of 1887, he reveals that: “I also want to make asceticism natural again: in 
place of the aim of denial, the aim of strengthening; a gymnastic of the will; abstinence and 
periods of fasting of every kind, in the most spiritual realm, too; a casuistry of deeds in regard 
to the opinions we have regarding our strengths; an experiment with adventures and arbitrary 
dangers.
607
 The passage is revealing because it brings to light the possibility of a natural 
asceticism, a possibility which the tremendous influence of religious asceticism has blocked. 
This is a type of asceticism that will not be hostile to the senses in favour of an imagined 
beyond, but it will remain true to the earth — through the gymnastic of the body. In that 
sense a religious ascetic may declare his willingness to serve the ideal of chastity as a way to 
accelerate the process of the separation of the flesh from the pure spirit; the eager aim of it is 
communication with the divine (sense-less) logos. Yet there is always the kind of chastity an 
athlete exercises before an important competition so that he can be strong. In that case 
asceticism serves, affirms, and fortifies a very natural end and a very natural process, that of 
power. “In this [chastity of philosophers] there is nothing of chastity out of an ascetic scruple 
and hatred of the senses, just as little as it is chastity when an athlete or jockey abstains from 
women: rather it is their dominant instinct that wants it this way, at least during times of great 
pregnancy”608. Already from the beginning of the essay, Nietzsche identifies multiple types 
of asceticism at work. The ascetic ideal can be found in a series of human types, from artists 
to philosophers and from the priests to that which could have toppled ascetic ideals but 
managed not only to not overturn them but to become the ascetic ideal’s “most recent and 
noblest form”609, science610. The omnipresence of the ascetic ideal is a first indication of the 
degree of its absorption by human culture, but it is probably also a first indication of a human 
need to produce an anti-life ideal which will fortify biological existence against the imminent 
threat of absence of meaning. What makes humans tremble is not so much the pain of 
suffering but rather the prospect of a meaningless suffering; in short, the terrifying truth of 
Silenus, that it would have been perhaps better for us not to have been born. 
Nietzsche is interested in the examination of religious asceticism and the ideal that it 
produces. He is interested in this for two reasons. The first is that the ascetic ideal produces 
and reproduces a totalitarian view of reality where everything not falling within its 
perspective is forced to be excluded. The second is that the ascetic ideal is not just to be 
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expressed in a religious context, but has taken all sorts of shapes and forms within human 
culture, to the degree of the characterization of the whole planet by Nietzsche as this ‘ascetic 
star’. As we have seen, the beginnings of the ascetic ideal lie in the promise to all those who 
do not participate in the festival of earthly pleasures, that one day they will be rewarded. 
Masses get persuaded to give up on this life for the sake of another one because they have 
been persuaded that life in the here and now is neither something valuable nor something 
desirable. What hides behind the ascetic ideal is nothing other than a will to self-
improvement, the idea (that has become an ideal) that humans somehow ought
611
 to 
constantly work on their presumed weaknesses so that they can reach an ideal of perfection. 
This ideal is of course provided to the humans by the adherents of the ascetic ideal who rush 
to provide a meaning to the poor animals’ otherwise nonsensical existence. Ascetic ideals 
predominate, well hidden behind utilitarian arguments. The priest comes in a thousand faces. 
He becomes a doctor ready to cure mankind from illness, a psychotherapist ready to cure 
‘deviance’, a politician caring for the ‘good’ of the nation and the importance of (current) 
sacrifices, a teacher (i.e. an instructor) ready to instruct future citizens into what is useful for 
society, a capitalist solely interested in the production and the idolization of more and more 
material things, a socialist interested in the elevation of the poor, ignorant, and for the most 
part indifferent Volk, to the level of the omnipotent judge of all history. In every case the 
priest says: “Restrain, endure today, because the future will be better”. But, there is no 
‘better’! Paradoxically, Nietzsche observes, what the ascetic ideal has revealed is a secret yet 
exceptionally powerful wish to self-annihilation. What, under the influence of 
Platonic/Christian West, we have come to call ‘improvement’ is nothing but our unspoken 
desire to knock ourselves down out of the pleasure of punishment.  “‘[I]mprove’ means for 
me – the same as ‘tamed,’ ‘weakened’, ‘discouraged,’ ‘sophisticated,’ ‘pampered,’ 
‘emasculated’ (hence almost the same as injured…)”612 
This last point brings us to the greatest question and the most important mystery, which the 
Third Essay attempts to examine. If Nietzsche understands the ‘priest’ as the most degenerate 
form of life, since it is the one who incites his disciples to say ‘No’ to life, then how was it 
possible for this thoroughly negative power to dominate the earth? How has the ‘priest’ 
forced to such an extent his own valuation (or rather de-valuation) of existence upon his 
willing slaves? What is the source of his immense power? The issue is of course complicated, 
                                                             
611 To whom really?  
612 GM: III, 21 
164 
 
since it has to do with the ambivalent way with which Nietzsche treats the character of the 
slave. As Aaron Ridley has shown in his masterful treatment of the Genealogy
613
, the priest 
belongs to two worlds, that of the noble caste but also that of the slave caste. The ‘priests’ are 
surely descendants of aristocrats, yet their “priestly-noble” manner of valuation somehow 
manages to get inverted and to create thus the appropriate conditions for the most spiritual 
revenge.
614
 But if he was only an aristocrat the priest would have lived at a distance from the 
slaves. He could not have been in communication with them and the slaves would have never 
accepted him as their leader. It is because the priest is also partly a slave himself (because he 
succumbs to hate, he is a great despiser) that he can have such a tremendous influence on the 
slaves. “He must be sick himself, he must be related to the sick and short-changed from the 
ground up in order to understand them – in order to get along with them…”615 
The instigator of the slaves’ revolt in morals, then, is an ambiguous figure who incorporates 
features from both the aristocratic and the slave castes. Nietzsche characterizes this enigma as 
an “incarnate will to contradiction” and an “anti-nature”616. How then has this immense 
power of anti-nature prevailed over nature and succeeded in imposing its own valuation of 
existence? Is it possible for nature (to the degree that the priest belongs to nature) to turn 
against itself and annihilate itself? Perhaps even more surprising than the answer that 
Nietzsche provides to this question is his own tone of surprise as if he is reluctant to accept 
the colossal force of contradictions that life itself seems to constantly generate! “It must [Es 
muss] be a necessity of the first rank that makes this species that is hostile to life grow and 
prosper again and again – it must be in the interest of life itself that this type of self-
contradiction not die out” and later his amazement continuous: “This is all paradoxical 
[Grade paradox] in the highest degree: we stand here before a conflict that wants to be 
conflicted [einer Zwiespältigkeit, die sich selbst zwiespältig will]…”617 
How are we to think the paradox of an anti-nature which produces a conflict which wants to 
be perpetuated as a conflict, as being in conflict with itself? Nietzsche’s answer is equally 
paradoxical. He suggests that the ascetic ideal is a protective shield behind which the 
‘instincts of life’ have remained intact, and despite the attempt of the priest to devalue them 
and annihilate them, have formed so that they can protect life itself (which means here 
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strictly: biological existence) against the imminent threat of self-annihilation due to a lack of 
meaning. “…the ascetic ideal springs from the protective and healing instincts of a 
degenerating life that seeks with every means to hold its ground and is fighting for its 
existence…the ascetic ideal is an artifice for the preservation [Erhaltung] of life.”618 But for 
what kind of ‘existence’ does this degenerating life strive? What kind of ‘life’ is that which 
gets ‘preserved’? Given Nietzsche’s abhorrence to a kind of life which gets restricted to its 
biological functioning
619
, we are required to understand the type of life that the ascetic ideal 
seeks to preserve as the opposite of a life as such is defined in BGE: 9, as a process of 
“assessing, preferring, being unfair, being limited, wanting to be different”620. Unlike popular 
prejudice - that wants life to ‘befall’  humans, with them being the passive recipients of that 
momentous event, Nietzsche likes to remind us that life is something which the humans are 
called to choose, or not, and certainly is not a biological fact of neutral value.  
And yet humans would do anything in order to preserve their biological existence. They 
would even authorise “the sickliest of human beings to derive a sense of meaning and vitality 
from their otherwise meaningless suffering”621, as Conway has put it. In that sense the priest 
takes upon himself the tremendous work of barricading humans against a type of pessimism 
that will bring them to their knees. The priest does that by changing the direction of 
ressentiment
622
. As a result of their confinement to culture and their oppression by stronger 
natures, the weak find themselves in an increasing state of dissatisfaction. They need to 
discharge their oppressed energy and their ressentiment toward something or someone. The 
priest orchestrates a type of slave-attack which is not based on the rules of Kriegspraxis 
exemplified in EH: I,7: it is not an agon between equals, but rather an attack based on 
cunning. Because the priest wants to rule over the slaves, he implicates them within a web of 
eternally self-reproducing torture. The slave needs someone to blame for his suffering, since 
as Simon May beautifully puts it, “blame anaesthetizes despair”623, and the priest responds: 
“That’s right, my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it – you alone are to blame for 
yourself!”624  Nietzsche characterizes this move as both ‘bold’ and ‘false enough’, a move 
that allows the priest to exploit the ‘bad-instincts’ of the heard to his own advantage. An 
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animal that feels sick with himself, an animal that biologically exists only so that he can 
perpetually blame himself for his sufferings is an animal rendered harmless, an animal 
structurally unable to act and an animal that will elevate any externally provided solution to 
his feelings of suffering as welcoming.  
In the Third Essay, Nietzsche describes the history of humanity as a long history of 
succumbing to sickness, specifically to a type of sickness that was thought of as a protective 
shield against suicidal nihilism. The problem is that humanity has not known, has not 
experienced, anything other than this sickness which, for it, has become almost a synonym 
for life. We have become accustomed to taking sickness for health, Nietzsche is telling us. 
Christian civilization (the product of the priest) provided an exit-strategy to the agony of man 
by bringing “all suffering within the perspective of guilt”625. This had as a major advantage 
the rescuing of man’s will. But will indicates for Nietzsche above all the “affect of the 
command”626, which additionally signifies the possibility of someone who commands and 
someone who obeys since will is not unified but plural. To say then that will was rescued is to 
say that the possibility for the development of a type of man conscious of the plurality of the 
will, a man able to command and to obey contra the levelling effects of the Christian West, 
was left open. In this sense Nietzsche even characterizes the priest as one of the “yes-creating 
forces of life”, because despite all his harmful effects, the priest created the wound from 
which the sick human animal paradoxically nourishes himself
627
. The disadvantage of the 
influence of the priest was that this rescued will was mobilized not toward the advancement 
of a plural view of the human (as will itself signifies) but exclusively toward willing which is 
harmful to life, that which excludes and humiliates life on earth, because “man would rather 
will nothingness than not to will…”628 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Genealogy is the most frustrating of Nietzsche’s texts. Its dazzling conceptions are 
underdeveloped, confused, and contradictory to the extreme. Yet, Genealogy’s charm lies in 
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its being an immensely ambitious text. In it we are presented with a history of humanity from 
its very beginnings to its current state and even further. No one before Nietzsche dared to 
present such a grand psycho-cultural history of the development of humanity, and only 
Oswald Spengler dared to re-try it after Nietzsche, with inferior results. The central question 
with which Genealogy is concerned is the question of the ‘nature’ of the human or, to be 
more precise, Genealogy is interested in examining the conditions under which the human 
(this experiment
629
) has been developed in such a way so as to have a nature. The nature that 
the human animal has come to have is the product of a long process of subjugation. One of 
the central questions that the Genealogy poses is who or what was responsible for this process 
of subjugation. At first it looks as if the Genealogy is telling us that if what we have come to 
call human was the product of this long process of subjugation, then through the reversal of 
those conditions another kind of production would be, in principle, possible. A proposal of 
getting rid of all the harmful effects of culture and then meeting, on the other side, so to 
speak, a human untouched, perhaps even innocent of the ills of centuries of webs of 
domination exercised upon it, it looks rather appealing.  
Yet, this is not what Genealogy is actually telling us. There are two reasons for this. The first 
is that nowhere in his genealogical narrative has Nietzsche suggested that a return to some 
sort of pure state of things would be possible, not only because a simple return to the past can 
ever be a viable proposal regarding the future of humanity, but also because what humans 
have come to be is now part of their constitution. One, either an individual or a culture, 
cannot simply remove elements of the constitution of the human, because those elements 
have by now been integrated into an organic whole. Nietzsche is telling us that there is no 
cure for our sickness because we are constituted as sick. When Freud suggested that neurosis 
is not just something that since it makes us uncomfortable we should get rid of it, but rather 
that we are what we are because we are able to be neurotic, i.e. able to develop an inner 
space harbouring the conditions of our struggle against ourselves, he was echoing this very 
basic Nietzschean conception, that it is our very sickness that defines us as humans, and not 
what we present as our healthy public persona. The former is where humans are born, (inter 
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feces et urinam, as St. Augustine put it); the latter is where we try to hide our true face, the 
public arena.
630
 
The second reason why Genealogy’s suggestions are much more complicated than the reader 
initially thinks has to do with the overall conception of the human that Genealogy helps bring 
to light. We have to stress here that it is this conception that stands as a witness to the 
continuous relevance of the Genealogy for any discussion of the Overhuman. Scandalously, 
Genealogy is ignored by Nietzschean scholars in almost every discussion relevant to the 
notion of Overhuman.
631
 Scholars tend to look at the most obvious places, and because of that 
they always get it wrong. However, the interpretation that we advance here places Genealogy 
to the peak of the texts relevant to discussions concerning posthumanism and Overhumanity. 
Genealogy is perhaps the most relevant text that one has to resort to when examining the 
notion of the Overhuman
632
. But why is that, then?  
In Genealogy, Nietzsche makes three very interesting moves which are represented by each 
of the three essays of the text. The first move is the contest
633
 between the slaves and the 
nobles. Rather than prescribing an egalitarian model of struggle, Nietzsche suggests that there 
are multiple ways which the lives of the nobles and the slaves meet and interconnect. The 
Nietzschean model of struggle is far more complicated than that of a historical struggle, 
Marxist style, between haves and have-nots. It is a model according to which forces (the ones 
represented by the nobles and the ones represented by the slaves) are not passive recipients of 
the produced power but the active producers of power, and thus they also produce the 
psycho-cultural conditions that have given birth to the human animal.  
With the Second Essay, Nietzsche continues and elaborates the move of the First Essay. Here 
we witness the genesis of human animal as intrinsically (i.e. as a nature that has become 
natural) guilty of his most basic desires and hostile to the closest things
634
. But unlike the 
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simplistic model of the Big Bad Wolf, having to be held responsible for everything, Nietzsche 
rather suggests that with internalization, a process taking place due to the unavoidable 
confinement of human animals within the bounds of culture, a new type of animal is born 
which harbours a contradiction and an enigma brought forth by the turning back of instincts 
that were formerly discharged outwards. The sickness of bad consciousness is something new 
to human history and certainly something very promising, since conflict becomes the element 
that defines humans and makes them restless so that they can produce history, i.e. conflict.  
The Third Essay closes the circle by proposing the third, final, and seemingly most 
pessimistic move. Even if the animal coming out of the Second Essay was seen as the product 
and producer of conflict, Nietzsche is telling us that it is from this very same (once) 
Zukunftvolles creature that we have to expect a will to shut down existence altogether by 
asserting its unconditional faith in anti-nature: the ascetic ideal. The human of the Third 
Essay prefers to will nothingness than not to will. Undoubtedly Nietzsche’s last observation is 
far from helpful. The situation could be compared to having to choose between the life of a 
catatonic patient (not to will) and the state of someone suicidal (to will nothingness). Neither 
of the two options is particularly appealing. Yet Nietzsche seems to suggest that even a life 
constantly flirting with its self-annihilation is to be preferred over non-existence. Again, 
though, Nietzsche does not leave much space for optimism. The will that gets preserved is not 
neutral and beyond its historical realization. That is because this is a “willing that has 
received its direction from the ascetic ideal”635, and thus it is going to be a willing that is to 
will the ‘hatred of the human’ and not the love of it. However, because all willing (through 
the sufferings and adventures of inward-turning instincts) ultimately gets to generate 
contradictions and enigmas, perhaps the possibility arises of some future productions, 
unknown to us in the present. 
Nietzsche makes two further explicit suggestions in Genealogy regarding the safeguarding of 
the possibility of a future for the human. The first is made in II: 20 and refers to the 
cultivation of atheism as the method which will release humanity from being bound to 
existential guilt, the type of guilt which links the human to an infinite obligation toward a 
transcendent force. However, Nietzsche notes in III: 27 that the abandonment of a belief in 
God has to entail the simultaneous abandonment of a belief in truth as a manifestation of the 
ascetic ideal, a manifestation, that is to say, of our need to live; a task which Paul Loeb has 
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rightly described as nothing less than a ‘suicide mission’.636 The second of Nietzsche’s 
explicit suggestions is made in II: 24 and refers to the possibility of the reversal of the 
enforced link between bad conscience and natural inclinations so as “to wed to bad 
conscience the unnatural inclinations, all those aspirations to the beyond, to that which is 
contrary to the senses, contrary to the instincts, contrary to nature, contrary to animal”637; or, 
as Aaron Ridley puts it, “…one should learn to feel bad about oneself for one’s transgressions 
against immanence”638. The type of bad conscience that Nietzsche speaks about in this 
passage is bad conscience in its ‘raw state’, i.e. prior to the process of moralization. This bad 
conscience refers to “this instinct for freedom, forcibly made latent”639. Is it plausible to wed 
what is already repressed with what is unnatural so as to celebrate a life paying tribute to 
immanence, to the closest things? Perhaps this is a legitimate task. This is not to suggest, 
however, the re-establishment of a culture of shame (a pre-moralized form of guilt) as one 
may perhaps conclude as a result of Bernard Williams’ influential reading of Greek 
antiquity
640
. Shame requires a degree of internalization of the power of the other over us, so it 
would be an utterly bizarre suggestion to re-establish it on behalf of such an exponent of the 
value of solitude
641
 as Nietzsche. After all, Nietzsche is adamant: “all human misery and 
wrongdoing is caused by traditional social structures”642. Despite this, it seems as if 
Nietzsche points toward the necessity of something which only looks like shame, with his             
“—foolishness, not sin! Do you understand that?”643 What does it mean to will foolishness 
over sin? 
Rather than a simple return to the Greeks through a form of shame, although unquestionably 
prevalent among such a community-oriented culture as that of the Greeks, it is our suggestion 
that Nietzsche’s evocation of foolishness—as the necessity of the setting-free from the 
bounds of an infinite creditor—refers more to the establishment of a new relation to truth 
after Truth’s demise in the hands of Christian morality. Since the ascetic ideal has been 
historically and culturally linked with the humans’ close relation to a transcendental truth 
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which defines the limits and the aims of human culture, the abandonment of religious 
asceticism could make possible, once again, another relation to truth itself. Liberated from its 
transcendental presuppositions, truth can survive if conceived as what Keith Ansell-Pearson 
calls “a set of practices of truthfulness” and a “diet of knowledge”644. This diet would have to 
include the closest things, such as “doubt, suspicion, critical distance, subjecting all things to 
scrutiny…”645 which when cultivated for a long period of time may bear the fruit of another 
relation of humans with both their communities and their physical environment. But for that 
to be done an honest relation to our history has to be established.  
GM: III, 28 has made clear that that a human expedition to a life beyond the realm of what 
culture has come to consider as truth will certainly amount to a suicide mission. The “ascetic 
ideal has been the “faute de mieux” par excellence there has been thus far.”646 Humans are so 
entangled in a life of projects (lives aiming somewhere) that they cannot abandon the ultimate 
ground of all truth: The realization that Silenus was right after all. This truth, that human 
existence on earth is after all an absurd project, is to be covered up by a long process of 
subjugation whereby humans become dependent on an interpretation of their existence which 
both preserves their biological existence and sets them in the service of a web of ideological 
mechanisms (religion, political ideologies, education etc.) which are to manipulate the human  
in such a way as to render it useful for their goals, i.e. to degrade human existence to a 
mechanism of production. Nietzsche believes that such an interpretation cannot be allowed to 
have an enduring effect in human history. His proposal is that an honest cultivation of 
atheism will entail the abandonment of the transcendental belief in truth but need not to 
herald also the rejection of a life of truthfulness. In AC
647
 Nietzsche has suggested that the 
separation of humanity from divinity is an act of profound modesty which is going to place 
humans back in their natural environment instead of letting them linger over the abysses of 
transcendent ideals. But an honest cultivation of atheism requires the critical conformation of 
humanity with its history and thus with the conditions that have cultivated humans the way 
they are today. This is not going to be an easy task. To overcome humanity, and not overjump 
it
648
, we have to discover the ‘over’ through going under and perishing for the sake of this 
very humanity. Genealogy does exactly that: it jumps into the unknown waters of the psycho-
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cultural evolution of man. What it brings back to the surface is a much more complicated, 
contradictory and conflicting view of humans than what the current omnipotent 
Western/Christian culture has trained us to believe that the human is. Isn’t that already more 
than we can endure?  
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The final overcoming: Otherwise than Time. 
An ethics of expense for the New Century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter we are going to defend the following provocative claim: In an agonist relation 
the winner certainly wins, yet what he wins is nothing. The nothing that he wins reveals the 
high degree of his power [Macht]. Through the nothingness of his victory his sovereignty is 
established. However, before supporting such an intriguing claim, several steps have to be 
taken, and for that thought to be contemplated, certain training is needed. To this end, in the 
first part of the chapter we will examine the work of French intellectual Georges Bataille. 
This will allow us to familiarise ourselves with notions such as loss, squandering and waste in 
conjunction to power and sovereignty. Bataille will reveal to us that it is possible to be like a 
squandering sovereign whose power increases the more he gives away. Then, in the second 
part of the chapter, we will turn to Nietzsche and through our original reading of the thought 
of the return, we will argue that Nietzsche pushes even further his earlier conceptions 
regarding the agon. While early Nietzsche believed that the life of the agonist ought to be 
preserved, later Nietzsche experiments with the idea of self-sacrifice and leans toward a new 
understanding of power which empowers only to the degree that he is willing to give away 
the productive logic of Christo-capitalism. This reading of Nietzsche paves the way toward 
the constitution of a new ethics of expense. This ethics, this proposal for a new bios for the 
“The sun gives without ever 
receiving.” 
Georges Bataille, The Accursed 
Share: Vol.I, p.28 
“For ever in a kind of love and for 
ever in a kind of selfishness and self-
enjoyment! To be in possession of a 
dominion and at the same time 
concealed and renouncing! To lie 
continually in the sunshine and 
gentleness of grace, and yet to know 
that the paths that rise up to the 
sublime are close by! – That would 
be a life! That would be a reason for 
a long life!” 
Friedrich Nietzsche, D: 449 
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humans, demands our breaking up from the experience of a linear time and the logic of 
production which follows it, and our embracing of a time perennially destined to lose time as 
humanity departs toward a bios based on wasteful activity; activity that produces nothing 
apart from its own sovereignty. 
 
A note on how to read Nietzsche (through Bataille). 
 
Georges Bataille’s highly idiosyncratic work has rarely been seen as a fruitful way to 
illuminate Nietzsche’s thoughts649. Indeed, ‘illumination’, the Platonic tradition of associating 
‘good’ with ‘light’, was never the task of this most obscure of modern thinkers, who 
celebrated the impossibility of any ‘conclusive image of the universe’650 and rendered the 
eternal night of anguish as the true birthplace of the human heart.
651
 Yet, although Bataille 
certainly lacks in scholarship, he has nevertheless incorporated Nietzsche’s teachings to a 
remarkable degree and produced a body of work in the wake of Nietzsche’s thought, showing 
the multiple ways in which the ‘master’s’ thought can be used in order to enhance the 
experience of thinking and the boundaries of philosophical work.  
What then does Bataille have to teach us concerning the final stage of Nietzsche’s 
meditations on the Overhuman condition? Bataille paves the way to a reading of 
Zarathustra’s teachings, the Overhuman and the eternal return of all things, which is going to 
take seriously what has usually been left unexamined, namely Zarathustra’s laughter. For 
Bataille, laughter achieves two things. First, it leaves all things in a permanent state of 
suspension. Nothing ‘concludes’ itself within the constant move from possibility to 
impossibility that laughter is. Laughter affirms nothing
652
, it denies to things and humans a 
state of closure, and like ecstasy opens up man to the world. Secondly, Bataille notes that: 
“By laughing I celebrate the marriage of power and loss.”653 The movement of power is 
fundamentally connected with sovereignty only to the extent that sovereignty is stripped off 
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from the power which certainly constitutes it. Loss is the precondition of a power which 
affirms itself as sovereignty, as that which escapes the totalitarian closure of the system of 
power. In that sense one succeeds only when one loses, only when one denies bringing all 
things within the perspective of the all-knowing Cartesian subject. Zarathustra belongs to the 
movement of laughter. He denies bringing his thoughts to their final conclusion and leaves 
them suspended over the great void of life. He is the teacher of what Nietzsche has called in 
BGE: 294 a ‘golden laugh’, where this laughter is the response to the spirit of gravity; to all 
things solemn and to those who have taught them. Zarathustra, the Antichrist, wishes only to 
inaugurate an era after the history of all things solemn and grave. 
In Luke 6:25, Jesus says to his disciples: “Woe unto you that laugh now! For ye shall mourn 
and weep”654. Zarathustra, the Antichrist, responds to Jesus by advising his own disciples the 
opposite: “What has been the greatest sin here on earth so far? Was it not the word of him 
who said: ‘Woe unto those who laugh now!’ Did he himself find no grounds on earth for 
laughter? Then he simply did not look…He – did not love enough: else he would also have 
loved us who laugh!...Get out of the way of all such unconditional men! That is a poor sick 
kind, a mob-kind: they look at life sadly; they have the evil eye for this earth”. A bit later 
Zarathustra urges the ‘superior humans’: “Laughter I have pronounced holy; you superior 
humans, learn from me – to laugh!”655 Zarathustra’s ‘golden laugh’ comes from a place 
which overcomes the history of the West as the unfolding of the utilitarian mechanism of 
salvation. Zarathustra laughs because this is all he has. The rest lies with the history of 
seriousness which is fed by the deniers of ‘this’ life and of ‘this’ earth. Zarathustra, then, is 
the one who responds to millennia of life vivisection and to a whole history of culture, from 
Plato (the grand master of all things ‘serious’) onwards, perceived as a long meditation on 
death, with a grand celebration of folly and dance, which are nevertheless to be taken as what 
they truly are—divine—yet their divinity comes from Gods that respond to different needs 
from those of the disciples of the Christian God. For the faithful, the Christian God can, 
perhaps, do many things. Yet of one thing it is incapable. For the religion that has elevated 
death to the source of man’s redemption from the sin of earthly existence, it is simply 
unthinkable to accommodate laughter, dance, and lightness in what it conceives as a ‘tragedy’ 
of existence. Life on earth is toil, and the faithful are aware of that, thus they cannot laugh. 
Yet Nietzsche wants Gods to respond to life’s need for enhancement, not annihilation, and 
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thus humans also have to learn to face life on earth not as a punishment but as a gift. This 
requires other types of Gods, those who can simply make fun, both of themselves and of 
others. In every case, “Gods like to make fun of things: it seems as if they cannot stop 
laughing, even during holy rites”656. Zarathustra’s ‘divine’ laugh, which Bataille brings to the 
fore, is neither some kind of reflex to a witticism nor a temporary psychological discharge. 
This would be a ‘human’ laughter anyway. The Overhuman is born from within the 
movement which opposes the preachers of all things grave (death, salvation, redemption, sin 
etc.) and celebrates the eternal folly of knowledge, the buffoonery of a nonsensical existence.  
In this chapter we are going to read the ‘return’ against the background of Nietzsche’s 
thought. The thought of the return is Nietzsche’s response to his lifelong occupation with 
exposing the malicious effects of Plato-Judeo/Christian culture. If not read like that, the 
thought of the return will remain perhaps an interesting (yet indifferent) thought experiment. 
Nietzsche’s lifelong occupation, we believe, was to expose the conditions under which a 
reverse experiment in terms of culture could be possible. His audience is not the late 
inhabitants of the democratic West but the ‘reversed ones’, the ones who have been taught to 
find the ‘exemplary’ in the opposite conditions from those of our civilization. Harsh as it is 
for us to admit it, we are not Nietzsche’s audience. The conditions for that have not yet been 
cultivated. Yet thinkers like Bataille, who have followed Nietzsche’s thought to an 
extraordinary degree, can help us to get perhaps a glimpse of something different from the 
one-dimensional future prescribed to us by the conditions of our civilization. Bataille has 
stressed that the ideology of the linearity of time supports only purposes of capitalist 
production, which is for him a way to re-entrap man into teleology where the telos is already 
fixed and prearranged by forces serving various political, social or religious interests which 
are nothing but neutral to the fate of the human. Contrary to what we are accustomed to think, 
Bataille prepares us to consider an earth pregnant with unending energy, for this reason 
certainly monstrous, as Nietzsche’s nature was: undisciplined, wild, exuberant and chaotic657; 
an earth that does not obey the guidelines of a system of revenge (as that of Plato-
Judeo/Christian civilization). Bataille teaches us to be faithful to a chaotic earth that stands 
beyond the pre-prescribed notions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ and incorporates the whole system of 
forces, which human (and cosmic) life is, back to the reality of human totality. To learn to 
read Bataille is to get slowly accustomed to the possibility of a reversed world; it is to learn 
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that a future of revenge against existence cannot be allowed to be humanity’s only path and 
that other possibilities are, in principle, possible. For these reasons our introduction to 
Nietzsche’s experiment on the nature of time is going to be through Bataille’s exposition of 
an earth and a life upon it beyond the demands of Christian teleology and the logic of 
production; toward a future of expenditure, i.e. of laughter and dance, toward a future where 
Gods laugh and perish laughing, out of love for this earth, for these humans, not out of some 
fantasised version of the earth and the humans. In short, if Gods can make ‘fun of 
themselves’, then humans have learn also to make fun of themselves and to discover lightness 
to all things grave and solemn. For that, though, another relation to the earth and ourselves 
has to be established. This is to say that we are in urgent need for a new narrative concerning 
our origins and thus our futures. This is what Bataille does. He teaches us that we have been 
fooled so far. Our origins lie elsewhere, and equally our futures. 
 
 Mauss’s influence. 
 
On his highly influential treatment of the notion of gift in archaic societies, Marcel Mauss 
notes that Homo economicus is a rather recent and certainly a very ‘Western’ way to 
understand man and his social activities
658
. Ultimately, Mauss believes, it is the wrong way to 
understand man, since the definition of the whole (Man is….) is extracted only from a small 
part of his overall social activity which seeks to dominate the entire existence of the human 
being at the expense of his entire historical and social reality. Mauss is not wrong. It was 
John Stuart Mill who set the limits of the ‘new science’ of political economy by restricting it 
to the research of man’s economic exchanges taking place independently of man’s overall 
social activity. “Political Economy considers mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and 
consuming wealth…[Political economy] does not treat the whole of man’s nature as modified 
by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him 
solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the 
comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end.”659 Modernity compartmentalizes 
man’s activities and treats them as independent of each other. A new type of man gets born, 
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the modern man, which forces Zarathustra to cry: “Verily, my friends, I walk among human 
beings as among fragments and severed limbs of human beings”660. Mauss argues that this 
was not always the case and that in archaic societies the economic and the social were 
blended into a functional whole which redirected economic exchange away from the realm of 
modernity’s utilitarian calculations and closer to a system of non-economic exchanges, which 
was based not on accumulation but on a complex system of obligations structured around the 
notion of the freely given gift.  
Mauss’s investigations of gift-giving, as the heart of the social life of primitive societies, 
provides us with the key with which we can unlock Bataille’s certainly complex and unusual 
meditations on solar economics and the construction of a society which is based on a 
principle of loss. In the primitive societies of North West America and Melanesia, economic 
life was based not on the principle of accumulation of profits or material things but on the 
exchange of gifts, which, although material in form, they were highly invested with spiritual 
powers. The potlatch describes a gift-giving process with three necessary steps: to give, to 
receive, and to return. The gift is not just a material thing; it possesses something from the 
soul of the giver and from the spirit of nature. Among the ancient peoples of Samoa and New 
Zealand, the spiritual force of the gift permeates through all donors and recipients of gifts 
who are obliged to return gifts of a higher value than the gifts given to them. “…the thing 
given is not inactive. Invested with life, often possessing individuality, it seeks to return 
to…its ‘place of origin’ or to produce, on behalf of the clan and the native soil from which it 
sprang, an equivalent to replace it.”661 The gift-giving process of the potlatch, which is based 
on the fundamental obligation to return something of a higher value from that which was 
given to you, creates what Mauss has called an “obligatory circulation of wealth, tribute and 
gifts”662. Nothing is eternally ours to keep. An ideology of possession (and a practice of 
possessing) would be unthinkable to the ancient peoples under investigation. One ought to 
return because Nature’s spirit is not for the humans to possess.  
This paradoxical economic organization of archaic societies cultivates an idea that one finds 
again and again in Bataille, and it will also be acknowledged in this chapter as the centre of 
the relation between Bataille and Nietzsche. The one who receives has the obligation to 
return, and to return more than what he was initially given, so that he can achieve both the 
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removal of obligation and a status higher than the status of the one who gave less. 
Paradoxically, then, to win one has to lose. Unlike the Western societies of utilitarian 
calculation where the winner is the one who gets it all, in archaic societies the winner is the 
one who loses the more, the one who wastes the bulk of his wealth on gifts and it is precisely 
because he loses that he wins the respect of his fellow men. There is certainly some sort of 
calculation here of respect or honour rather than material things. The purpose of the potlatch 
is to overturn the connection between accumulation and rank by replacing it with another 
connection, that between loss and rank. Bataille has noted that “Capitalism in a sense is an 
unreserved surrender to things, heedless of the consequences and seeing nothing beyond 
them.”663 By losing, and by wishing to lose, individuals and societies declare their liberation 
from their surrender to matter in favour of webs of interconnectedness among members of the 
community.  
Mauss describes a sociology of honour as it functions among the people of the American 
Northwest which draws Bataille’s fascinated response. While in the modern West issues of 
rank are organized largely around the possession of wealth, which subsequently enables one 
to acquire an expensive education and later to get a high earning or high-profile position, in 
archaic societies issues of rank are organized around the notion of unproductive expenditure. 
Among the Native Americans of the Northwest the idea that one acquires a higher position in 
society depending on how much he wastes reaches a peak. Mauss notes: “Consumption and 
destruction of goods really go beyond all bounds. In certain kinds of potlatch one must 
expend all that one has, keeping nothing back. It is a competition to see who is the richest and 
also the most madly extravagant. Everything is based upon the principles of antagonism and 
rivalry. The political status of individuals in the brotherhoods and clans, and ranks of all 
kinds, are gained in a ‘war of property’…”664, which is to say in a war where property is 
measured by how much and how willing is one to waste. The peak, the summit of this 
process of expenditure is reached through the total destruction of goods which immediately 
places the ‘madly extravagant’ destroyer to the peak of the political ladder of society. “In a 
certain number of cases, it is not even a question of giving and returning gifts, but of 
destroying, so as not to give the slightest hint of desiring your gift to be reciprocated. Whole 
boxes of olachen (candlefish) oil or whale oil are burnt, as are houses and thousands of 
blankets. The most valuable copper objects are broken and thrown into the water, in order to 
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put down and to ‘flatten’ one’s rival. In this way one not only promotes oneself, but also 
one’s family, up the social scale.”665 Bataille does not fail to spot what he calls the ‘agonistic 
type’ of expenditure666, a term whose significance he draws from Nietzsche. Indeed, what 
characterizes this extravagant loss is above all its competitive character. Donors are not 
isolated individuals who give anonymously. but rather participants in a large public festival of 
excess, the type perhaps that Zarathustra participates in the fourth part of TSZ, which judges 
everyone’s position in the social ladder according to their willingness to waste 
unproductively.  
 
On general (or solar) economics. 
 
‘General economics’ refers to an understanding of the economic life of societies beyond their 
dependence on economic data, as in the case of the ‘restricted economy’ of modern 
capitalism. General economics, following the example of Mauss’ exposition of archaic 
societies, encompasses the whole of the life of society, taking into account sociological and 
anthropological findings which organize human life into an organic whole, unlike Mill’s 
vision of a political economy restricted to matters of possessing and managing (strictly) 
material wealth. Taking inspiration from Mauss’ anthropological findings, Bataille expands 
the notion of expenditure, already found in Mauss, to a principle able to embrace the entire 
economy of life and to provide inspiration for the organization of the social realm other than 
that of the current model of Protestantism-inspired capitalism. Indeed, one of capitalism’s 
(this indigenous combination of asceticism and absolute faith to some future salvation — 
salvation to be provided only after the ascetic renunciation of life) ideological pillars is the 
idea that resources are scarce, and thus a fundamental demand of society is the immediate 
satisfaction of scarce resources through accumulation of capital.
667
 This is Bataille’s first 
break with classical political economy. We do not live in a state of scarce resources. On the 
contrary, we live in a state of abundance of resources, and more than that, in a state of over-
abundance. The planet produces more, not less, than what we need. The real economic 
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problem of humanity is overproduction. Overproduction creates the additional problem of the 
management of what Bataille calls the ‘accursed share’ which indicates the excessive energy 
that economy constantly produces but it cannot consume. 
Based on the (now rather dubious) scientific research of his friend, nuclear scientist Georges 
Ambrosino
668
, Bataille proposes a model of perennial excessive energy, radiating from the 
sun and embracing every aspect of life on earth. “Solar energy is the source of life’s 
exuberant development. The origin and essence of our wealth are given in the radiation of the 
sun, which dispenses energy – wealth – without any return. The sun gives without ever 
receiving.”669 Allan Stoekl has described a three-stage process of ever-greater release of 
excessive energy. At first the sun provides the earth with excessive energy, which is then 
taken by the flora and fauna of the planet which consume energy by proliferating wildly, and 
then, at the last stage, man receives the proliferated energy of the planet and squanders it on 
unproductive activities like war, religious sacrifices and (unproductive) erotic activity.
670
 The 
question then that one has to ask is the following: What do we do with surplus energy? The 
management of this excessive energy is the real problem of humanity and the true question of 
economics. A redistribution of wealth (excessive energy) is necessary since the opposite 
leads to social discontent which subsequently lead to wars and revolutions as expressions of 
the cosmic need for unproductive activity. Bataille thinks that a paradigmatic example of the 
management of excessive energy was the Marshall Plan, the economic aid that United States 
offered to Europe after the Second World War for the rebuilt of European economies. As 
Paul Hegarty notes, the Marshall Plan managed to integrate to “societies dominated by a 
‘Protestant ethic’ of utility and acquisition”671 the principle of unproductive expenditure 
(already of course present in every society in the form of gifts, presents and social or sport 
spectacles where energy gets released for the sake of it) into the very core of capitalist 
economics and politics. Regardless of the validity or not of Bataille’s view (wouldn’t a 
producer – the US – need a consumer – Europe – to whom they could sell their products?) for 
Bataille it is the extent of the aid, and the apparent absence of obligation to return it, that 
disturbs the capitalist logic of accumulation by placing a ‘moment’ of unproductive 
expenditure at the very centre of it.  
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But the question regarding economics is followed by an even more pressing question 
regarding the place of man in the midst of a ‘mad’ logic of useless consumption. Indeed, the 
ethical question is the following. If capitalism, with all of its values of “prudence, calculation 
and predictability”672 has managed to produce man as ‘homo economicus’, then what type of 
man would a movement of useless expenditure would create? Bataille notes that: “The 
general movement of exudation (of waste) of living matter impels him [man], and he cannot 
stop it; moreover, being at the summit, his sovereignty in the living world identifies him with 
this movement; it destines him, in a privileged way, to that glorious operation, to useless 
consumption.”673 According to this passage, man is implicated in a ‘general movement of 
waste’ from which he cannot only escape, as if this movement is something external to his 
existence, but rather the movement defines his very existence as an operation of waste, as 
‘useless consumption’. Bataille has no doubts as to the ethical consequences of such a view. 
“Changing from the perspectives of restrictive economy to those of general economy actually 
accomplices a Copernican transformation: a reversal of thinking – and of ethics.”674 To the 
omnipotent Western cultural model, the Plato/Judaeo-Christian line of thought, man is 
considered to be the principle conserver of planetary equilibrium who cautiously and 
persistently is destined to climb up Jacob's ladder on his attempt to reach the highest point of 
clarity, having ridded on the way everything that tied him to the earth; emotions, senses, 
drives, and of course matter itself. This operation needs persistence, responsibility, (Socratic) 
optimism and above all faith in the rational management of both the subject and the world so 
that the final point, the light of reason, can be reached. Isn’t humanity, after all, the sweet 
offspring of God, the crown of creation, the most perfect achievement of Nature, the 
conclusion of evolution, the splendour of rationality, the end of all dialectics, the Geist of 
cosmos? Well, no! “Humans are in no way the crown of creation.”675 Nietzsche cried and 
Bataille listened. No, this ‘modern’, for Nietzsche, obsession with progress does not describe 
the movement of the cosmos but only a typically small, bourgeois need; the need to deceive 
oneself by anthropomorphising the cosmos, attributing to the cosmos characteristics typical to 
humans such as rationality, conservation, progress and, above all, harmony. ‘Unfortunately’ 
Nature is not the mirror image of a petty state employee, but rather an undisciplined, 
unorganized chaos irreducible to the demands of human science and certainly a chaos devoid 
                                                             
672 Conor, Tracey Peter. Georges Bataille and the mysticism of Sin. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University 
Press. 2000, p. 160 
673 Bataille, Georges. The Accursed Share (Vol. I). Op.cit. p. 23 
674 Ibid. p. 25 
675 Ibid. p. 14 
183 
 
of God. Upsetting the well-known Spinozist dictum, where Spinoza identifies nature with 
God, Nietzsche, on the contrary, proclaims a new vision of a de-deified nature where chaos, 
instead of order, becomes Nature’s unsettling identity: “Chaos sive Natura”676. 
On this chaotic Nature humanity stands not as its greatest achievement but rather as its 
greatest waste. To start with, all life is waste. “The history of life on earth is mainly the effect 
of a wild exuberance; the dominant event is the development of luxury, the production of 
increasingly burdensome forms of life.”677 Echoing Nietzsche678, Bataille also believes that 
man does not stand in a position superior to the rest of creation but rather is caught in the 
midst of this movement of expenditure and waste that life is. “…Man is only a roundabout, 
subsidiary response to the problem of growth. Doubtless, through labor and technique, he has 
made possible the extension of growth beyond the given limits. But just as the herbivore 
relative to the plant, and the carnivore relative to the herbivore, is a luxury, man is the most 
suited of all human beings to consume intensely, sumptuously, the excess energy offered up 
by the pressure of life to conflagrations befitting the solar origins of its movement.”679 The 
problem for Bataille lies in that instead of man doing everything in order to align human 
existence to the wasteful movement of the cosmos, he has done everything to restrict his 
existence to the narrow boundaries of a secure life promised by the linear logic of a capitalist-
governed Christian civilization. Would that be a typical case of the death instinct at work? 
Didn’t Nietzsche and Freud proclaim the existence of destructive forces at the very heart of 
the exuberant movement of life? Perhaps that may be the case. But for Bataille, man is still 
caught between two ends. On the one hand is the utility of the world (a world that needs to 
make sense and needs a future so that it can avoid the horrors of the present) and on the other 
hand a world beyond utility, where man is free to “live only for fascination”680 surrendered to 
the wasteful movement of the cosmos. “The world to which we have belonged offers nothing 
to love outside of each individual insufficiency: its existence is limited to utility. A world that 
cannot be loved to the point of death – in the same way a man loves a woman- represents 
only self-interest and the obligation to work.”681 Against the principles of law and utility 
which the homo economicus represents, Bataille juxtaposes the headless monster that has 
escaped all utility and has embraced the monstrous responsibility of utter freedom in a 
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Godless universe. Andre Masson produces the famous drawing for the first issue of the 
review Acéphale
682
 which Bataille has created. In the first article of the issue, Bataille 
describes this picture of an anti-man who attacks the principles of classical economics and 
the Western fetishization of rationality and calculation. We provide the complete passage as it 
will work also as a bridge to our next enquiry into the notion of sovereignty. Bataille 
describes the Acéphale as follows: “Man has escaped from his head just as the condemned 
man has escaped from his prison. He has found beyond himself not God, who is the 
prohibition against crime, but a being who is unaware of prohibition. Beyond what I am, I 
meet a being who makes me laugh because he is headless; this fills me with dread because he 
is made of innocence and crime; he holds a steel weapon in his left hand, flames like those of 
a Sacred Heart in his right. He reunites in the same eruption Birth and Death. He is not a man. 
He is not a god either. He is not me but he is more than me: his stomach is the labyrinth in 
which he has lost himself, loses me with him, and in which I discover myself as him, in other 
words as a monster.”683 
 
On Sovereignty and Nothingness. 
  
Lexicographically, sovereignty is associated mainly with two things. The first is royal rank 
and the second is the power which usually emanates from the supreme authority of royalty. 
Bataille will retain the noble aim of achieving sovereignty, but only by turning authority on 
its head. The starting point for Bataille’s meditations on the problem of sovereignty is 
Hegel’s exposition of the master-slave dialectic684. Bataille clearly identifies mastery with 
sovereignty for the same reasons as Kojeve has done before him. What gives mastery to the 
master is not his willingness to dominate but his willingness to stake his life on the agon with 
the slave. In Bataille’s terms, it is the master’s willingness to lose685, to lose himself, his life, 
in a moment of glorious expenditure, that turns the one participant into a sovereign and the 
other into a slave; because while the slave is after the most basic, and base, needs, the master 
is only after pure prestige, transcending thus the everyday world of utility and animal desire. 
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“To struggle without having the satisfaction of animal needs as an object is above all in itself 
sovereign; it expresses a sovereignty.”686 
Above all, sovereignty disturbs the world of everyday utility; the world dedicated to progress 
and the attainment of goals and targets, the world in which the rules of general economy 
apply. So while sovereignty may borrow from Hegel something like the dialectical unfolding 
of itself, and while for Hegel spirit gradually realizes, through its identification of itself with 
itself, its manifestation into absolute knowing, for Bataille sovereignty comes to realize its 
identification with the nothing which constitutes it from the very beginning. This nothing, 
though, is not the nothing of nihilism, the nothing that brings you to your knees with 
exhaustion and despair, but rather the nothing of negation, of Hegelian-Kojevian negation 
which is the prerequisite of freedom. Bataille never tires of repeating Kojeve’s lesson: 
“Action is Negativity and Negativity, Action.”687 Negativity then has to be utilised against 
the efficacious activity of the social animal man. “In efficacious activity” Bataille notes, 
“man becomes the equivalent of a tool, which produces; he is like the thing the tool is, being 
itself a product. The implication of these facts are clear: the tool’s meaning is given by the 
future, in what the tool will produce, in the future utilization of the product; like the tool, he 
who serves – who works – has the value of that which will be later not of that which is.”688 
Bataille is adamant that (capitalist) utility and (Christian) progress lock individuals within a 
logic of futurity which he calls the ‘project’. According to this logic, human beings are 
produced as anguished beings, since the overemphasis of the future over the present can only 
lead to the fetishization of death. The way out of this logic is the liberation from all ends and 
the celebration of non-productive activity, i.e. the type of activity that escapes the logic of 
progressive attainment of goals and targets. Instead of dying a ‘human’ death, then, i.e. a 
death where the individual has suffered the traumatism of his separation between a past and a 
future, Bataille calls for a sovereign death for which “the present is not subject to the 
demands of the future.”689 A sovereign existence is the type of existence that has liberated 
itself from the logic of futurity and has turned its attention to the present and to the 
consumption of wealth. “The sovereign…truly enjoys the products of this world beyond his 
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needs. His sovereignty resides in this. Let us say that the sovereign (or the sovereign life) 
begins when, with the necessities ensured, the possibility of life opens up without limit.”690 
The image of sovereignty is thus encapsulated in the figure of the acéphale who has given up 
all authority (this is what the absence of the head signifies), perhaps even the minimum of 
authority required for his sustainability to (biological) existence. Paradoxically, then, 
sovereign existence becomes both the maximum and the minimum (to the point of nothing) 
of subjectivity, since the subject embracing nothingness has to be first ‘fully’ subject, so as to 
be able to place his subjectivity into the hands of non-productive activity, an activity which, 
because it produces nothing and only consumes, always threatens the subject with a gradual 
evaporation. Is the headless man something that can still be recognized as human? If the 
human ‘has to be overcome’, what is to be found on the other side? A human? A monster? 
The Acéphale is certainly Bataille’s version of the Übermench. It signifies the necessity of 
overcoming and the horror of what is to come. In his description of the graphic figure of the 
Acéphale, Bataille has noted that “He is not me but he is more than me”691. But both 
Bataille’s ‘more’ and Nietzsche’s ‘over’ have nothing to do with a ‘living behind’ but rather 
with the possibility of the cultivation of those latent forces of the human in present time, in a 
time liberated from the bounds of the future. Bataille expresses this need by his outright 
rejection of utility and the embrace of useless consumption. Like Nietzsche, Bataille also 
believes that power is power as long as it cultivates the conditions of its disappearance, as 
long it sustains itself in an agonistic relation with what it threatens it. The following passage 
is illuminating: “If he wins, the man who once rejected constraint becomes, for himself as 
well as for the others, like those whom he once fought against and who constrained him. 
Puerility, sovereign, uncalculating caprice, cannot survive their victory. Sovereignty can only 
exist on condition that it should never assume power, which is action, the primacy of the 
future over the present moment, the primacy of the promised land. It is hard not to struggle in 
order to destroy a cruel adversary.”692 
If, then, power has to be ‘nothing’, one is not wrong to question Bataille’s choice to ‘glorify’ 
the notorious criminal and child killer of 15
th
 century Gilles de Rais, and to present him as an 
example of a sovereign existence. Why does the example of a sovereign existence have to be 
a child molester and not a nice old lady giving cookies to children? What makes Bataille 
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speak for the “sovereign monstrosity of Rais”693 over and against examples of sacrifice, 
unegoistic behaviour, and unpretentious offering to the community? The reason, it seems to 
us, is twofold. In the beginning is violence, or rather transgression, i.e. the impulse to the 
violation of limits. A limit can be violated; indeed it calls for, it demands its violation
694
, as 
long as it exists. The double role of taboo, which Bataille examines in Eroticism, is both the 
(necessary) institution of the limit and the establishment of the conditions for its 
transgression. In the words of Paul Hegarty: “Transgression is a possibility contained within 
taboo – or else there would be no need for the taboo”695. Transgression serves for Bataille a 
function similar to Hegelian aufhebung; it both suspends and supersedes the power of 
prohibition. So violence is there against the background of a world already resistant to its 
impending violation. Violence generates the limit against which it smashes its head, so to 
speak. The power of violence and transgression is hardly news to Nietzscheans. The criminal 
has already been elevated by Nietzsche to a nonconformist figure of revolutionary (i.e. anti-
establishment) ethos. Indeed, for Nietzsche our only hope against the prospect of an 
increasingly docile existence is the unsettling power of violent spirits: “The strongest and 
most evil spirits have so far done the most to advance humanity….”696 Sovereignty is thus 
linked with a fundamental experience of violation. This is why Rais is ‘sovereign’, because 
he dares to break a taboo; but the taboo that Rais breaks is not of an ordinary nature
697
 but of 
an extraordinary one — and this leads us to the second of our attempts to clarify his 
‘sovereign monstrosity’. 
“Ostensibly [Rais] would sit on the belly of his victim and, in this fashion, masturbating, 
come on the dying body; what mattered to him was less the sexual enjoyment than to see 
death at work. He liked to watch. He had the body cut open, the throat cut, the members 
carved to pieces; he relished seeing the blood.”698 Rais is not a monster because he does 
unthinkable things. He is a monster because he does these things against resistance-incapable 
victims (the victims are always children) and, most importantly, because his crimes are 
totally senseless “…we are at the antipodes of reason. Nothing in Gilles de Rais is 
reasonable. In every respect, he is monstrous”699, thus his ‘monstrosity’. But, again, he is a 
‘sovereign’ monster. The monstrosity of which Bataille talks is of a special kind. As 
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presented by Bataille, Rais lives a life of excess; he is a noble who waists his fortune on 
orgies, killings, and feasts. He has a profound disregard for the world of utility, for the world 
of projects, and thus for the future and his future. Rais lives “a life never dominated by 
calculation”700; his fascination is to see ‘death at work’ as he masturbates siting on the dead 
body. Rais is not afraid of death. He is fascinated by it. It is because his existence belongs 
entirely to a movement of expenditure in which death has no place. Because one is afraid of 
death as long as his existence is directed toward a future, “the fear of death appears linked 
from the start to the projection of oneself into a future time”701. Once liberated from the 
world of utility which demands future-orientated individuals, one is also liberated from the 
anguish of death; “in a sense, he escapes death, in that he lives in the moment. The sovereign 
man lives and dies like an animal.”702 In this respect Rais truly exemplifies the demand for 
innocence, which has nothing, of course, to do with judicial innocence, but rather for a 
fundamental demand for liberation from all final ends. Rais lives and dies like an animal, in 
the innocence of a moment liberated from the demands of the world of utility and calculation. 
He calculates nothing, he reserves nothing for himself except the summit experience of 
disregarding death. Thus, against a trembling humanity awaiting judgment and the prospect 
of a servile existence in an inhospitable world, his only response is an act of monstrous 
violence and perhaps also of (divine!) comedy: Masturbating in front of death.  
Who gives without receiving? Who wastes extravagantly and thus places his existence on a 
route other than that of the dominant paradigm? Bataille has suggested that the movement of 
life belongs to the extravagant waste of solar energy rather than to the petty calculations of 
the last human. The last humans, with all of their futile projects, belong to the past of 
humanity. The future of humanity is going to come through its realignment to the wasteful 
movement of the cosmos. The human to come, the Overhuman, like the Sun, is going to 
spend himself in a profound festival of waste, his life is willingly outside of human projects; 
he is an outcast of the societies of the last humans. Zarathustra calls his disciples to sacrifice, 
to waste themselves, so that they can be true to the earth, to the movement of the cosmos 
rather than to the movement of the capitalist machine for which material production has 
become the sole meaning of all life on earth. “This is your thirst, to become sacrifices and 
bestowals yourselves…” and again “Insatiably your soul strives for treasures and jewels, 
                                                             
700 Ibid. p. 14 
701 Id. The Accursed Share (Vol. III). Op.cit. p. 218 
702 Ibid. p. 219 
189 
 
because your virtue is insatiable in wanting to bestow.”703  The Overhuman exists insofar as 
he gives without receiving, like Bataille’s Sun. His highest virtues are the bestowing virtues. 
The way the Overhuman understands his existence within time is by opposing the linear time 
of accumulations and rewards of the Western/Christian world and by inscribing himself in a 
perennial movement of repetition which marks the utmost limit of non-productivity. The 
Overhuman produces nothing other than his own wasteful movement. And this is why he is 
sovereign, because his existence serves nothing other than his own sovereignty, the pleasure 
of losing. That is all. “This is my poverty, that my hand never rests from bestowing.”704  
 
Nietzsche, time and the Greeks. 
 
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche has famously described the thought of the eternal return as coming 
to him ‘suddenly’, as he was walking through the woods “6000 feet beyond man and 
time”705. Nietzsche’s rhetoric may have misguided scholars into treating the thought of the 
return as something independent from the rest of his philosophical meditations and to seek to 
answer the problems generated from the thought as logical puzzles. Although it may be true 
that thoughts do tend to appear suddenly, they also tend to be responses to problems already 
occupying the individual. Nietzsche’s proceeding self-characterization as a ‘female 
elephant’706, as someone who has to prepare for a long time his thoughts so as to eventually 
give birth to them, has, naturally, escaped commentators’ attention. In what follows we are 
going to occupy ourselves with Nietzsche’s long pregnancy and the significance that the 
thought of the return has for the cultivation of a humanity under the reverse cultural 
conditions from those that have generated the current victory of the slaves over the rest of 
humanity, and indeed over the earth itself.  
One of the most common mistakes concerning the thought of the return is that Nietzsche had 
some final word to say on the matter and that a final explanation on the thought of the return 
can be provided. Far from it — the thought of the return represents one more of the multiple 
experiments that Nietzsche had conducted throughout his career. The idea that a final answer 
can be provided is a gross misunderstanding of the nature and the scope of Nietzsche’s 
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experimental and personal way of philosophising. Beyond the fruitless attempts to solve the 
logical puzzle of the return, one question seems to us to have survived and be in urgent need 
of investigation. Why does Nietzsche even think the thought of the return? Why does he think 
that this thought is of some great significance? To what, from the problems that preoccupied 
Nietzsche, is the thought of the return a response? To answer these questions seems to us that 
we have to bring to the surface Nietzsche’s debt to Heraclitus707. Indeed, as we are going to 
support further, it is out of his dialogue with Heraclitus that Nietzsche comes to realize the 
significance and the urgency of another understanding of time for the cultivation of another 
type of humanity which will specifically place itself away from the guilt-ridden civilization 
of the meta-Platonic West.  
Nietzsche learns from Heraclitus to think about time in the agonistic fashion of the Greeks, 
which is only approachable to us today as a remote eccentricity. It is unable to penetrate the 
bubble of our lives because of what Bataille calls ‘projects’ aiming for accumulation (of 
wealth, of good deeds, of knowledge), with us ‘investing’ in us, so that our asceticism one 
day to be rewarded by the meaning-giving telos of our lives. A life devoid of contradictions 
(negativity in Hegelian parlance) would ultimately be an unjust life since only ‘strife is 
justice’708, according to the cosmic law which wants tension (polemos) to reign among all 
things, human and non-human
709
. The so-called doctrine of the ‘harmony of opposites’ is not 
only one of Heraclitus’ main contributions, but also the key to his understanding of a playful 
time understood in terms of the doctrine of the eternal flux of all things.
710
 Heraclitus 
complains that ‘the people’ (οι πλείστοι711) do not understand that something can agree with 
itself while being at variance with itself
712
. Indeed, one can understand ‘the people’s’ 
reluctance to accept what is logically unacceptable
713
. At the most one can understand 
Pythagoras and his followers. “For Pythagoras the best state was one in which opposite 
qualities were so blended by a law of proportion that their oppositions were neutralized and 
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they produced, for example, euphony in music, health in the body, cosmos – order and beauty 
– in the Universe as a whole.”714 Heraclitus agrees with Pythagoras on the existence of 
opposite forces; however, for him opposition is not neutralized but rather gets multiplied and 
perseveres. At the ‘centre of things’ there is no ‘order’ but rather a kind of harmony that turns 
back and bites itself, and therefore also never rests; “παλίντροπος αρμονίη”, a harmony that 
turns back, that is not in agreement with itself. As Guthrie rightly notes: “The harmonia was 
a dynamic one of vigorous and contrary motions neutralized by equilibrium and so 
unapparent.”715 Where Pythagoras posed opposition only to cancel it later, Heraclitus insists 
on safeguarding it. (Pythagorean) rest is for the dead. “Heraclitus took away rest and standing 
still from the totality, for this is characteristic of dead things; motion assigned to 
everything…”716 
Naturally, time also is in constant motion. Yet the motion of time is not uninterrupted and 
orderly, but rather, in accordance with the cosmic law, must be παλίντροπος (at variance with 
itself); that is it has to be a time turning back against itself, a snake biting its own tail, perhaps 
every 18,000 solar years.
717
 But Nietzsche learns from the ‘dark’ (σκοτεινός) Heraclitus 
something of even greater significance. Heraclitus schools his disciples in a form of 
paradoxical logic where harmony is restless, roads going up and roads going down are the 
same
718
, waters being clean and being dirty at the same time
719
, etc. In a famous series of 
fragments
720
 Heraclitus suggests that the waters one steps into are always different while the 
river remains the same. Sameness and difference are only sides of what Anaximander calls 
the necessity (χρεών-chreon)721 that governs everything. For Heraclitus it is Logos which 
governs everything, a necessity beyond the petty history of the humans upon the earth. In his 
early lectures on the Pre-Socratics, Nietzsche expresses an idea prevalent also in his last 
works, especially in the Anti-Christ: “The highest form of nature is not humanity but [the 
never-resting] fire.”722 In Heraclitus’ meditations on time, Nietzsche finds an ethics of life 
governed by the logos of the cosmos instead of the desiderata of humans. He especially links 
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teleological to moralistic thinking and seeks a way to escape from it. He finds his way out in 
a notion of time as a playing child and remarks: “We find here a purely aesthetic view of the 
world. We must exclude even more any moralistic tendencies to think teleologically here, for 
the cosmic child (Weltkind) behaves with no regard to purposes but rather only according to 
an immanent justice: it can act only wilfully and lawfully, but it does not will these ways.”723 
The Logos underlying the eternal play of the world does not allow for either 
anthropomorphisms or for the positing of external value systems. “This is genuinely 
Hellenic!” he concludes, “It is in itself a harmony, yet one that touches on its opposite, 
bending back (παλίντροπος).” Yet this kind of paradoxical logic celebrated by the 
Heracletean movement is not for the many
724
; one has to be on one’s way to become 
something other than what he already is in order to apprehend it — perhaps an Overhuman. 
“[Such a thought] is recognizable only to the contemplative god and to similar human 
beings.”725 
 
Eternal Return: A Sovereign thought. 
  
In this way, Heraclitus trains Nietzsche. An unruly time, a time which does not succumb to 
the utilitarian logic of the power structures which produce man as a ‘working-animal’, an 
animal dedicated to ‘projects’, aiming at the oblivion of the reality of death and the fatality of 
existence, is a time destined to be thought by either gods or ‘similar human beings’. This is 
indeed the way Nietzsche presents the eternal return on the famous GS: 341, as the heaviest 
weight: “If this though gained power over you, as you are it would transform and possibly 
crush you.”726 Two things are interesting to note here. The first has to do with the ‘wie du 
bist’ (as you are). The thought of the return is not a neutral observation on the nature of time, 
it is not a detached scientific fact announced in conferences and concerning no one
727
. On the 
contrary, it is a thought that holds power over you, a thought that will eventually transform 
your entire disposition toward life and toward your own life. For this reason it is a thought 
that has to be cultivated, a thought which one has to prepare oneself for a long period of time 
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(like a ‘female elephant’). That is because it is a thought that does not belong to the ‘here and 
now’ of a historical time produced by the various interests of the groups promoting it. In the 
first public appearance of the ewige Wiederkunft in GS: 285, Nietzsche is adamant: “You will 
never pray again, never adore again, never again rest in endless trust…there is no avenger for 
you anymore, no final corrector of the text of your life; there is no more reason to what 
happens, no love to what will happen to you; no more resting place stands open for your heart 
in which to find and no longer seek; you arm yourself against any ultimate peace, you will the 
eternal recurrence of war and peace.”728 The prospect of an ‘unreasonable’ future, where 
‘reason’ is to be equated with a telos of human life and existence, a future without telos and 
without a final avenger against a life that humans have been trained to see as structurally 
unjust
729
, is indeed a prospect able to crush anyone. It needs a certain preparation so that one 
will not get crushed by it. And with that we reach our second observation. The idea of the 
return, Nietzsche seems to argue, is an idea that will possibly obliterate the individual who 
will undertake it, because no one is yet strong enough so to think it and incorporate it into his 
mode of existence. This is the problem of the dwarf in ‘On the Vision and the Riddle’ which 
we are going to analyse in the following paragraphs. Those able to overcome the crushing 
fatalism of senseless repetition are going to acknowledge the thought of the return as the 
‘great cultivating idea’730. The ones who will be able to endure it will survive; the rest will 
perish.  
But is the thought of the return a thought on the nature of time, or a thought on that which 
escapes all time altogether, even a circular or repetitive time? It is true that Nietzsche leaned 
toward an idea of a circular time, partly because this was the conception of time among 
various ancient peoples, most importantly that of the Greeks, and partly in order to oppose 
the Christian positing of a linear time. Nevertheless, as Laurence Hatab rightly observes, the 
thought of the return has as its primal aim the affirmation of the value of “temporal events as 
they are.”731  But it has to be a beyond the temporal. The problem with time itself lies in the 
fact that it is experienced as a value which gets integrated within the current cultural 
paradigm. Nietzsche believes that along with all the other values supporting the current 
cultural paradigm, time also, insofar as it has become a cultural value, has to undertake the 
scrutiny of revaluation. We need a time which goes beyond the time of ‘our’ times, a time in 
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the service of life instead of a time in the service of production. Production accumulates, 
whereas life is wasteful. The realignment of time to life is going to bring about a wasteful 
time, a time which no longer resembles Aristotle’s “succession of nows (before and after) 
counted in motion”732, but rather a time erupted, a time which, liberated from its utilitarian 
foundations, is going to resemble more the chaos of archetypical energy rather than the order 
of the humans. “This world: a monster of energy [Kraft]…a play of forces and waves of 
forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; 
a sea of forces flowing and rushing together…”733 Nietzsche indeed identifies the thought of 
the return with circularity; nevertheless, it is not the circularity which aims at the eternal 
repetition of either identity or difference. It is a circularity aiming at the overcoming of any 
apparent dichotomy between being and becoming, it is a circularity aiming at the 
transformation of temporality into something else, namely: energy.  
Nietzsche’s opposition to a nihilistic circularity becomes apparent on Zarathustra’s 
confrontation with the dwarf in ‘The Vision and the Riddle’. After Zarathustra’s description 
of his vision concerning the contradictory ways that meet at ‘The Moment’ (Augenblick), the 
dwarf murmurs, what he believes as Zarathustra’s insight on the nature of time: “All truth is 
crooked; time itself is a circle.”734 But Zarathustra bursts out in anger and accuses the dwarf 
of ‘making it too easy’ for itself. What does that mean? To be sure Zarathustra does not say 
that the dwarf did not understand anything. This would have been untrue. The dwarf has 
understood that time is indeed circular and that past and future meet at the moment of the 
present which is the moment of affirmation. What the dwarf had not understood is that the 
affirmation of the moment goes beyond time itself, since it concentrates in it, in the moment 
of affirmation which is a moment of eternity, being and becoming and then spews them out 
in the form of energy. “And are not all things knotted together so tightly that this moment 
draws after it all things that are to come? Thus – itself as well?”735 If the eternal return is to 
be of some value for a vision of culture which aims to combat the current nihilistic state of 
humanity brought about by the victory of slave morality and its values, then it has to 
symbolize something beyond the passivity of repetition which, as Alexander Nehamas 
observes, forces one to pose the question of what it may happen in the case of an indifferent 
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attitude toward the thought of the return
736
; what if one were to respond to the challenge of 
the return with simply shrugging his shoulders? Nietzsche’s positing of the Augenblick, 
which is the moment of an extraordinary decision
737
, aims to expose the existential 
imperative that informs Nietzsche’s treatment of the return.  
Laurence Hatab has rightly drawn our attention to the non-circular presentation of time, on 
behalf of Zarathustra, in ‘On the Vision and the Riddle’. The two pathways extend to eternity 
and yet they meet (by contradicting themselves) at the Augenblick. Hatab proposes the 
following: “Did Nietzsche want to borrow something from this linear model of time 
[Christianity’s model], namely the eternal value of moments in time? If so, the value of 
moments would no longer be conceived as an irreversible transition to something extra-
temporal. The value of moments, as eternally repeated, would now be registered in their 
concrete finitude, in just the way that they manifest themselves.”738 We believe that Hatab is 
right in his suggestion that Nietzsche’s paradoxical task was the eternalization of the moment, 
the blending of eternity with a present that extends into infinity. Hatab is right because in that 
way moments get eternalized and time concentrates itself into a single moment (which 
nevertheless it will repeat itself eternally), which acquires infinite value. What is at stake here 
is nothing less than the value of the moment, a task which Nietzsche wishes to disclose. The 
thought of the return has as its task to reveal the uncompromising value of the moment 
against the fetishization of the future (or of the past, or of the present) by the power structures 
which have produced, and which they constantly reproduce, the decadent human being of the 
Judeo/Platonic-Christian tradition. Man belongs neither to the ghosts of an invented 
‘glorious’ past, nor to the ‘reward’ awaiting him at the end of the process of endurement 
which has been called ‘his’ life.  
Nietzsche’s lifelong battle against teleological explanations of the human condition has to be 
mentioned here. On a note from 1888 he writes: “Becoming must be explained without 
resource to final intentions; becoming must appear justified at every moment…the present 
must absolutely not be justified by reference to a future, nor the past by reference to the 
present.” Later on in the same note he adds: “Becoming is of equivalent value every moment; 
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the sum of its values always remains the same.”739 This is what the dwarf was unable to 
understand: that a time which is simply circular is a time that misses the existential exigency 
of the value of becoming which is encapsulated by the force with which the contradictory 
pathways collide at the ‘pregnant’ Augenblick. In that moment, the moment of collision 
between past and future, man’s life explodes, since it is a moment that recognizes neither a 
final judge of existence nor an extra-temporal moment of origin (God-morality-nature) 
according to which one has to drive the ‘project’ of his life. The moment of the moment is a 
moment of Dionysian ecstasy which is to say of terror in front of the prospect of an existence 
from which all meaning has been removed; a lacuna of being, perhaps
740
. Yet it is, and this is 
only possible because of Nietzsche’s apprenticeship to Heraclitus, that out of this 
confrontation with the void of the world that man gets born, the same way nations get born 
only out of the experience of war.  
The above interpretation is in agreement with the ethical-existential presentation of the 
thought of the return on GS: 341, and thus contradicts Nietzsche’s unfortunate experiments 
with cosmology in his unpublished notes. Despite of all the rhetoric, it is simply not the case 
that someone will want the eternal return of an identical life. The same has nothing to teach 
us anyway. What is significant in the thought of the return is the value with which one 
charges the unique moments of one’s life. Whereas this value is lost under a linear, future-
orientated model of life or on an eternal passive recycling, it does not get lost in the ‘charged’ 
moment. Because the dispensation of value to the moment is an act of sovereignty which 
requires a long and arduous schooling on the requirements of free-spirit (independence, 
detachment, playfulness of spirit, etc.
741
), it is also an act that will “impose upon becoming 
the character of being”742 as, at times, Nietzsche seems to realize is needed. Not eternal 
transitoriness, then, but rather an eternalized being which will memorialize existence without 
mummifying it. The following passage reveals Nietzsche’s intentions: “A certain emperor 
always bore in mind the transitoriness of all things so as not to take them seriously and to live 
at peace among them. To me, on the contrary, everything seems far too valuable to be so 
fleeting: I seek an eternity for everything: ought one to pour the most precious salves and 
wines into the sea? – My consolation is that everything that has been is eternal: the sea will 
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cast it up again.”743 One has to pay attention here to the Bataillean tone with which Nietzsche 
constructs his remark. To be sure, the answer to the question of whether one ‘ought’ to waste 
what is more precious to him is a resounding ‘yes’. Echoing Matthew 10:39, Nietzsche 
asserts that one has to lose if one wants to find. What one finally finds is the eternity of the 
moment which the sea casts up, which also means the moment’s infinite value. 
Aaron Ridley has contested the above interpretation of the thought of the return. He has 
argued that Nietzsche’s prioritization of the present reveals his debt to Christian linearity and 
more than that in Christian eschatology, which is based on the Christian’s relation to a 
present which is “maximally weighty with redemptive potential”744. Ridley accuses Nietzsche 
that on his attempt to present the thought of the return as a “non-transcendental successor to 
Christianity”745 he has invested ‘will’ with so much power that past, present and future get 
concentrated on a ‘supreme moment of affirmation’ which loads the present with a weight 
similar to that which it has in Christian eschatology. According to Ridley, the past gets 
redeemed since it gets willed, the future gets redeemed since it is eternally repeated in a 
perennial present, and the present gets redeemed through repletion which makes it matter 
again. The moment of supreme affirmation is also the moment where the ‘will’ becomes 
omnipotent and an omnipotent will imposes itself as a being upon the becoming of life. 
“…the will is suddenly to find itself capable of transcending “the whole sphere of becoming 
and transitoriness” – of stepping outside of time, of the conditions of contingency and 
embodiment, and of re-establishing a harmony between truth and human well-being.”746 The 
result, as Ridley notes, is that both Nietzsche and the Christian “transcendentalize the 
present”747 and thus they both reveal a wish to escape the tragic wisdom of the immanent 
character of existence, the wisdom of the finitude of human existence but also the simple fact 
of human temporality and human experience in a present that is now to be considered as 
something to be transcendent instead of cherished. Perhaps Ridley is right when he claims 
that Nietzsche borrows too much from Christian eschatology. To make the present matter 
again, Nietzsche does indeed invest the ‘will’ that wills it with too much power. However, 
Nietzsche’s multiple statements concerning the thought of the return are ambiguous. Thus, 
Ridley bases his interpretation on TSZ: Of Redemption, which certainly describes the will’s 
relation, on the present, with that of the past. However, in ‘On the vision and the Riddle’, past 
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and future meet at the ‘gateway’ which has the name ‘moment’. Is the ‘moment’ a present 
moment, then? We believe not. The moment of the ‘moment’ is the eternity of its eternal 
repetition, not the momentariness of the present. It is only out of habit that we suppose that 
the moment of the Augenblick has to do with the present. How could Nietzsche support that 
the moment of the ‘moment’ (let’s say: the first kiss, the first contact with your new-born 
child, etc., i.e. what Nietzsche wants to eternalize because as moment is infinite, which is to 
say invaluable) is a moment locked in an eternal present (even of a present which wishes to 
transcend itself)? Should we then speak of a transcendence of the moment? Is that eternity? 
We believe that this is not the case. The eternity that Nietzsche is after is not the eternity of a 
fetishized present whose value is going to be reflected on the future. It is the eternity of the 
return to the power of the primordiality of the forces which constitute the human. In that 
sense there is no transcendence, because there is neither a final judge nor a retreat to a 
messianic beyond. Nietzsche’s eternity is not an eternity of escape where one ‘jumps out’ of 
his situation and finds refuge in an imaginary beyond. There is neither beyond nor refuge, but 
only eternal return to the agonistic relation of the forces whose expression ‘we’ are. In that 
way one gets to love his fate, he gets to love the inevitability of his existence, i.e. the fact that 
his fate was to discover what was kept hidden from him: pure force, recognizing of neither 
good nor evil, only the exigency of expression; in eternity.  
To be sure, this is what (on a first level) sovereignty is; the immense power that one needs in 
order to offer an alternative interpretation to the imminent collapse of the world. Sovereignty 
comes into the fore after the collapse of all meaning. Nihilism is the womb of sovereignty, as 
Nietzsche makes clear
748
. In many of his unpublished notes, Nietzsche presents the thought of 
the return as an alternative to the detrimental and ultimately nihilistic doctrines of the West, 
“in place of ‘metaphysics’ and religion, the theory of eternal recurrence (this as means of 
breeding and selection).”749 It is clear that in his private notes Nietzsche intends the thought 
of the return to stand as the new “cultivating idea”750 that humanity desperately needs. A 
doctrine which is going to teach ‘pure immanence’, a life dedicated to the attendance of 
man’s primordial needs beyond the moralizations that culture imposes; a doctrine devoid of 
“hells or threats”751 since it is only upon the sovereign man to build the monument of his 
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existence and most importantly to live without a reference to something external which 
provides meaning to his existence.  
Who can bear a life of ‘pure immanence’? Most probably, none. “It [the thought of the 
return] is the great cultivating idea: the races that cannot bear it stand condemned; those who 
find it the greatest benefit are chosen to rule [zur Herrschaft ausersehn].”752 It is only to a race 
of men who have done away with the beyond that the thought of the return can be useful as a 
‘selective machine’, where the few who are strong enough will be chosen to rule over the 
masses of the weak who depend for their existence on the dictates of their projected 
phantasies. Like Nietzsche’s meditations on politics, his unpublished notes experiment with 
an idea of rule (Herschaft) not fully worked out. In the next section we are going to see how, 
in his published material, Nietzsche remains true to his fundamental insight into the nature of 
the human as a locus of forces eternally competing against each other. The rule there is going 
to refer to the rule of the one who dispenses with the very idea of the permanency of the rule 
over other forces. Instead of the construction of another doctrine explaining the whole of the 
human experience, Nietzsche will try to distance himself from the inflexibility of doctrines 
and he will turn toward the articulation of the moment of the recognition and illumination of 
all those latent, uncultivated forces of the human; a moment in which, in a truly Hegelian 
fashion, the master is going to recognize himself as truly dependent on the slave for the 
recognition of his existence.  
 
Sovereignty in ruins. 
 
TSZ opens with Zarathustra’s remarkable statement concerning the necessity of his going 
under [Ich muss…untergehen]753. Untergehen is a verb describing not only a descent (toward 
something) but also destruction. In that sense Ich muss…untergehen means: ‘I must destroy 
[myself]’ or ‘I must perish’. Commentators like Lampert754 and Rosen755 are right in 
underlining the importance of Zarathustra’s descent as the antipode to Platonic/Christian 
culture which ascends toward [divine] light (or turns toward light, as in Plato’s parable of the 
                                                             
752 WP: 1053. KSA: 11:26 [376] 
753 TSZ: Prologue:1  
754 Lampert, Laurence. Nietzsche’s teaching – An interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press. 1986, p.16 
755 Rosen, Stanley. The Mask of Enlightenment – Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
2004, p.28  
200 
 
cave) in its attempt to approach the transcendent truth. Zarathustra the teacher follows a 
different path. Instead of ascending, and leaving behind what he finds unworthy to the 
contemplation of the divine logos, he descends and takes with him (incorporates) everything 
that has been neglected by the Platonic/Christian culture: the data of experience, the 
experience of the body, senses, etc. All of the above is certainly true. However, one must not 
lose sight of Zarathustra’s literal use of untergehen. Zarathustra really has to perish, really 
has to destroy himself, really has to beat himself to the ground, so to speak, if he is to be 
worthy of his vocation as the teacher of the one who goes over, the Overhuman.
756
 This literal 
use of untergehen is reinforced further in the text when Zarathustra makes an even more 
remarkable calling to one’s self-destruction: “I love those who do not know how to live 
except by going under [als Untergehende], for they are those who go over and across.”757 
Here Zarathustra makes a rather powerful claim. He tells us that, unfortunately, and despite 
the plethora of self-help literature, ultimately there does not exist a guidebook in life, 
something that can guide us around this mystery of our lives. How sad, in a sense! We go 
blind in the dark, helpless and abandoned. Where from? Where to? As if the above is not 
enough, Zarathustra makes another claim. He does not simply say that we are left alone, but 
additionally that he, ‘our’ teacher, will give all his love only to those who will live by 
destroying themselves. To be able to live beyond life, beyond the burden of self-preservation, 
is to want to perish. Ultimately the Sovereign, the Overhuman, is going to be the human 
willing to abandon himself so that he can find himself
758
. This is what characterises the 
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Overhuman. He is not the power that dominates, but rather the power that sacrifices [itself] so 
that he can further live as power.  
This distinctly Nietzschean idea of a multifarious and yet interdependent ‘power’ or form of 
life is expressed in Nietzsche’s meditations on time, which are characterized by a Heraclitean 
sense of contradictions that wish to be taken seriously as contradictions. There is probably no 
one other than Gilles Deleuze who tried to capture Nietzsche’s need to understand the 
possibility for an understanding of time beyond the uninterrupted and non-contradictory 
linearity of Christian time. Deleuze’s powerful interpretation of Nietzsche came as a response 
to a demand to liberate Nietzsche from the many problems that the thought of the eternal 
return had created; more specifically, the problem of the inconsistency between the ‘straight 
line of evolution’, perceived as the life of the Overhuman, and the cosmic demand for infinite 
repetitions of cosmic circles, which the eternal return is supposed to be. This problem was 
already posited in Georg Simmel’s (1907) work on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche759. Deleuze 
argued that the eternal return does not refer to a return of identical events, but rather on the 
event of the return itself. What returns in the return is not ‘facts’ but the very act of 
returning
760
, which returns as eternally differing since being and becoming are intertwined: 
“That everything returns is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of 
being…”761 That Deleuze heavily relied on mistaken French translations for his undoubtedly 
original exposition of the return is now well-known.
762
 However, this does not minimize his 
contribution to efforts to provide Nietzsche with a way out of the deadlock that his apparent 
insistence on the sameness of the same in which returns had trapped him. Deleuze was 
certainly right in insisting that a type of identical sameness would remove from Nietzsche his 
right to an educational philosophy of overcomings, which is something that we still ought to 
safeguard today. But Deleuze makes also another, rather problematic, move in two steps. 
First, he invents a dichotomy that is highly unlikely to ever have existed in Nietzsche’s work, 
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that between active and reactive forces
763
, and in a second step he understands what he calls 
‘reactive forces’ as essentially nihilistic764. This requires him to deny the eternal return of ‘the 
reactive’ as inconsistent and contradictory to Nietzsche’s affirmative philosophy.765 In what 
follows we are going to elaborate a reading of the same as indeed differing (thus we will be as 
audacious as Deleuze was and perhaps equally unfaithful to the letter of Nietzsche’s 
exposition), yet we are going to base our presentation on sources, and a logic, different from 
the logic of Deleuze. The issue for us is to expose exactly what Deleuze finds unacceptable: 
the intentional contradictions at the very core of the thought of the return, contradictions that 
nevertheless are the offspring of Nietzsche’s agonistic understanding of power. It is from this 
womb that the vision of the Overhuman is born, and it is a vision that has hardly anything to 
do with the fetishization of being and an eternity which remains blind to the demands of the 
grand educational project of the ‘revaluation of all values’. Our reading of the return 
illuminates an Overhuman who is eternally unstable, an Overhuman whose very sovereignty 
consists on holding nothing for himself, and his power, his sovereignty, consists in sustaining 
that which constantly threatens to annihilate him.  
In GS and EH, references to the thought of the return are clear and unambiguous. The thought 
of the return is an experiment aimed at evaluating one’s disposition toward life. From 
Nietzsche’s phrasing in GS, it is clear that the question is only suited as an experiment aiming 
to expose how ‘well disposed’ one is toward life and his life. Nietzsche does not occupy 
himself with analysing the virtues of the eternal repetition of the same, since those are in 
every case impossible to locate. The eternal return of identity would oppose Nietzsche’s 
educational program regarding the fight against the long process of incorporation of errors 
and superstitions during man’s long period of what Kant called ‘self-incurred immaturity’. 
Nietzsche’s educational program, though, is not one that leads to a final point of illumination 
(one is never illuminated enough) but rather to the realization (and the subsequent demand for 
their utilization) of the latent forces at the very heart of human existence, forces that have 
                                                             
763 “Neither the word nor the concept of ‘reactive forces’ ever appears in Nietzsche’s philosophy” Ibid. Also: Cf. 
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764 Deleuze, Gilles. Nietzsche and Philosophy. Ibid. p. 64-65 
765 “The eternal return of the mean, small, reactive man notably makes the thought of the eternal return 
unbearable, it also makes the eternal return itself impossible; it puts contradiction into the eternal return.” Ibid. 
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been made latent by forces both external (e.g. the civilizing process) and internal (e.g. 
idleness and cowardice for Kant and, in a similar fashion, complacency for Nietzsche) to the 
human. Instead, then, of a passive observance of repetition, the thought of the return is 
structurally linked to an experience of living aiming at the liberation of man from history, to 
the extent that history is perceived as the fulfilment of a ‘project’, and the immersion in the 
eternity of the forces constituting man. Nietzsche’s opposition to teleological explanations of 
history and the human finds its ultimate expression in the experience of the thought of the 
return. 
In a Nachlass note from 1883, Nietzsche notes: “The absolute necessity of a total liberation 
from ends: otherwise we should not be permitted to try to sacrifice ourselves and let 
ourselves go. Only the innocence of becoming gives us the greatest courage and the greatest 
freedom!”766 The note is interesting for many reasons and it can be argued that it paves the 
way to our reading of the thought of the return. The note’s compelling claim is the link 
between the exigency of man’s disengagement from any logic of teloi and the prospect of 
absolute freedom which this liberation promises. Improvement is a key notion in Christian 
religion, and ascetic practices necessarily accompany a life dedicated to self-cultivation with 
regard to transcendental aims. In his GM, Nietzsche has shown how the ascetic life that the 
priest imposes as a value upon the masses of the heteronomous slaves has hindered their 
realisation of the immensity of the forces which constitute them and has forever sealed them 
in a protective cocoon against the threat of nihilism, i.e. the threat of having to ‘dare’ to 
create their own meaning of their existence. But Nietzsche makes also another, perhaps more 
audacious, claim. He asserts that the freedom one gets from the innocence of becoming is not 
so much a freedom from X or Y, but rather a freedom to something very specific, namely 
self-sacrifice
767
. He insists that the alternative vision to the current Western model of living 
life according to a project is the utter disassociation of human existence from the bounds of 
existence itself. Nietzsche’s abhorrence of a life of mere survival is well-known, but on this 
note he calls for something more. We have to be ready, at all times, to let ourselves go, to 
sacrifice ourselves. Man is not to be the animal fighting for his ‘right’ to existence (to be is a 
privilege anyway); as long as he does that he dedicates his life to something petty, i.e. to 
himself.
768
 Modern humanity’s quest to find itself is grossly misdirected. We have to look 
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767 TSZ: On the Bestowing virtue 
768 Admittedly ‘our’ narcissistic generation of ‘virtual’ internet figures hiding behind self-constructed profiles of 
an imagined life has elevated pettiness into something like a form of art. Public discourse has been replaced by 
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elsewhere! “…for your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably 
high above you, or at least above that which you usually take yourself to be.”769 Nietzsche 
turns the usual method of evaluation of humans upside down. Despite of the cries of liberals, 
democrats, Christians, and other moderns, your value does not lie in yourself, value is neither 
natural nor God-given. Your value lies in that to which you have dedicated yourself: in your 
work. And the ultimate value of this work is the courage to sacrifice everything to which you 
have dedicated your life to, like a great author whose act of greatness consists on burning all 
of his work or a painter who decides to destroy his paintings, not because they are not nice, 
but because one has to release oneself even from the necessities of self-honour. Then, one 
becomes finally and for the first time free.  
We have seen before how Zarathustra’s inaugural speech conveys the ambivalence of a 
movement that has to be a going under so that it can eventually be also a going over.  
Transitions and movements of this sort are prevalent throughout TSZ and they reach their 
peak at every mention of the thought of the return. The chapter ‘On Convalescent’ is one of 
those characteristic moments of Nietzschean dialectics where opposites meet only to be 
melted into a whole which is going to move the narrative forward. The chapter is concerned 
with the fate of the lowest, of that which does not deserve existence since all it can do is to 
accuse and debase it. Zarathustra is horrified at the idea that he may himself have to be what 
he loathes most: an accuser of humanity. Why does Zarathustra even dare to contemplate 
such a defeatist thought? How could he, the eulogist of all joy which comes from attending to 
the needs of the earth and of those who live according to nature’s (chaotic) demands, turn 
against his own mission? Yet, Zarathustra confesses to his animals life’s enigmatic teaching: 
“Ah, my animals, this alone have I learned so far, that for the human its most evil is 
necessary for its best” and that the human “must become better and more evil.”770 The West 
has advanced so far by a process of exclusion, which was originally based on the Platonic 
teaching concerning the contemplation of the Forms. Nietzsche wishes to overturn the 
Platonic/Christian model of exclusion by advancing an interpretation of the human which is 
based on incorporation. The new type of the human advanced by Nietzsche is not going to 
exclude the other but incorporate it; that is the meaning of Zarathustra’s advice to become 
more evil. We have to welcome what until now has been deemed unworthy, evil, inferior; 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
narcissistic monologues and the ‘work’ of a man’s unique life has been replaced by posted photos of friendly 
strangers. Nietzsche knows best though. 
769 UM: Schopenhauer as Educator: 1 
770 TSZ: On Convalescent  
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only by this process of incorporation eventually we are going to learn; the rest is cowardice, 
in the most Kantian sense. Naturally, the process is not going to be easy. In a note from 1887 
Nietzsche observes: “The time has come when we have to pay for having been Christians for 
two thousand years.”771 The thought of incorporation is difficult to swallow even for 
Zarathustra. He literally chokes at the idea of a ‘great loathing for the human’. And yet he has 
to accept the greatest of all thoughts, that the love of his fate and the eternal return of all 
things demands also the return of the most despicable, of the most nauseating form of human 
animal, the return of the lowest: the last human, the complacent bourgeois, the Christian, the 
socialist, the democrat, the cultural philistine. “Ah, disgust! disgust! disgust!” cries 
Zarathustra at the realization of the necessity of the eternal return of the smallest human 
being
772
.  
To be sure, Zarathustra does not endorse the return of something changed, but the return of 
the same conditions that bring about life as a possibility of growth and incorporation. A few 
lines further, Zarathustra insists that he will eternally return to “this self-same life [zu diesem 
gleichen und selbigen Leben]…not to a new life or a better life or a similar life”773. Is this 
equivalent with the return of the identical? Nietzsche clearly believes that the life which 
returns is the same as the life already lived. Yet his rhetoric gets ahead of him, since it 
promotes something qualitatively different to what even Nietzsche believes that he endorses. 
The typical example is ‘The drunken song’ from the fourth part of TSZ. There Zarathustra 
praises Joy, for it wants all eternity. A life of joy seeks to incorporate in it everything that up 
to now has been left outside the corpus of ‘approved’ life for the humans. Joy wants all that 
life has to offer, beyond judgments and exclusions. Indeed, “so rich is joy that she thirsts for 
woe, for Hell, for hate, for disgrace, for the cripple, for world…You superior humans, it is for 
you that she yearns, this joy, intractable, blissful for your woe, you that have failed! For 
failures does all eternal joy yearn.”774 The passage raises many problems in relation to the 
thought of the return. What does it precisely mean that joy seeks the return of hate? It 
possibly means that joy, which wishes the return of all things, wishes also the incorporation 
of such a fundamental source of human knowledge as hate. According to Nietzsche’s 
agonistic model of life (power), one (one person, one culture) is the locus of antithetical 
forces fighting for victory. The ‘victory’ of a force is the recognition of the power of the other 
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force. Joy, then, would not be a joy at all if it didn’t seek the other which completes it. It 
needs the other the same way the master in Hegel’s Phenomenology needs the slave in order 
to recognize him. However, Nietzsche goes one step further. Joy also needs Hell [Hölle]! Is 
the mention of hell made in order to exaggerate the conditions of resistance that joy needs in 
order to express itself, or as a premonition of the Christian condemnation that awaits this 
overfull joy which seeks all eternity? What does it mean precisely to suggest that through the 
thought of the return humanity should wish also the return of hell? Does it mean that 
humanity should seek the return of the conditions that will bring her [humanity] down?  
The next line further complicates the matter. Zarathustra, turning to the ‘superior humans’ 
(those who pave the way to the Overhuman but who are not yet Overhumans themselves), 
warns them that “it is for you that she yearns this joy…for your woe, you that have failed! 
For failures does all eternal joy yearns.”775 What does it precisely mean to say that joy, which 
wants all eternity, seeks also the eternal return of failures? According to the agonistic model 
of power, a force, as long as it resists, it can maintain itself both in life and in the agon. But 
what about failures? What about those who have simply failed to maintain themselves in the 
agon? Do they disappear? Here Nietzsche seems to suggest that even the most nauseating 
element in life will return also, because the joy of life, the willingness to incorporate the 
whole range of human experience, is so great that joy will not exclude anything. Nietzsche is 
on thin ice here. On the one hand he has repeatedly asserted the return to this ‘self-same’ life 
which is not going to be either ‘new’ or ‘similar’, and on the other hand he declares the return 
of failures as if what has failed is not going to change the kind of life that one lives! To seek 
the return of all woe and all hell is not simply to seek the return of conditions of resistance; it 
is to actively seek that which can potentially fundamentally upset the very conditions of life. 
It is not the case that the return wishes the return of an opposite. The return here seeks that 
which will perhaps challenge the very conditions of the return itself. Otherwise a ‘hell’ is not 
hell, but something simply unpleasant. The chapter ‘The drunken song’ is Heraclitean in the 
most precise fashion, because it upsets every rule of logic
776
 and yet it wants its fundamental 
suggestion to be taken seriously: that joy, a life beyond the exclusions of the 
Western/Christian paradigm, is not afraid to seek its own failure as well.  
                                                             
775 Ibid. 
776 E.g. “Pain is also joy, curse is also a blessing, night is also a sun –be gone! or you will learn: a wise man is 
also a fool” TSZ: The drunken song: 10 
207 
 
But the above cannot be a declaration of pessimism and a testimony of defeat. If it were that, 
then Silenus would have had to be right after all, and man’s short sojourn upon the earth had 
to be in vain. On another occasion, Nietzsche has warned all those who tend to spend 
themselves extravagantly (the ‘higher types’) that they should learn to conserve themselves, 
since this is the “greatest test of independence”777. To say that one has to be ready to wish 
failure is not the same with saying that one has to wish the eternal return of the conditions of 
failure. In the former is getting ready to accept defeat while in the latter wishes to incorporate 
the whole of life back to the cultural paradigm of the present. But Nietzsche is also telling us 
something else: that the wish of the return of the conditions of failure brings back the issue of 
the agonistic relation not only to one’s own self but also to one’s contemporaries. Ultimately 
one has to conserve himself against the fashions and the clamouring crowds of his times so 
that he can be ready to throw himself to the right sort of agon. To be sure, there are 
competitions of all kinds, and then there are agons. Competitions are what the Roman crowds 
in the Colosseum (and their contemporary equivalence in public arenas) craved: in some 
cases an exhibition of sheer power, in other cases exhibitions of (so-called) beauty, 
possessiveness of things, etc. The end of competition is the annihilation of the other. The first 
is first and the second is nothing, as the popular saying goes. In agonistic contests, on the 
other hand, the aim is the consolidation of the power of the one through the consolidation of 
the power of the other. There is a dialectic of forces at work here aiming again at an eternal 
aufhebung, not at a final stage of closure. “And all the people laughed at Zarathustra.”778 
Zarathustra comes to learn to conserve himself and not be wasted to pointless competitions. 
The crowds will never be ready to hear his message. He has thus to conserve himself for 
those who are ready (if any is), he has to prepare himself for the right sort of agons, for 
worthy opponents
779
 whose opposition to him will ultimately honour him.  
 
Living wastefully. Concluding Remarks.  
 
In their engagement with TSZ, Burnham & Jesinghausen stress the future-oriented character 
of the book and suggest that the question which the book wishes to pose is the following: 
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“What does the future look like, and how can it be achieved?”780 Upon reading the suggested 
question a great sadness falls upon the human heart. Is there anything uncannier for humans 
today? Isn’t it exactly this so-called ‘future’ that humanity has been deprived of through its 
long training in submission and the narrowness of its intellectual horizon to the one-
dimensionality of a path which fails to do justice to the multiplicity of the forces that 
constitute this betrayed animal going by the name of human? It took someone audacious 
enough to dare to imagine the unimaginable: not another future
781
 but rather the possibility of 
a multiplicity of futures. Zarathustra is certainly Nietzsche’s reinvention of the Titan 
Prometheus. Both of them reinvent human beginnings by placing the origin of the human not 
in an act of submission (obedience before God) but on an act of hubris. Both of them steal 
from Gods what belongs to the Gods and offer it to the humans as a gift. If the West is going 
to break the spell of its Semitic origins, with all of its morbid appeal of death, then it has to 
educate itself with different myths from those on which it has based its education so far. 
Simply put, both Prometheus and Zarathustra suggest the unthinkable: that man is not and 
never was guilty of anything. The future then becomes the contemplation of something of 
which we do not know. What does innocence look like? 
Zarathustra is forced to speak from a place of luminosity. His preaching is playful and his 
messages ambiguous because he doesn’t obey the Platonic paradigm of propositional 
philosophy.
782
 But he is not the new Christ, even if Nietzsche sets the scene for it, because 
Zarathustra teaches neither a dogma nor promises any salvation. Ultimately his disciples have 
to invent their own way; otherwise, they are going to be reduced to the level of the imitating 
ape. Zarathustra begins by offending (the Gods, history, little humans); his movement 
belongs to obscenity. He is hard to digest. “I think as a girl takes off her dress. At the 
extremity of its movement, thought is indecency, even obscenity.”783 Zarathustra is indeed 
indecent, since he dares to challenge the established history of humanity and demand the 
right of futures for the humans. Heraclitus was outraged at the inability of his fellows to 
understand the obvious: that it is possible for A to be both A and not-A at the same time
784
! 
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782 For an excellent treatment of Nietzsche’s therapeutic philosophy see: Hutter Horst. Shaping the future – 
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783 Bataille, Georges. Essential Writings. Op.cit. p. 145 
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Zarathustra finds nothing strange about that. Only Socrates could find it impossible. 
Zarathustra reinvents a line of contemplating that was long lost due to the omnipotence of the 
Christianized Platonism over the history of the West. But the time is up. Zarathustra gives a 
gift to the humans and he does that from within a movement of profound joy, which 
inaugurates something unprecedented: a thinking that belongs to life, not of death. How does 
one live? With this question philosophy can truly begin. “See, there is no above, no below! 
Throw yourself around, and out, and back, you who are light! Sing! Speak no more!”785 
It is obvious that the stand which we have taken in our reading of the thought of the eternal 
return is close to what has been called the ‘existential reading’786, which is a reading 
concentrating on the transformative effect that the thought of the return may have upon the 
lives of individuals. It is a reading that wishes to remain faithful to the overall picture of 
Nietzsche’s thinking, sometimes (given Nietzsche’s own endorsement of a cosmological 
reading of the return) even in spite of him. What is important for us is to highlight the precise 
way with which the thought of the return influences and is ultimately able to transform 
individual lives. “I bring human beings a present”787, Zarathustra exclaims after having 
confessed his love for the humans. The ‘present’ of Zarathustra, the teaching of the 
Overhuman, from the very beginning implicates his audience in a logic of profound 
selfishness which is inspired not by religious feelings of abandonment of the self, but rather 
by an attempt to re-discover a self long lost under the debris of civilization. Zarathustra does 
not give to the humans because he is compelled by pity. Zarathustra is pitiless. He gives 
because he cannot do otherwise. Like the sun of Bataille, Zarathustra gives because this is his 
fate and he cannot but love it. Zarathustra’s gift to the humans is to teach them the necessity 
of loss as a prerequisite of sovereignty, where the latter indicates the overhuman movement 
of the overcoming of the history of the West as a history of submission. If the humans want 
to overcome the current state of their one-dimensional civilization, they have to be ready to 
let themselves go, to perish, to lose what they have been trained to think of as ‘theirs’. 
Zarathustra warns his disciples that “only when you have all denied me will I return to 
you.”788  
                                                             
785 TSZ: The seven Seals 
786 People like Richard Schacht, John Richardson, Tracy Strong, Kathleen Higgins, Bernd Magnus, Alexander 
Nehamas and Maudemerie Clark are among those embracing this reading. 
787 TSZ: Prologue: 2 
788 TSZ: On the bestowing virtue 
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 What the humans have to deny is nothing less than their history. By history we mean the way 
with which a people, a civilization or an individual unfold(s) their dynamic based on an 
(imagined) myth of origin
789
. For this reason, history depends absolutely on its founding 
(imagined) myths. Nietzsche detects that the West has been unfolded according to a myth 
which, instead of letting humans realizing their full potential, has, on the contrary, severely 
limited their horizon. One of the fundamental tenets of the mythopoeic religious thought of 
the West is the need for the alignment of existence to an (imaginary) meaning-providing 
future which can only be achieved through the utilization of ascetic practices. The myth of 
the future is fundamentally linked with the thought of death as the extreme limit of the 
possibility of existence and as the sole provider of sense in what otherwise is a senseless 
existence. Thus humans have to be made to learn to invest onto their existence, the way an 
estate agent invests in a piece of property at the hope that one day he will be rewarded. 
Production takes the place of life. Production has no place for loss. A factory cannot afford to 
lose. On the contrary, life, as the expression of antithetical forces at work, is the principle 
stage of loss. One only loses by living. Every Beckett hero knows that. But it is not just any 
loss. It is not that one loses something which he then can regain. Neither is there any kind of 
compensation or security against loss. One loses always. And not just that; one must wish to 
relive the experience of loss again and again, in eternity.  
Is that defeatist? It could be, if the defeat had to do with the recurrence of a loss of 
production, but here we are on the other side of production. We are on the side of an 
existence which, according to Bataille, has become sovereign since it has liberated itself from 
the logic of ‘future projects’ and has embraced a principle of profound loss (of power among 
other things
790
).We are on the side of life which does not lose ‘stuff’ in its advancement 
toward a final goal but rather gains at the very moment of its loss. What it gains is certainly 
eternity, since life gets to realize that the eternity of forces was always ‘here’ at the moment 
of the eruption which constitutes the Augenblick. What Nietzsche calls the Overhuman is 
indeed linked to a fundamental experience of time, but it is the experience of a temps perdu, a 
time that, as a gradual advancement toward a pre-arranged goal, has been lost. The 
Overhuman is the master of the lost time, the master of all which gets lost. The thought of the 
return is the thought with which we lose time. The time which gets lost is the time of 
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vitality and power, and neither is their ideality an argument against them (as it is not an argument against 
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capitalist production and Christian redemption. The future for which Nietzsche prepares 
humanity is to be radically different from the comfortable lives of late humans promised by 
the capitalist machine or the redeemed lives of ‘saved’ Christians and other religious 
characters. Indeed Nietzsche’s philosophy is one of the future, but it is an unknown future for 
which the humans of today can predict nothing. The question then of ‘What does innocence 
look like?’ finds no answer in the present time. We are in ignorance of the human after the 
revaluation of all values. But if we accept with Nietzsche that “the total character of the 
world…is for all eternity chaos, not in the sense of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, 
organization, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever else our aesthetic anthropomorphisms are 
called”791, then we ‘ought’ to throw existence again back into the primordial chaos from 
which it had originally sprung without safeguards and securities. This would be a time of true 
sovereignty, beyond the anthropomorphisms of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ and the hesitations of an 
existence which for too long has been pampered by the comforts of salvation. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alguna vez, tal vez, encontraremos 
refugio en la realidad verdadera. 
‘Perhaps sometime we‘ll find refuge 
in true reality.’ 
Alejandra Pizarnik, El infierno 
musical 
 
I am neither man nor beast. I am 
something new entirely. My own set 
of rules. 
From “Dexter”, Season 1, episode 4 
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Toward the future.792 
 
Contemplating the reasons for Greek cultural superiority over Judeo-Christianity, Nietzsche 
observes that the Greeks had managed to incorporate all elements of human expression into a 
whole, in which all that was considered ‘lower’ or even ‘evil’ was concentrated. These forces 
Greeks found ‘inescapable’. Instead, then, of repudiating what could be considered as 
‘foreign’, ‘alien’, or ‘harmful’, it was thought best to regulate those elemental forces and 
shape them into something going beyond an opposition that was likely to lead nowhere. “This 
is the root of all moral free-mindedness of antiquity. One granted to the evil and suspicious, 
to the animal and backward, likewise to the barbarian, the pre-Greek and Asiatic, that still 
lived on the foundations of the Hellenic nature, a moderate discharge, and did not strive after 
their total annihilation.”793 In this way Greeks had achieved the ideal of an ‘exemplary life’ 
which consists “in a fullness of heart that does not exclude even the lowliest.”794 Nietzsche 
                                                             
792 In an interview, Jacques Derrida has commented: “In general, I try and distinguish between what one calls 
the Future and “l’avenir” [the ‘to come’]. The future is that which – tomorrow, later, next century – will be. 
There is a future which is predictable, programmed, scheduled, foreseeable. But there is a future, l’avenir (to 
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comments, the first regarding the language of direction (toward, aim, prepare, etc.) which is used in abundance 
in this thesis, and the second regarding the nature of the ‘future’. When it comes to the first, it was Aristotle who 
first recognized the human as a goal-oriented animal in his Nicomachean Ethics. In our first chapter we made 
the distinction between micro-goal activity (the activities of everyday life, e.g. wake up, make a coffee, read a 
book, etc.) and macro-progress ideologies (the ideologies of the ‘improvers of humanity’ who establish an 
heteronomous and dominating relation between the human and the ideologies who guide it). That the human is a 
goal-oriented animal does not contradict our thesis in the fourth chapter regarding the sovereign unproductivity 
of the Overhuman. The Overhuman directs itself toward a goal that nevertheless remains open. One conquers a 
height only to discover that there is another height to be conquered as well, or one conquers a height only to 
discover than then has to descend in order to ascend again to the following height. (I owe the imagery to 
Douglas Burnham from a private conversation) To our view the human is the animal which orients itself toward 
the infinite opening of the future. Anything else (an immovable animal, so to speak) would be absurd. This 
brings us to our second point, the ‘future’. Toward what is one who orients himself to the future directed? For 
us, the future does not indicate a closure, the place which one reaches after a long journey, but rather the 
opening. The opening refers to the event of the embrace of the radical indeterminacy of the human animal. The 
opening stays true to Nietzsche’s non-definition of the human as given in BGE: 62 (“humans are the still 
undetermined animals”). The opening wishes the (infinite) return of the human to the indeterminacy which 
constitutes it, without however giving up the task of opposing the history of morality and the institutions which 
have produced human animals so far. The difference between Derrida’s Other and Nietzsche’s Overhuman, 
then, is that while the former arrives totally unpredictably (and thus one – one individual, one culture – does not 
have to prepare for his arrival) the latter has been envisaged. The Overhuman places a great demand on us (He 
is not thus some kind of undemanding and loving father): the demand to resist the diminution and domestication 
of man which has lasted for too long. The Other stands in a passive relation to the history of humanity (He 
comes only to forgive, Derrida would say) whereas the Overhuman seeks to be actively involved in human 
history through acts of resistance that have to be undertaken by the warlike preparatory human beings (GS: 
283). For Derrida’s interview: Derrida. (Directors) Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman. Film. Jane Doe 
Films. 2002. I thank Professor David Webb for his valuable comments on this matter.  
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rightly detects
795
 that this attitude toward life could not have been achieved without the help 
of the most intricate part of community
796
, which is religion.  
One of the most wondrous things about this strange people, the Greeks, was that they had 
created for themselves a sort of religion which reflected and promoted their agonistic culture, 
a religion which was based on the multiple agons among Gods and humans while 
simultaneously lacking any extra-worldly moral order to which the individual and the 
community had unquestioningly to obey. Not democracy, as ‘modernity’ wants it, but (the 
specifically Greek form of) polytheism, is the crowning achievement of the Greek people, and 
it is only because of polytheism that all subsequent developments in the field of culture 
became possible in the Greek world. This is because polytheism generated and promoted a 
culture of agon from which not even the Gods are excluded. Polytheism’s “multiplicity 
always implies opposition. Hera against Zeus, Aphrodite against Artemis, Dionysus against 
Apollo.”797 Famously, Greek religion knows of no thou shalt not(s); the moral ‘management’ 
of the world is a matter of apportionment (moira) where both humans and Gods are supposed 
to respect the boundaries which guard each’s authority798. “What happens on the other side of 
the boundary does not affect [each God]”, the leading authority in Greek religion observes, 
and he continues: “Asylum attaches to the sanctuary … elsewhere one may murder. Man 
must chart a course between numerous claims and necessities; piety is shrewdness and 
caution. This, of course, gives polytheism its ability to embrace a richly various reality 
without evading contradictions and without being forced to deny a part of the world. What is 
more, man is left a sphere of freedom beyond the satisfied claims; for this reason law and 
ethics could develop among the Greeks as human wisdom, free and yet in harmony with the 
god; wise sayings and laws are engraved on temple walls, but they are always regarded as 
human endeavour, not divine revelation.”799 It is with Greek polytheism, then, that for the 
first (and last) time in the West, the possibility (Nietzsche calls it “the first great 
synthesis”800) of a free man is born; a man whose value is measured not by the level of his 
obedience but by the audacity of his revolt. Civilization is born and with it a man unruly, 
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797 Burkert, Walter. Greek Religion. John Raffan (trans.) London: Blackwell Publishing. 1985, p. 248 
798 This does not mean that Greeks ever actually respect these boundaries. The contrary is mostly the case. 
Homeric heroes constantly overcome divine boundaries, while the very beginning of civilization becomes 
possible only because of Prometheus’ profound defiance of Gods’ boundaries.   
799 Burkert, Walter. Greek Religion. Ibid. p. 248. See also GS: 143 
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stubborn, determined, but also culturally equipped to move flexibly among alternatives and 
strong enough to be able to incorporate within him the wholeness of the world’s experience. 
But a culture like that was not meant to endure. Endurance requires homogenization, and the 
multifariousness of Greek polytheism possibly broke down the forces which were kept in a 
constant state of agonistic (i.e. fragile) togetherness. Nietzsche has foreseen it: “the higher 
type represents an incomparably greater complexity – a greater sum of co-ordinated elements: 
so its disintegration is also incomparably more likely. The ‘genius’ is the sublimest machine 
there is – consequently the most fragile.”801 So the ‘fragile machine’ of Greek culture breaks, 
and with it the West enters into a long period of darkness which will give birth to a new type 
of the human as yet unprecedented upon the earth. 
Christianity represents the counter-ideal of the Greek world. As the successor to the Platonic 
idealization of a projected ‘meta’-natural world, Christianity knows only one path to 
salvation, and this path passes through negation, not affirmation. Christianity “has waged a 
war to the death against this higher type of person” [which the Greeks had created] by 
‘banning’ all forceful constituting instincts of this exemplary form of life and excluding them 
from the formation of its own ‘ideal’ human type.802 The old era which generated a ‘plurality 
of norms’803 gives way to Christianity’s new model of life, which is binary: here and there, 
nature and the Beyond, good and evil; the old model is deemed dangerous, perhaps even too 
difficult to follow. If the old piety required ‘shrewdness’, man’s utilization of all his forces 
and abilities in order to direct himself into the world, the new model required nothing more 
than blind obedience. An ethics of either/or is relatively easy and requires no special abilities.  
To be sure, the consequences of this decision are enormous and they have sealed the fate of 
humanity for many centuries to come. Nietzsche is clear that this unprecedented devaluation 
of life will not go unpunished.
804
 Humanity cannot just jump over its history and phantasize a 
future liberated from history. This would be an unforgivable return to idealism. There is 
simply not a post-historical stand from which one can view human history. Every stand is 
historical
805
. This naturally creates a significant problem both for Nietzsche, as the one trying 
to utter a discourse of and by the future, and for us as participants in his web of thought.  
Simply put: What does the Overhuman look like who stands not beyond history (for then we 
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805 Although there is always the possibility of an imminent end of history which will mark the end of the human 
endeavour upon earth. But beyond history is nothing and so it is of no concern to us. 
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would have to speak for an Overhuman theology, which in this work we did not) but at a 
historical point where he is to be considered humanity’s most cherished accomplishment and 
the consequence of another historical route? The millennia-long training of humanity in the 
school of depreciation of life has left present-day humans with no clear picture of what the 
future could look like after the demise of the Christian/Western paradigm. Nietzsche does not 
pretend that he can see beyond the cultural fog of today, and neither should we, since that 
would simply be hypocrisy. Nietzsche is, after all, as we all are, a decadent [décadent]
806
, and 
as such is implicated with the mechanisms of a culture which produces humans as sick and 
failed animals.
807
 But aside from decadent, he (but not necessarily we) is also “the opposite of 
a décadent”808 since he has trained himself in fruitful contests (i.e. contests that have been 
lost
809
), as well as in a profound disregard for the ideals of today.
810
 For these reasons he is 
able to express, even if only in a fragmentary and incomplete way, a vision concerning the 
future which remains, however, foreign to us, insofar as we are immersed in our cultural 
present and the conditions that made possible our sickness. We have tried to track this vision 
in this work, and we have worked throughout with the most basic of materials, since nothing 
concrete was given to us except for some thoughts on the need for new cultural principles, a 
few meditations on the political constitution of the future, some reflections on the 
psychological constitution of mankind, and finally an experiment in something other than 
time. Yet behind Nietzsche’s half-finished meditations lurks a persistence that is 
unprecedented in his work, as well as a deep concern for a thought that is destined to 
overcome the bounds of its cultural context and respond to needs primordial and yet also 
timeless. 
In a series of aphorisms
811
 Nietzsche has expressed the counter-ideal which the figure of the 
Overhuman exemplifies. The Christian/West is accused of forgetting the most important 
lesson that (Nietzsche’s) Greeks taught: that it is futile to try to eradicate some of the 
antithetical forces that constitute human existence in favour of some other forces which are 
deemed ‘good’ or ‘life-enhancing’ depending on their use by institutions. Instead of 
condemning the ‘other’, Nietzsche calls for a ‘reverse’ experiment where the ‘other’ will be 
incorporated into the main body of culture and, it is expected, will fertilize it and make it 
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809 See Chapter Four. 
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stronger and more dynamic. The Overhuman will encapsulate all those forces that have been 
forcefully made latent by the cataclysmic power of the Christian/Western paradigm, and will 
reappropriate on behalf of the earth what belongs to the earth — its most precious offspring, 
the human animal.
812
 This new ‘being’ is going to express forces that have not yet been 
expressed among living beings on earth. He is going to be the second great unity and 
synthesis. In this ‘being’ the most contradictory forces and the ‘greatest multiplicity of 
drives’813 will be concentrated. There is nothing new about this as a cultural ideal. The 
Greeks held it before, and since the demise of their civilization this ideal had been expressed 
here and there but always accidentally. Goethe was such a happy accident, and Napoleon 
another; and various artists and thinkers among the centuries have incorporated it. For 
Nietzsche the problem lies in how one safeguards the maintenance of the highest degree of 
forces while simultaneously protecting the oppositional core of their relation. Due to the 
fragility of the system (extreme pressure exercised by all forces involved), in the past this has 
been proved, in the long run, unattainable. Nietzsche suspects that the long-run sustainability 
of the system can be guaranteed only if the cultural and other institutions of any given society 
work toward the cultivation of those conditions which will eventually allow the strengthening 
of the system in such a degree so as to endure the high intensity of the forces involved
814
. In a 
Nachlass note from 1885, he sets the problem of the emergency of a setting of task(s) for the 
preparatory humans of today: “The great question and the great duty [Aufgabe] is coming 
closer, irrefutably, hesitantly, terrible as fate. How can the earth be managed as a whole? And 
toward which direction the human as a whole—and no longer a people, a race—will it be 
pulled and for what it will be bred?”815This is, then, the story of the institutional preparation 
of a future type of human which will achieve the double aim of the highest contradictions 
wedded to the highest degree of unity. The role of a culture and the role of humanity as a 
whole are to prepare the arrival of such a type. The measure of their worth is to be judged 
according to the degree of their dedication to the task. Nothing else matters
816
. 
To be sure, Nietzsche describes a process that belongs wholly to the future; not to the 
chronological future, but rather to an era after the overcoming of the current cultural 
conditions. It is highly doubtable that such an era will ever arrive. Certainly the state of our 
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cultural present shows no signs of any preparations underway. This is because the institutions 
which are supposed to prepare this future are still the victims and perpetrators of the forces 
that have brought about the demise of the human animal. Culture is still entertainment, 
democracy’s exclusive interest remains the idolization of the uneducated and ignorant 
masses, religious institutions still cultivate the human forces they find useful to their purposes 
and condemn every other opposing force, and finally humanity as a whole is still implicated 
in a movement of production toward a final goal largely coexisting with the grand movement 
of capitalist/materialist production, which aims at the final collapse of all contradictions and 
thus of all culture and all life on earth. In short, humanity is still too engulfed by the sickness 
that has made it possible to see beyond the ‘present’, onto a great health and to the new seas 
of a new universe.  
 
Recapitulation, achievements, limitations. 
  
Approaching the end of this investigation, we are obliged to pause and recall the main points 
of our research. In our introduction we charted the long history of the gradual exhaustion of 
humanist ideals in the West. This exhaustion made possible posthuman thought, an attempt to 
overcome the stalemates and limitations of humanism. Away from all transcendental truths, 
the human animal, which now slowly and with caution tries to come to being, attempts to 
assert for himself his right to an existence which is going to be directed and judged by his 
own immanent criteria, away from institutional and societal pressures or extra-worldly 
principles. In the chapters following our introduction, we have tried to identify the specific 
steps that must be taken for comprehension of the Nietzschean trajectory.  
The quest for the Overhuman led us to examine the cultural presuppositions of such a 
possible genesis in our first chapter. Distancing ourselves from the Platonic and Christian 
ideals regarding the body-less and personality-less approach to truth, we tried to get back to 
what Nietzsche has called the ‘closest things’ [nächsten Dinge]817 and to begin our 
examination of the problem of the Overhuman not from some imaginary projection of what 
the true and the right should look like, but from the living flesh of the one who directs 
himself in the world. To that end, we examined the genesis of the possibility of the 
philosopher as that being which unites the forces scattered in various cultures and makes 
                                                             
817 WS: 16 
219 
 
possible the changing of the now-stale Western paradigm, which is based in the idolization of 
abstractions over and above the realities of individuals living in dynamic environments. 
Young Nietzsche, under the influence of Wagner, paid particular attention to the way a 
culture has to organize itself in order to become the womb for the creation of the exceptional, 
which means for the creation of that which will leave survival behind and sail toward the 
uncharted seas of life. We must guard ourselves from such “superfluous teleological 
principles”818 as that of self-preservation. The Overhuman belongs to another paradigm and 
must be judged by its own criteria, not by the principles of the past. In our first chapter we 
also examined a popular misconception regarding the thought of the Overhuman. In an age 
like ours, where everything becomes easier, some have thought that Nietzschean 
posthumanity will have to relate itself to the scientific advancements of the day. The 
transhumanists have argued that the posthuman ought to leave suffering behind
819
 and 
embark on a life enhanced by the support of sciences. We have argued that Nietzsche would 
attack transhumanists’ dreams from at least two directions. First, Nietzsche, far from 
abolishing ‘grave suffering’, prescribes what he calls ‘great suffering’ [des Grossen 
Leidens]
820, and considers it to be “the sole cause of every enhancement in humanity so 
far”.821 Great suffering not only shields individuals against the great hardships of life, but 
additionally is what creates depth in human animals, and thus the possibility of creating a 
‘soul’ for themselves, as Nietzsche has argued in GM: II, 4. But Nietzsche also accuses 
science of being the latest manifestation of the ‘ascetic ideal’, and it is thus unable to provide 
an alternative to posthuman aspirations
822
. We are in need of those who create values. 
Science does not create values; it is only in the service of those holding power. It has by itself 
no moral significance.  
In our second chapter, we attempted to present and explain Nietzsche’s dismissal of 
democracy and his subsequent prioritization of a hierarchically structured society which will 
stand over and above the equalizing effects of modernity. We argued that, despite his 
occasional disparaging comments against Hegel
823
, Nietzsche adapts from him the higher role 
that great individuals are destined to play in human history, and also the necessity of a type of 
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justice suitable only to them, instead of the universalizable principles of slave morality 
enforced in modern societies. We then tried to shed light on Nietzsche’s term Grand politics 
and argued that his early aspirations regarding the rejuvenation of culture are transferred into 
his later meditations regarding the application of a type of politics beyond the petty 
nationalisms of the 19
th
 century and the morals of the democratic masses. In the second part 
of our chapter, we juxtaposed the modern liberal democratic model against what we have 
argued to be Nietzsche’s distinct contribution to political philosophy: agonistic power. We 
showed the particular way that Nietzsche understands the agon, and also that Nietzschean 
power is always agonistic and subsequently relational. Away from the pipedreams of 
domination and imposition, we argued that societies organised under the model of agonistic 
power will achieve distance from the West’s democratic heritage without succumbing to 
barbarism.  
In our third chapter we tried to make sense of Nietzsche’s more ambitious but also 
frustratingly underdeveloped work, the Genealogy. Genealogy bears certain similarities to the 
work of Sigmund Freud. Both Nietzsche and Freud seek to detect the genesis of the human 
animal in a moment of conflict. For both of them, the human is the result of the tremendous 
forces exercised upon it, which has as a consequence the genesis of a being that finds 
nutrition in its antithetical moment of origin. Because of his origins, the human animal, rather 
than a seeker of stability and happiness, is a being bred by its contradictions and existing only 
because of them. In our presentation of the three essays constituting the Genealogy, we have 
tried to bring to light this model of the human to which both Nietzsche and Freud ascribed. 
We have tried to show the multiple moments of conflicts, interactions, and necessary 
coexistences that haunt Genealogy throughout, and to argue that the human of tomorrow will 
necessarily have his roots in its long and tumultuous history. In short, we have tried to show 
the importance of being fully human in order to be Overhuman.
824
 
In our final chapter we have shown the many ways in which the work of intellectual, writer, 
and ‘excrement philosopher’825 Georges Bataille meets, but also illuminates, Nietzsche’s 
work. Bataille has conceived a cosmos which gloriously consumes itself, and that act of self-
consumption marks its very moment of sovereignty. Through Bataille, we were able to make 
                                                             
824 The allusion is here to the remarkable Nachlass note from 1883: “One must also be perfect as a beast if one 
wants to be perfect as a human being.” [KSA: 10: 4 [94]. Translation belongs to Graham Parkes from: 
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm.  Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Graham Parkes (trans.) Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 2005, p.293 
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sense of Nietzsche’s multiple statements regarding the contradictory forces at work in the 
thought of the return, and moreover we were able to advance a theory according to which 
Nietzsche, rather than a proponent of some blurry, whining mentality, becomes the martyr for 
a type of life that achieves its highest affirmation at the moment of its glorious self-
annihilation. The human to which Nietzsche aspires, then, becomes the human who lives with 
a profound disregard for the preservation of his biological or other existence. He becomes a 
human who does not ‘save and conserve’, but rather consumes his wealth, since only the 
child’s play that humans ought to rediscover in themselves matters. After all: “αἰὼν παῖς ἐστι 
παίζων, πεσσεύων· παιδὸς ἡ βασιληίη.”826    
But what is our own contribution to Nietzschean studies, and specifically to the problem of 
the Overhuman, that we tried to tackle in this thesis? This work was originally conceived as a 
result of our frustration with the state of Nietzschean scholarship, which for the most part 
exhibits a hard-to-understand shyness when it comes to discussing the problem of the 
Overhuman in Nietzsche’s work. Social and historical conditions (the misuse of Nietzsche by 
the Nazis, the Hollywood simplifications, the unquestioned political status quo—democracy, 
liberalism, equality—in the West, etc.) can perhaps explain the problem, but certainly cannot 
be a continual excuse. It is certainly true that Nietzsche never developed a systematic theory 
on the problem of the Overhuman, which functions as a ‘blanket term’ for an array of 
attitudes, characteristics, and theories that Nietzsche ascribes to the cultural model that he 
hopes will replace the current one. Despite the diffusion of Overhuman thought in 
Nietzsche’s work, we have argued that the Overhuman is not just one of the many 
Nietzschean ideas, but rather is what Heidegger would call his ‘single thought’ which gives 
(some) coherence to his work and illuminates aspects of it that otherwise would be 
incomprehensible. We have argued that Overhuman thought permeates every aspect of 
Nietzsche’s work and that the cultural model that the Overhuman inaugurates is present in 
Nietzsche’s most diverse meditations, from cultural criticism to politics and from morality to 
the metaphysics of time. Every thought of Nietzsche, every aphorism of his, every meditation 
is constructed in such a way as to function as an open window to a future which will come 
only after the radical critique of the present. Nietzsche’s thought is overhuman through and 
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through, without, however, being post-human
827
, since the Overhuman sublates humanity; he 
does not overshoot it. 
In addition to our main concern, which was to establish the centrality of the Overhuman in 
Nietzsche’s thought, we have also made a series of contributions to the various issues 
discussed in this thesis. In our first chapter we have argued that culture plays a major role in 
the thought of early Nietzsche, since it is only through a radical change in the way cultural 
institutions function that another type of a human animal can be produced in the future. We 
have also demonstrated that Nietzsche should not be associated with the proponents of the 
all-too-timely faith in the latest manifestation of the ascetic ideal, i.e. science. That science 
alleviates human misery could perhaps in some cases be true, but this is not what interests 
Nietzsche. Unfortunately, Nietzsche does not believe that the overcoming of nihilism will 
come through some latest discovery in the field of techno-science. His work concerns values 
and the creators of values. His struggle is to make these creators possible.  
In our second chapter we have demonstrated Nietzsche’s radical critique of democracy and 
the institutions associated with it. By placing Nietzsche in the company of Kant and Hegel, 
we have shown that his critique bears certain similarities to the thoughts of his most unlikely 
allies, the German idealists. We have argued that Nietzsche’s contribution to political 
philosophy can be a very valuable one. An overhuman politics, which is going to replace the 
petty politics of the slaves, is going to be a politics based on the dynamic of a perpetual 
conflict, not on the negotiation of differences in favour of the liberal dream of security. We 
have argued that Nietzsche wishes nothing to be secure, nor to aim to security. In recent years 
a number of theorists
828
 have tried to apply agonistics (the placement of conflict at the heart 
of political process) to modern day politics. To a Nietzschean this would be a welcome move, 
were it not for their unwillingness to question the ground upon which they stand, i.e. the post-
French Revolution democratic status quo. Rather than maintaining the status quo through 
little acts of defiance, we argued that Nietzsche organises a full blown attack against the 
whole paradigm of the West. One who dares such an outrageous attack understandably 
“breaks the history of humanity in two”.829  
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In our third chapter we argued that the Genealogy is one of the prominent places where the 
problematic over the Overhuman takes place in Nietzsche. There, more than in any other text 
of his, Nietzsche argues for the centrality of the human in any discussion concerning the 
Overhuman. We have argued that with his Genealogy Nietzsche proves Robert Musil’s 
suggestion
830
 concerning the coexistence of features and characteristics which, depending on 
the particular way of their utilization, give birth to forces capable of both creation and 
annihilation. The Genealogy proves that human complexity is so deep and multifarious as to 
force the entire history of the past (the history of the domestication of the human animal) to 
become also the vitalizing force of the story of the future (the story of the liberation of the 
human from the fetters of slave morality). We have argued that Genealogy’s force lies in 
proving a paradox. Sickness becomes the precondition of health, of great health. 
Our fourth chapter has presented what we believe to be a novel approach to the overall 
significance of Nietzsche’s work. We sought to ‘read between the lines’ of the Nietzschean 
oeuvre and to present a Nietzsche that celebrates Zarathustra’s gift to the humans and turns it 
into the very heart of his own thinking. We argued that with the thought of the return, 
Nietzsche seeks to overcome the productive time of the West. This is a time which produces 
both humans and things with no regard for their ontological difference, a time that has turned 
humans into telos-seeking machines, where this telos is manufactured by the dominant 
ideological forces of techno-capitalism: that of slave morality and accumulative economy. 
There is no telos, though. Like Cronus, man devours time and spits back to earth his wasteful 
product. Humans are this waste. This is their sovereignty.  
As is understandable, a thesis which seeks to embrace most of the main parts of a thinker’s 
body of work inevitably will fall into the hermeneutic circle. That is, because the thought of 
the Overhuman is so broad and covers many ideas, thoughts, and visions for the future, it is 
simply not possible for a writer to cover adequately every aspect of the subject under 
examination. That would require experts from all fields of Nietzschean studies. Inevitably, 
then, one has to accept one’s (personal) limitations and subsequently the limitations of one’s 
work. However, a weakness can also be the strength of one’s work. Because the Overhuman 
is such a general term, the examination of the part, what is usually expected in an academic 
thesis, would inadequately address the vision of the whole, which the Overhuman is. Instead, 
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then, of losing the whole, and thus our very subject as well, it was the intention of this thesis 
to attempt to address the whole, even if that meant the imperfect treatment of the parts. One 
of the many diseases proliferating in the academic world is that the exhaustive treatment of 
specific parts forces one, in the best of cases, to lose sight of the whole, let us say, 
philosopher under examination; and in the worst of cases, to turn the results from the 
examination of the parts to a general view of the whole. In the case of such an anti-systematic 
thinker as Nietzsche, this would be catastrophic. Let us take an example to illustrate our 
point. A researcher concentrating on Nietzsche’s notion of the agon often faces the difficulty 
of elevating Nietzsche’s 1872 findings (made under specific influences, addressed toward a 
specific audience, within the limits that academy and his role as university philosopher 
imposed upon him) to some kind of well-founded system that Nietzsche presumably held 
uninterrupted throughout his life. This Nietzsche would be then a Nietzsche who glorified 
contest and the winning mentality of the competitors involved — a Nietzsche for whom the 
repetition of the Greek agonistic model (a model existing only in the heads of the researchers 
who have invented it
831
) is to be the only source for inspiration concerning the future. In our 
fourth chapter, but also throughout this work, we have argued that Nietzschean thought 
harbours many contradictory ideas that create multiple perspectives on any given issue. 
Perhaps we should, with good conscience and without embarrassment, stop talking for 
Nietzsche and start talking for Nietzsche(s) and their ideas, Nietzsche(s) and their visions.  
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the Asiatic Dionysus perhaps escapes the logic of commentators. Those who read Nietzsche know better though. 
When will you understand the Greeks “in a Greek way [einmal griechisch]”? Nietzsche wonders. Most 
probably, never. For Tuncel see: Tuncel, Yunus. Agon in Nietzsche. Wisconsin: Marquette University Press. 
2013, particularly Chapter One. For a nice response to Tuncel see: Dodds, E.R. The Greeks and the Irrational. 
London: University of California Press. 1951. Nietzsche’s question is to be found in: HC: p.95 
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But then again, is it not the case that Nietzsche is so big as to ‘contain multitudes’832, which 
we are not ready to comprehend?  
Apart from the problem of circularity, a series of issues would have benefited by a more 
extended treatment, if it was not for the space restrictions imposed upon us, but also for the 
personal inability of the writer to deal with every problem raised throughout the writing of 
this work. In that sense, an extended study concerning Nietzsche’s early understanding of the 
role of culture in relation to the process of the production of Overhuman animals is yet to be 
written, alongside a systematic treatment of Nietzsche’s understanding of the limits of natural 
sciences regarding the activity of human animals. Whereas Nietzsche’s critique of democracy 
is well-built in our work, questions are still raised concerning the applicability of our 
proposal to the politics of conflict which is to replace the present state of liberal democracy. 
Indeed, Nietzsche and our suggestions sound so foreign to our liberally trained ears that the 
threat of being isolated as idiosyncratic or downright barbaric always looms in the horizon. 
Connected to that problem, one also has to deal with the problem of the legitimising sources 
of the future philosophers-legislators and the instigators of Nietzsche’s reverse experiment in 
politics, which was only partly dealt with here. When it comes to the constitution of the 
human, as was exemplified in our necessarily sketchy treatment of the Genealogy, further 
work is needed in the field of the genesis of the soul out of the practice of punishment and the 
role played by it in future forms of human associations. The dramatic role of the instigator of 
the slaves’ revolt in morals, the priest, and what his presence means for the history of 
humanity, has not been adequately dealt in this work and further research is urgently needed. 
Finally, we are only at the beginning of the realization of the connection between the 
metaphysics of time and the productive character of capitalism. The work of Max Weber was 
only the foundation of work that has yet to unfold. In our research we have only touched on 
the many consequences of a possible shifting of our cultural paradigm. It is the work of future 
philosophers to try to articulate the precise conditions of the disengagement of man from his 
transcendental signifier (God, hope, time, telos, etc.) and the formulation of an immanent 
praxis of living. We have done our best to honour our share. 
 
                                                             
832 Perhaps nothing expresses Nietzschean thought better than Walt Whitman’s poem ‘Song of Myself’ with its 
celebrated lyrics: “Do I contradict myself? Very well, then I contradict myself, I am large, I contain multitudes”. 
Whitman’s poem to be found in: http://rpo.library.utoronto.ca/poems/song-myself [Accessed: 04/10/2014] 
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Incipit Vita 
 
Until recently philosophy was no more than a long history of necrophilia. “All that 
philosophers have been handling for thousands of years is conceptual mummies; nothing real 
has ever left their hands alive.”833 Plato was the first to characterize philosophy as 
‘meditation on death’ [μελετη θανατου]834. This is the foundation of our dear vocation. 
Through the victory of Christianity, the whole of the planet was turned into an ‘ascetic 
star’835, and philosophers became the apologists of this life-denying culture. We have been 
systematically trained to believe in the necessity of some future redemption, of some hope, of 
rewards awaiting us at the end, or rather after the end, of our biological existence. We have 
learned to accept, to endure and to obey: the story of humanity in three verbs. How ironic, 
really, that at the end, and for all their arrogance, philosophers came to walk on the side of, if 
not fully ideologically supporting, what Nietzsche has called the ‘kingdom of the mob’ [das 
Reich des Pöbels]
836
, an unholy coalition of slaves, nationalists, money-making, and 
happiness-seeking last humans. Philosophy for too long has dedicated itself to the pursuit of 
the ‘ideal of today’.837 As for the philosophers? Philosophers have spent too much valuable 
time and have lost too much energy in trying to answer a nonsensical question: How do we 
die? For all of his simplifications, and his rather annoying optimism, Epicurus was right: “So 
death, the most frightening of bad things, is nothing to us; since when we exist, death is not 
yet present, and when death is present, then we do not exist.”838 By concentrating on what 
they cannot talk about, philosophers have left unexamined the most important question: How 
do we live? The history of the response to this question is yet to be written. It is the history of 
the future and belongs not to philosophy, which has been inseparable with death, but to a 
thinking liberated from the necrophilic instincts of the philosophic tradition. Nietzsche 
inaugurates this thinking. The future will tell whether humanity is up to the challenge of this 
thinking.  
                                                             
833 TI: ‘Reason’ in Philosophy 
834 Plato, Phaedo in: Plato. Phaedo. In: Cooper, M. John (ed.) Plato – Complete Works G.M.A. Grube (trans.) 
Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. 1997, 81a 
835 GM: III, 11 
836 TSZ: The sorcerer  
837 BGE: 212 
838 Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, in: Inwood Brad (trans. & Ed.) The Epicurus Reader – Selected Writings and 
Testimonia. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 1994, p. 29 
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Until that day, the final day
839
, το Σάββατο των Σαββάτων840, where existence will be 
realigned to the movement of the cosmos, Nietzsche advises: “To wait and to prepare oneself; 
to await the emergence of new sources; to prepare oneself in solitude for strange faces and 
voices; to wash one’s soul ever cleaner from the marketplace and dust and noise of this age; 
to overcome everything Christian through something supra-Christian…to rediscover the 
South in one and to spread out above one a bright, glittering, mysterious southern sky; to 
reconquer southern health and hidden powerfulness of soul; step by step to become more 
comprehensive, more supranational, more European, more near Eastern, finally more Greek – 
for the Greek was the first great union and synthesis of everything Near Eastern, and on that 
account the inception of the European soul, the discovery of our “new world”: whoever lives 
under such imperatives, who knows what he may not encounter one day? Perhaps – a new 
day! [Vielleich eben – ein neuer Tag!]”841 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
839 Allow us, for once, the messianic tone. 
840 ‘The Saturday of all Saturdays’ meaning the final Sabbath in Christian theology where Christians will rest 
from the hardships of earthly existence and Time itself will be completed with the second revelation of Christ.  
See: Φλωρόφσκυ, Γεωργίου, Οι Βυζαντινοί Ασκητικοί και Πνευματικοί Πατέρες. (Μετάφραση Παναγιώτη Κ. 
Πάλλη). Εκδόσεις Πουρναρά. Θεσσαλονίκη 1992, σελ. 302 - 308). 
841 WP: 1051. KSA: 11:41 [7] 
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